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ABSTRACT
The dissertation research examined four research questions. First, the question of 
w hether or not imagery processing could be m easured was addressed. It w as assum ed that 
mental imagery does exist and can be measured in three dimensions: quality, quantity, and 
elaboration. Support for this assumption is provided by the psychometric properties of the scale 
developed to  m easure Imagery processing in concert with the support toward nomological 
validity of the construct that w as provided by applying the scale in an experiment.
Second, antecedents to  mental imagery were examined, namely, the imagery-eliciting 
strategies of pictures and instructions to  imagine, and their effects on consequence variables of 
memory, beliefs, attitudes, and intentions. A range of pictures was examined instead of simple 
pictures versus words. Also, it w as shown that Including instructions to  imagine within m essage 
stimuli was more effective than not including instructions to  imagine within m essage stimuli for 
several consequence variables studied.
Pictures included in a  print advertisement enhanced brand attitudes; more specifically, 
concrete pictures resulted in greater brand attitudes than either abstract or no pictures. More 
positive attitudes toward the advertisement were evident from concrete pictures as  opposed to 
abstract pictures. Instructions to  imagine enhanced inferred beliefs and attitudes.
Third, the moderating role of processing preference on relationships between imagery- 
eliciting strategies and consequence variables and between imagery-eliciting strategies and 
dimensions of imagery processing was examined. This hypothesis was not supported.
Fourth, the mediating role of imagery processing on relationships found between 
imagery-eliciting strategies and consequence variables w as examined. When the mediating role 
of imagery processing, specifically elaboration and quality, w as examined, relationships between 
imagery-eliciting strategies and consequence variables were completely or partially explained by 
those dimensions. Thus, further understanding of the effects of imagery-eliciting strategies in a 
print advertising context is provided.
xii
CHAPTER ONE 
OVERVIEW OF THE TOPIC AND RESEARCH
INTRODUCTION
The dissertation research examined imagery-eliciting strategies in advertisements. More 
specifically, the research:
1. addressed measurement of mental imagery as the central
research issue;
2. examined antecedents to mental imagery;
3. examined individual differences that may influence relationships
between antecedents and consequence variables and between 
antecedents and mental imagery; and
4. studied effects of mental imagery on memory, beliefs, attitudes, and 
intentions.
Mental imagery is defined as "a process by which sensory information is represented in 
working memory" (Maclnnis and Price 1987, p. 473), and it is typically in the absence of genuine 
and perceptual counterparts (Richardson 1969). While several studies have attributed results to 
mental imagery, very few have attempted to assess imagery processing evoked by a stimulus.
This chapter provides an overview of the topic and the dissertation research.
Specifically, the prevalent research paradigm is discussed followed by research questions 
addressed by the dissertation. A brief description of the dissertation research design is 
presented next. Finally, contributions and limitations of the dissertation research are discussed.
Prevalent Research Paradigm
A stimulus-response paradigm has been adopted in most imagery research, especially in 
psychology. Thus, variables believed to be high in imagery content (i.e, pictures or concrete 
words) were manipulated and effects on memory or learning were measured. It was assumed 
that imagery was the explanatory construct causing the results. However, no measurement of
1
imagery was typically performed. While these studies can easily be criticized for lacking 
construct validity, it is important to  point out that most of these studies were performed in the 
1970’s when construct validation was not routinely performed In studies. Studies performed in 
the 1980’s  have attempted to substantiate this assumption by including scales to  measure 
imagery processing, especially in marketing.
More researchers in marketing have tried expanding the stimulus-response paradigm to 
a  stimulus-organism-response paradigm in which attempts have been made to measure the 
presence of imagery processing. These attempts have been haphazard and inconsistent in 
nature. Researchers in psychology have not neglected scale development altogether; indeed, 
considerable effort has been put forth in developing scales, but such efforts have concentrated 
on measuring individual differences in imagery processing or spatial ability rather than imagery 
processing itself. The dissertation research adopted a  systematic program for developing a 
measure of imagery processing by following the paradigm set forth by Churchill (1979) and 
recommendations given in Anderson and Gerbing (1988).
As in most stimulus-response applications, the prevalent research design has been an 
experiment. As will be discussed in Chapter Two, most imagery experiments in psychology 
have concentrated on the superior effect of pictures over words and concrete words over 
abstract words in memory studies. Consequently, the majority of imagery studies in marketing 
have utilized an experimental design (exceptions include Gould 1990; Maclnnis and Price 1990; 
Rethans and Hastak 1982; Smith, Houston and Childers 1984).
In contrast to experiments in psychology, however, several marketing studies have 
examined dependent variables other than memory. For instance, Bone and Ellen (1990), Burns, 
Biswas, and Roach (1991), Dickson, Burnkrant, Minlard, and Unnava (1986), Edell and Staelin 
(1983), Gregory, Cialdini, and Carpenter (1982), Holbrook and Moore (1981), Kisielius and 
Sternthal (1984), Oliver, Robertson and Mitchell (1989), Rossiter and Percy (1978; 1980), and 
Wright and Rip (1980) have all studied attitudes as dependent variables. Even though several
marketing studies have concentrated on the relationship between imagery and memory (e.g., 
Childers and Houston 1984; Childers, Houston, and Heckler 1985; Gardner and Houston 1986; 
Houston, Childers and Heckler 1987; Lutz and Lutz 1977; Rethans and Hastak 1982; Robertson 
1987), It is evident that studies have incorporated expanded areas of interest; indeed, Maclnnis 
and Price (1990) have even studied the relationship between imagery and consumer satisfaction. 
However, no studies have examined the relationship between either the level of elaboration of 
imagery processing and memory or the level of elaboration of imagery processing and attitudes. 
Maclnnis and Jaworskl (1989) propose that high-elaboration processing results in self-generated 
persuasion, and consequently, stronger attitudes. This is a research gap that was addressed by 
the dissertation research.
RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Research questions that prompted the dissertation research were stimulated from the 
review by Maclnnis and Price (1987) and from research gaps that became evident after review of 
previous imagery studies. They focus on measurement of imagery processing, factors in an 
advertisement that influence mental imagery processing, impact of individual differences, and 
effects on memory, attitudes, and intentions. Specifically, the dissertation research sought to 
answer the following questions, and each is elaborated on below:
1. Can imagery processing be measured?
2. Do various imagery-eliciting strategies used alone and in 
combination in print advertisements differentially impact Imagery 
processing?
3. Is imagery processing subject to individual differences in 
processing preferences?
4. What are the effects of imagery processing on awareness, 
beliefs, attitude toward the ad, attitude toward the brand, and 
intentions?
Assessment o f Imagery Processing
The question of whether or not imagery can be measured is open to criticism on two 
accounts. First, and most extreme, it could be argued that no mental process can be measured 
adequately with verbal responses because individuals are unable to tell us what they know or 
how they think (Nisbett and Wilson 1977). Second, it could also be argued that verbal scales 
are inappropriate for measuring nonverbal phenomena (Holbrook, Chestnut, Oliva and Greenleaf 
1984; Maclnnis and Price 1987; Sheehan et al. 1983). Thus, an individual must translate a 
nonverbal process into a verbal response. As an example of an attempt to overcome this, 
Holbrook et al. (1984) combined verbal and nonverbal reference points in a scale to measure 
processing style. Each item contained a stimulus (a word or picture) and an anchor (a word or 
picture), and subjects were asked to place a check closer to the anchor that was more strongly 
associated with the stimulus. However, this is still primarily verbal and does not adequately 
overcome the last criticism. Nevertheless, pencil and paper tests to assess imagery processing 
have been developed, which represent the best alternative possible at the present time.
Imagery-Eliciting Strategies
Maclnnis and Price (1987) discuss four imagery-eliciting strategies: pictures, concrete 
words, instructions to imagine, and guided imagery (more applicable in clinical applications). 
These were compiled from reviews by Lutz and Lutz (1978) and Alesandrlni and Sheikh (1983), 
and these reviews, in turn, were compiled primarily from the psychology literature. Paivio (1970) 
enumerates the typical types of imagery manipulation as concrete stimuli, instructions, and 
selection of subjects based on individual imagery capability. Rossiter (1978) also lists these as 
three basic ways for advertisers to take advantage of mental imagery. Finally, Wollman (1981) 
discusses the use of guided imagery in studying social psychological phenomena. In sum, there 
is a substantial base of literature that shows that there are different types of imagery-eliciting 
strategies. However, with the exception of Slee (1978), no studies have examined whether there
are differences among these strategies. Slee examined the differences among the use of 
concrete words, instructions to imagine, and individual differences as imagery-eliciting strategies 
and found that each type of strategy caused different effects on memory.
While guided imagery may not be realistic in an advertising context, the remaining three 
strategies enumerated by Maclnnis and Price (1987) are viable alternatives for print 
advertisements and could be compared separately and in combination to determine the impact 
on memory and brand attitudes. In a normative paper, Rossiter (1978) boldly states, "high 
imagery visuals work far better than instructions to imagine" (p. 102). He bases this assertion on 
Slee’s (1978) work, whose study, however, did not compare high imagery visuals (i.e., pictures) 
to instructions to imagine. Furthermore, Rossiter never states what high imagery visuals work 
better for - recall? attitude? This is not specified. Thus, it is apparent that empirical investigation 
seems warranted to address the question of the relative efficacy of alternative imagery-eliciting 
strategies.
Style o f Processing
Style of processing is an individual difference variable, and several scales exist to assess 
this variable. It was hypothesized in the dissertation that a presentation format that was 
congruent with an individual’s preferred style of processing would amplify effects of imagery- 
eliciting strategies, particularly for individuals preferring a  visual styie of processing. While this 
variable has been included in several marketing studies as a  predictor variable (e.g., Gould 1990; 
Holbrook et al. 1984; Maclnnis and Price 1990; Oliver et al. 1989; Rossiter and Percy 1978) or as 
a moderator (Burns et al. 1991, 1992; Childers and Houston 1984), results have been mixed. 
Thus, consistent with extant studies, the dissertation research included style of processing as a 
moderator between imagery-eliciting strategies and consequence variables and between 
imagery-eliciting strategies and dimensions of imagery processing.
Consequence Variables
While memory plays an important role in brand awareness, beliefs, attitudes, and 
intentions are also major communication effects for advertising research (Rossiter and Percy 
1983, 1987). Brand attitudes are believed to be the precursor to behavioral intention, and hence, 
actual behavior. Thus, consequence variables studied in this research included beliefs, attitudes 
(brand attitude and attitude toward the advertisement), and behavioral intentions in addition to 
awareness.
Consequence variables examined in the dissertation research are consistent with 
previous imagery studies. As will be seen in Chapter Two, with respect to imagery studies, 
memory has been the dominant dependent variable, especially in the psychology literature. 
However, several studies in marketing have also examined the effect of an imagery-eliciting 
strategy on recall and recognition of brand names (e.g., Childers and Houston 1984; Childers et 
al. 1985; Houston et al. 1987; Lutz and Lutz 1977; Robertson 1987) or message recall (Gardner 
and Houston 1986). Finally, several studies in marketing have examined the impact of some 
imagery-eliciting strategy on attitude toward the product or brand (e.g., Bone and Ellen 1990; 
Burns et al. 1991, 1992; Dickson et al. 1986; Edell and Staelin 1983; Gregory et al. 1982; 
Holbrook and Moore 1981; Kisielius and Sternthal 1984; Mitchell 1986; Mitchell and Olson 1981; 
Oliver et al. 1989; Rossiter and Percy 1978, 1980; Wright and Rip 1980), and subsets of these 
have also examined the impact on attitude toward the ad (e.g., Bone and Ellen 1990; Burns et 
al. 1991, 1992; Mitchell 1986; Mitchell and Olson 1981), behavioral intentions (e.g., Burns et al. 
1991, 1992; Dickson et al. 1986; Edell and Staelin 1983; Gregory et al. 1982; Kisielius and 
Sternthal 1984; Mitchell 1986; Mitchell and Olson 1981; Rossiter and Percy 1878, 1980; Oliver et 
al. 1989), and actual behavior (e.g., Gregory et al. 1982).
THE DISSERTATION RESEARCH
Following the stimulus-organism-response framework of Maclnnis and Price (1987), 
antecedent, moderating, processing, and consequence variables were studied In a  print 
advertising context. Specifically, an experiment was conducted in which two imagery-eliciting 
strategies were manipulated: pictures and instructions to imagine. Levels of pictures included a  
concrete/interactive picture, a concrete/noninteractive picture, an abstract picture, or no picture. 
The instruction manipulation involved embedding instructions to imagine within m essage stimuli 
or not including instructions at all. As will be reviewed in Chapter Two, several studies have 
manipulated one of these strategies in a given experiment, but none have examined the range of 
pictures examined in the dissertation or have effectively examined embedding instructions to 
imagine within message stimuli.
Style of processing was proposed as a  moderating variable between relationships of 
imagery-eliciting strategies and consequence variables. Two published scales were utilized to 
assess this variable.
In contrast with several previous studies, a scale was developed to measure presence 
and elaboration of imagery processing. Dimensions of imagery processing were proposed, and 
a scale was developed to measure those dimensions.
Consequence variables examined in the experiment included awareness, beliefs, attitude 
toward the brand, attitude toward the advertisement, and intentions. Awareness was analyzed 
independently from attitudes and intentions, for the relationship between memory and attitudes is 
equivocal (Srull 1989); indeed, examination of this relationship alone could be another 
dissertation. Consequence variables studied in the dissertation research have been studied 
extensively in other imagery studies, and measures followed those previously used.
CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE RESEARCH
The major contribution of the dissertation research was the systematic attempt to  
develop a  scale to measure imagery processing. By integrating past efforts where possible, this 
scale can serve as a base  for future research. Furthermore, with the exception of Ellen and 
Bone (1991), previous scale attem pts have failed to  specify the domain of the construct and to 
propose dimensions of Imagery processing. Finally, psychometric properties of the m easures 
were assessed , and support toward nomological validity of the m easures was provided by the 
final experiment. Thus, support toward construct validity of the mental imagery construct was 
provided.
A second contribution holds implications for advertisers. First, it was found that 
embedding instructions to imagine within m essage stimuli resulted in stronger beliefs inferred 
from the m essage as well as more positive attitudes toward the brand and advertisement. 
Second, this research gives advertisers a better understanding of which combination of stimulus 
characteristics are relatively more effective for print advertisements. It w as found that including 
a  picture in a  print advertisement enhanced attitudes, but concrete pictures were superior to 
abstract pictures.
Finally, it was found that quality and elaboration of imagery processing effectively 
mediated relationships between imagery-eliciting strategies and consequence variables. Thus, 
empirical support w as given for theoretically-based hypotheses.
LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH
Like any mental process, it is difficult to  measure imagery processing, and the use of 
verbal reports is subject to  limitations and criticisms. Furthermore, use of verbal reports to 
m easure a nonverbal process is also subject to  criticism. However, this method is in line with 
extant practices, and these criticisms were tempered by a  systematic attempt to m easure this 
construct.
Second, due to the nature of the stimuli, there is no way of knowing for sure if the 
manipulation caused the effect or something else in the ad did. Thus, there is a potential for 
criticism because it is difficult to control for other ad aspects. Kisielius and Sternthal (1984) 
discuss this problem and point out that many of the studies that have used relatively realistic 
advertisements are open to this criticism. However, there is a trade-off, and it has also been 
suggested that more natural settings for research are called for in imagery research (Maclnnis 
and Price 1987). To mitigate this criticism, strict adherence to good experimental design to 
assure internal validity was adopted in this research.
Third, some of the insignificant results reported in Chapter Four may have been due to 
the experimental procedure followed. Thus, improvements for future research are discussed in 
Chapter Five.
Finally, the assumptions of the study can be criticized. The experiment was necessarily 
an artificial situation in which subjects were highly motivated to process the ad information. 
Additionally, "real" ads were not used for the study. That is, a fictitious product name was used, 
and the print advertisements were black and white, not four-color glossy print advertisements 
such as those found in magazines. However, the prints ads were consistent with past research, 
and they were used under the cover story of early advertisement development. The dissertation 
study also used undergraduate students as respondents, which may be considered a  criticism 
by some. However, the dissertation was concerned with a mental process, not necessarily 
application, so a  homogeneous sample was required (Calder, Phillips, and Tybout 1981). 
Therefore, the use of undergraduate students was acceptable. However, one can only 
generalize results to this population for the type of product (automobiles) used in the study.
STRUCTURE OF THE DISSERTATION
This chapter has provided a brief overview of the dissertation research. Chapter Two 
provides an extensive literature review of constructs examined in the dissertation. Conceptual
and empirical literature from both psychology and marketing is reviewed. Chapter Three 
outlines the dissertation study as well as methodology fotlowed. A conceptual framework, 
hypotheses, and details concerning experimental stimuli development, experimental design, 
experimental procedure, sample, manipulation checks, and measurement of variables is given in 
Chapter Three. Considerable detail concerning how measures assessing dimensions of imagery 
processing were developed, evaluated, and refined is given in Chapter Three, also. Chapter 
Four presents results of hypotheses tested with the final experiment data. Finally, discussion, 




In this chapter, conceptualization, measurement, and empirical studies of imagery are 
reviewed. Following this introduction, the chapter is organized into eleven sections.
First, a  working definition of imagery is given. While several types of imagery have been 
defined, thought (or memory) imagery is relevant to the dissertation. Thus, the definition of 
imagery utilized in the dissertation research is based upon this type of imagery.
Second, an  overview of gaps in imagery research provides a  preview of the constructs 
a s  well a s  their m easures and empirical studies including them. This section se ts the stage for 
the rest of the chapter.
Third, a  brief history of imagery research is provided. Imagery research in psychology is 
not new by any means, but it has only enjoyed increased attention in marketing during the last 
decade.
Fourth, four imagery-eliciting strategies are reviewed, two of which were manipulated in 
the dissertation research. The strategies are conceptualized in this section, and studies utilizing 
the strategies of interest to  the dissertation research are reviewed in the eighth through the tenth 
sections.
Fifth, constructs and m easures of individual differences in imagery processing are 
reviewed since the dissertation used style of processing as  a  moderating variable. Individual 
differences in imagery processing represent an individual trait, and they have been 
conceptualized as imagery ability, imagery content, and processing style. Each individual 
difference variable is reviewed with respect to conceptualization, measures, and applications in 
empirical studies, and the rationale for including processing style instead of one of the other 
individual difference variables in the dissertation research is provided.
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The sixth section reviews measurement attempts of imagery processing. This construct 
differs from individual differences because it may be influenced by an imagery-eliciting 
communication regardless of ability or preference. As will be seen, there is a definite need for 
conceptual and scale development of this construct.
Seventh, empirical studies investigating awareness (recognition and/or recall) as a 
dependent variable are reviewed. A large number of studies has examined one of these 
imagery-eliciting strategies and awareness. General findings and marketing applications are 
reviewed for those studies manipulating pictures or instructions to imagine, respectively.
Eighth, empirical studies examining beliefs as dependent variables are reviewed. 
However, very few imagery studies have done so, and alt of them have been marketing 
applications.
The ninth section is similar to the seventh, except attitudes as dependent variables are 
reviewed. Again, general findings and marketing applications manipulating pictures or 
instructions to imagine are reviewed.
In the tenth section, a  review of imagery studies examining behavioral intentions as a 
dependent variable is provided. However, not many studies have done so, but those studying 
intentions have also investigated attitudes (c.f., Anderson 1983).
Finally, the last section involves a summary of the entire chapter as well as conclusions 
that can be drawn from the review. While several studies are reviewed throughout the chapter, 
this section highlights the important conclusions relevant to the dissertation research.
DEFINITION OF MENTAL IMAGERY
One of the problems in imagery research has been the confusion over what mental 
imagery means. Some researchers treat imagery as a process in short-term, or working, 
memory, while others treat it as a representation of how information is structured in long-term
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memory. This section will define how imagery was applied in this research, which provided the 
foundation for how imagery was conceptualized and measured.
Holt (1964) offers definitions of principal types of imagery. In general terms an image is 
defined as, "a generic term for all conscious subjective presentations of a quasi-sensory but 
nonperceptual character" (p. 255). He then defines eleven other specific types of imagery, such 
as thought imagery, phantom limb, hypnogogic images, hallucinations, and dream images. 
Thought imagery is relevant to this research, and is defined as follows:
Thought imagery is a faint subjective representation of a  sensation or perception 
without an adequate sensory input, present in waking consciousness as part of 
an act of thought. Includes memory images and imagination Images; may be 
visual, auditory, or of any other sensory modality, and also purely verbal (p.
255).
As such, a thought image is a purely natural mental process that can be, and most likely is, 
experienced by any individual (Betts 1909). This is in contrast to the other types of imagery.
For example, phantom iimb imagery refers to an individual experiencing an image or sensation 
of an amputated limb, or hallucination is often referred to as an illusion and is not common to 
most individuals.
In concert with Holt (1964), Richardson (1969, pp. 2-3) provides a comprehensive
definition of mental imagery:
Mental imagery refers to (1) all those quasi-sensory or quasi-perceptual 
experiences of which (2) we are self consciously aware and which (3) exist for 
us in the absence of those stimulus conditions that are known to produce their 
genuine sensory or perceptual counterparts, and which (4) may be expected to 
have different consequences from their sensory or perceptual counterparts.
However, he later states that the fourth characteristic is inadequate due to evidence indicating 
that consequences from self-initiated thought imagery and their genuine sensory counterparts 
appear to be indistinguishable (Richardson 1983).
Richardson (1969) also provides a classification, albeit an arbitrary one, of four types of 
imagery. The first type of imagery is referred to as after imagery. This type of imagery involves
a prolonged or intense stimulation of one or more senses followed by sensorylike consequences 
when the actual stimulation ceases. For example, for a time after being on a boat one still 
experiences the motion of the rocking boat. The second type of imagery is eidetic imagery.
This is similar to what has often been referred to as photographic memory. Thus, an individual 
experiencing this type of imagery is able to form an image of such clarity that it seem s real.
This type of imagery has usually been reported in children (Holt 1964), The third type of 
imagery is imagination imagery. Richardson points out that the content of this type of imagery 
may be more intense and unexpected as well as unconnected with any identifiable memories 
from one’s past. Thus, this type of imagery is usually experienced by individuals undergoing 
sensory deprivation or taking hallucinogenic drugs and is not applicable to this research. The 
final type of imagery enumerated by Richardson is memory imagery, which is also referred to as 
thought imagery (e.g., Holt 1964), This type of imagery holds the most relevance for the present 
research in that voluntary thought imagery can be stimulated by instructions from oneself or 
from another. Thus, some kind of quasi-sensory or quasi-sensory perceptual experience from 
long-term memory can be brought into working memory by an individual and possibly 
elaborated upon by using one’s imagination. This type of imagery has also been the basis of 
most imagery research in cognitive psychology and in marketing.
Definitions of imagery in the marketing literature are consistent with the definitions of 
thought imagery given in the psychology literature. For example, Lutz and Lutz (1978, p. 611) 
define imagery as "a mental event involving visualization of a concept or relationship.” Maclnnis 
and Price (1987, p. 473) define imagery as "(1) a process (not a structure) by which (2) sensory 
information is represented in working memory." Thus, like discursive processing (i.e., symbolic, 
language-like information processing), imagery is considered as a mode of processing 
information and ranges from low- to high-elaboration depending on the extent to which 
information in working memory is integrated with information stored in long-term memory 
structures (Maclnnis and Price 1987). However, unlike discursive processing, imagery can be
15
multi-sensory. Thus, imagery can involve images made up of sight, smell, taste, sound, and 
feeling sensations.
In sum, the definition of imagery adopted for this dissertation research is consistent with 
that espoused by Maclnnis and Price (1987) and Richardson (1969):
Mental imagery is  a process by which sensory  information is represented in
working memory in the absen ce of genuine and perceptual counterparts.
Memory and imagination play a significant role in determining how elaborate imagery processing 
will be (Maclnnis and Price 1987). Elaboration implies incorporating additional information or 
details, either from one’s memory or imagination. If an individual forms an image in his/her 
mind but does not add additional information from long-term memory or does not elaborate 
further on the image, then the individual is engaging in low-elaboration mental imagery. 
Conversely, if memories of events from long-term memory are added to the image or if the 
image is further expanded upon by using one’s imagination, then the individual is engaging in 
high-elaboration mental imagery. Thus, a major goal of this dissertation research is to measure 
the relative elaboration of mental imagery undertaken by an individual as a  result of being 
exposed to various imagery-eliciting strategies.
While imagery processing is the main focus of the dissertation research and the idea of 
imagery processing is accepted in the literature, the issue of how knowledge is represented in 
long-term memory wilt not be addressed. Some theorists (e.g., Anderson 1978; Pylyshyn 1973, 
1981) claim that knowledge is represented solely by verbal propositional networks, whereas 
others (e.g., Bugelski 1983; Kieras 1978; Kolers 1983; Kosslyn 1975) argue that knowledge can 
also be stored as images. This debate is still unresolved in the psychology literature, and 
Anderson (1978, p. 249) states, "barring decisive physiological data, it will not be possible to 
establish whether an internal representation is pictorial or propositional." Furthermore, since 
imagery processing is concerned with working memory and only draws information from long­
term memory, this debate is irrelevant to the dissertation research.
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OVERVIEW OF GAPS IN IMAGERY RESEARCH
The following review will serve to substantiate several gaps in imagery research which 
are addressed in the dissertation. These gaps are:
1. measurement of imagery processing;
2. inclusion of individual differences in processing style as a moderating variable in 
imagery studies;
3. examination of the effects of pictures and instructions to imagine on memory,
attitudes, and intentions in the same study;
4. examination of brand attribute beliefs as a consequence variable; and
5. examination of instructions to imagine embedded within a m essage stimulus
rather than externally provided by the experimenter.
The major gap in imagery research has been the conceptualization and measurement of 
imagery processing, which the dissertation addressed. Next, two imagery-eliciting strategies, 
pictures and instructions to imagine, have not been examined within the same study. Finally, 
most studies investigating instructions to imagine have provided these instructions externally to 
the message stimulus. However, from an advertiser’s standpoint, it would be useful to examine 
the impact of instructions to imagine embedded within message stimuli.
In the following review, each of the constructs in the dissertation are explained, and 
empirical studies examining them are reviewed. Furthermore, rationale for the inclusion or 
exclusion of constructs is provided. First, however, a brief history of imagery research is 
provided.
BRIEF HISTORY OF IMAGERY RESEARCH
Holt (1964) provides a thorough history which will be recapitulated in this section. 
Basically, the history of imagery research has undergone three distinct eras that have mirrored 
developments in psychology (Holt 1964): concentration on introspection, banishment of 
mentalistic concepts, and "return of the ostracized."
Prior to and around the turn of the twentieth century, psychology concentrated on the 
science of mind in an introspectionist era, and imagery was given a great deal of attention. The
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primary task of psychology from this perspective was to describe and explain the mind, and 
imagination a s  well as memory, thinking, and perception played major roles. Through the 
examination of one 's  own thoughts and feelings, subjects gave information to the psychologist, 
who then studied them on an N of one - himself (Holt 1964).
During the years 1901-1908, however, studies carried out at Wurtzburg lead to  the 
conclusion that introspection was fruitless as It yielded nothing that made any sense (Holt 1964). 
Thus, prior to World War I, researchers ventured into an  era that was not founded on the study 
of consciousness: behaviorism and psychoanalysis. Both were concerned with behavior, and 
both assum ed that conscious descriptions of mental content did not explain anything.
According to the behaviorist perspective, then, the primary task of psychology becam e to 
describe and explain objective observable behavior on subjects other than oneself. Thus, 
mentaltstic topics such as imagery had no place in this era.
Holt enum erates several factors that have lead to the re-emergence of imagery during 
the 1950’s  and 1960’s, which he refers to as the “return of the ostracized." These factors 
include:
1. practical problems, especially when individuals such as  pilots on long distance
flights or radar operators required to stare at scopes for long periods of time
began to hallucinate causing potential for serious accidents;
2. accounts of individuals confined in concentration camps;
3. increased usage of hallucinogenic drugs;
4. relatively normal people reporting seeing unidentified flying objects;
5. advances in brain research (Holt reported that some researchers were able to
drill a hole in a  subject’s head under local anesthesia and, while applying an 
electrode to the exposed cortex, were able to cause the subject to 
spontaneously describe an event from their past);
6. most individuals hallucinate in their sleep; and
7. the change in psychological thinking.
The last factor, the change in psychological thinking, has spurred an increase in cognitive 
research. Thus, psychology is now in an era in which model construction of the processing 
organism has become the primary task. Indeed, this is evident from the increased interest in 
artificial intelligence to simulate human thought.
The contemporary background of imagery studies in psychology can be divided into 
experiential and behavioral considerations (Richardson 1983). The majority of the factors listed 
above fall under experiential considerations; that is, images becam e something to  explain. 
However, the move has been more toward behavioral considerations, such as learning, in which 
imagery is used as  an explanatory construct. Thus, imagery has becom e an independent 
variable of interest. This will becom e evident as  the review of the literature will reveal how 
imagery has been used to explain the picture superiority effect and concrete word superiority 
over abstract words in memory research. The behavioral direction has also been adopted in the 
marketing literature.
While the 1970’s  and early 1980’s  saw the greatest increase in imagery research in 
psychology, imagery has only becom e an independent variable of interest during the past 
decade in marketing studies. Maclnnis and Price (1987) enum erate several fruitful areas of 
research in which imagery is applicable. For example, they propose that imagery is likely to 
have effects on consum er problem framing, probability assessm ent and satisfaction, and 
purchase intentions and purchase timing. Furthermore, they posit that imagery can becom e a 
consumption experience.
An advertising context also appears to lend itself well to  imagery applications. Lutz and 
Lutz (1977), in one of the earliest applications of imagery to marketing phenomena, used 
imagery in advertisements. In a review of imagery-eliciting strategies, they also speculate that 
uses of imagery in advertising are made in several decision areas, such as advertising design, 
media selection, measuring advertising effectiveness, and advertising regulation and public 
policy (Lutz and Lutz 1978). Finally, review of the marketing literature will also reveal the 
increased interest of imagery in advertising research.
IMAGERY-ELICITING STRATEGIES
Mental imagery is generally thought to be elicited by one of four types of strategies, 
which are external treatment variables: (1) pictures; (2) concrete words; (3) instructions to  
imagine; and (4) guided imagery (Alesandrini and Sheikh 1983; Lutz and Lutz 1978; Maclnnis 
and Price 1987). Each of these strategies will be defined and described below along with 
explanations concerning why two of the strategies, concrete words and guided imagery, were 
not manipulated in the dissertation research.
Pictures
Pictorial material is defined as  "any two-dimensional representation in which the stimulus 
array contains at least one element that is not alphabetic, numeric, or arithmetic" (Lutz and Lutz 
1978, p. 611). As such, photographs, drawings, and illustrations fall under the rubric of pictures.
It is believed that pictures influence the process of mental imagery (Bugelski 1983;
Paivio 1971; Rossiter 1978; Shepard 1967). The picture superiority effect, which implies that 
visual information tends to be remembered over verbal information, has been explained through 
Imagery by Paivio’s (1986) dual code theory. The theory posits that not only do pictures 
activate a visual encoding process, but they also activate a  verbal encoding process. Moreover, 
the visual code is thought to be qualitatively superior to  the verbal code. Thus, two retrieval 
paths can be activated at the time of recall, which increases recall. Words, on the other hand, 
most likely only activate a  verbal encoding process, thus resulting in poorer recall. However, 
words can also stimulate mental imagery, and this is discussed under concreteness of wording.
Pictures can be classified according to the level of concreteness and the degree of 
interaction depicted. Concreteness can range from very concrete and realistic to abstract 
(Rossiter and Percy 1983). A concrete picture is one that is easily identifiable of a  person, place, 
or object, whereas an abstract picture is one that is not easily identifiable (Rossiter and Percy
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1983). For example, an advertisement containing a realistic picture of a product is more 
concrete than one that contains a silhouette.
The elements within a  picture can also be interactive or noninteractive in nature (Lutz 
and Lutz 1977, 1978). An interactive picture is one in which a person and/or objects are 
figurally integrated in such a manner as to be associated in some mutual or reciprocal action, 
whereas a noninteractive picture depicts the items side by side (Alesandrini and Sheikh 1983). 
Since it is unusual for an abstract picture to contain interactive elements, an interactive or 
noninteractive picture is first considered a concrete picture. Thus, concrete pictures can be 
interactive or noninteractive, and abstract pictures are simpiy that, abstract.
Concrete Words
Concrete words are more likely to elicit a mental image in the mind of the reader 
because of their higher "imagery value" than abstract words. By asking readers to rate words 
with respect to their ease of arousing sensory images, imagery values have been established for 
nouns (Paivio, Yuille, and Madigan 1968), for verbs (Lippman 1974), and for 1,000 frequently- 
used words (van der Veur 1975). For example, it is easier to form an image given the concrete 
word "dog" than it is given the abstract word "justice." There is substantial evidence indicating 
the positive effects of concrete words on memory (Paivio 1969).
Concreteness of wording was not manipulated in the dissertation research for three 
reasons. First, there is a large body of evidence corroborating the superiority of concrete words 
over abstract words for memory applications and a few for attitude applications. This research 
is summarized in Table 2.1. Second, as can be seen from Table 2.1, most studies that have 
manipulated the concreteness of wording have also manipulated another imagery-eliciting 
strategy (e.g., instructions to imagine or pictures). Finally, it is unrealistic that practical 
applications of advertisements would utilize abstract wording. Indeed, in a normative paper, 
Rossiter (1978, p. 101) states, "High imagery words should be used in advertising." Therefore,
T ab le  2 .1
EM PIRICAL STU D IES M ANIPULATING CO N C R ETEN ESS OF W ORDING








Study 2: (n = 28 undergraduates)
1) sentence list (concrete; redundant)
2) type of modifier (concrete; redundant)
(n = 20 blind, 20 deaf, & 40 normal 
undergraduates)
1) concreteness of words (concrete; 
abstract)
2) subject group (blind; deaf; normal)
(n = 72 undergraduates)
1) type of stimulus (abstract word; concrete 
word; picture)
2) processing task (structural; phonemic; 
semantic)
3) response judgement (yes; no)
(n = 48 undergraduates)
1) instructional set (imagery; rote repetition)
2) word imagery value (low; high)
3) interpolated task activity (none; figures; 
numerical; word category)
Studies 2 & 3: (n2=48; n3 = 18 
undergraduates)
1) enactive imagery ratings of pair (high- 
high; high-low; low-high; low-low)
Concrete modifiers led to better recall.
All groups exhibited greater recall of high-imagery than 
low-imagery words, but normals exhibited far greater 
recall of low-imagery words than the other groups.
Recall increased as a direct function of the processing 
task variable only under the concrete word condition.
Recall performance was greater for high imagery words 
than low imagery words.
In both studies, the number of words recalled was 




EMPIRICAL STUDIES MANIPULATING CONCRETENESS OF WORDING
Source Independent Variables Relevant Results
McKelvie & Demers 
(1979)
(n =70 high schoolers)
1) imagery ability (low; high)
Stimuli were abstract nouns, concrete 
nouns, and pictures.
High visualizers recalled more concrete and abstract words in 
immediate test than low visualizers, but they recalled more 
concrete words for 1-week recall.
Paivio & Csapo (1969) Study 1: In=96 undergraduates)
1) stimulus concreteness (pictures; 
concrete words; abstract words)
2) memory task (immediate memory span; 
free recall)
Study 2: (n = 192 undergraduates)
- same as Study 1 except addition of 2 
memory tasks (serial learning; recognition 
memory
Both pictures and concrete words greater recall and 
recognition than abstract words. The order of effectiveness 
was pictures > concrete words > abstract words in serial 
learning and in both nonsequential tasks.
Peterson & McGee 
(1974)
Study 1: (n = 64 undergraduates)
1) instructions (imagery; rote repetition)
2) imagery rating of nouns (low; high)
Studies 2 & 3: (n2 = 64; n3 = 192 
undergraduates)
1) number of dictionary meanings (few; 
many)
2) instructions (imagery; rote repetition)
3) imagery rating of nouns (low; high)
High imagery word pairs led to greater recall.
Robins, Bray, Irvin, & 
Wise (1974)
(n = 60 undergraduates)
11 instructions (interactive-imagery; 
separation-imagery; rote repetition)
2) imagery rating of nouns (HH; HL; LH; LL)
Interactive-imagery instructions led to superior recall only 
with high-imagery cues
Table 2 .1  (Continued)
EMPIRICAL STUDIES MANIPULATING CONCRETENESS OF WORDING
Source Independent Variables Relevant Results
Slee (1978) Study 1: (n =40 undergraduates)
1) concreteness of nouns (abstract; 
concrete)
2) instructions (imagery; verbal)
3) imagery ability (low; high)
Concrete nouns produced greater recall than abstract nouns.
Wittrock & Goldberg 
(1975)
Study 1: (n=48 undergraduates)
1| instructions (imagery; story; sentence; 
control)
2) imagery value of noun (low; high)
3) meaningfulness of word (low; high)
Study 2; (n=48 6th graders)
• same as Study 1
For both studies, high imagery words had greater recall, 
regardless of instructions.
Study 1; Meaningfulness adds to recall when imagery rating 
is high.
Study 2: Meaningfulness more important for the children 
than the adults in Study 1.
Wortman & Sparling 
(1974)
(n=36 undergraduates)
1) concreteness of stimuli (abstract; 
concrete)
2) instructions (bizarre images; common 
images; verbal connections)
Concrete stimuli better recalled than abstract stimuli in 




(n = 60 undergraduates)
1) concreteness of wording (concrete; 
abstract)
2) brand familiarity (familiar; unfamiliar)
Concrete wording led to more positive attitudes toward the 
advertisement and brand.
Robertson (1987) (n=69 undergraduates) More high imagery brand names recalled and recognized in 
1) imagery rating of brand names (low; high) both 1-hour and 2-day recall and recognition.
T ab le  2 .1  (C o n tin u ed )
EMPIRICAL STU D IES M ANIPULATING CO N CR ETEN ESS O F W ORDING
Source Independent Variables Relevant Results
Rossiter & Percy (n = 88 non-student adults) Strongest attitude elicited by combination of strong visual
(1 9 7 8 ,1 9 8 0 ) 1) visual (strong; weak) and concrete copy.
2) advertisement copy (concrete; abstract)
3) imagery ability (verbal; visual) - 1 9 7 8  
study only
only concrete copy was utilized as experimental stimuli, which is in concert with other 
researchers (e.g., Bone and Ellen 1990; Dickson et al. 1986; Edell and Staelin 1983; Kisielius and 
Sternthal 1984).
Pictures and Words Hierarchy
Rossiter and Percy (1983) derived from the literature a  hierarchy of advertising stimuli, 
given pictures and words, ranked in terms of memorability. This hierarchy Is reproduced in 
Table 2.2. While they included video, print, and audio stimuli, the hierarchy for print stimuli is 
applicable to the dissertation research. Specifically, the hierarchy from most to least effective is:
1. Static concrete pictures
2. Static abstract pictures
3. Static concrete sentences or phrases
4. Static concrete words
5. Static abstract sentences, phrases, or words
In general, this hierarchy indicates the superiority of pictures, concrete or abstract, over words in 
memory applications. This also shows the superiority of concrete over abstract stimuli. The 
dissertation, however, will expand this hierarchy by including interactive and noninteractive 
concrete pictures and another imagery-eliciting strategy, namely, instructions to imagine.
Instructions to Imagine
This imagery-eliciting strategy is a  more direct way to encourage imagery processing 
than the two previously discussed strategies. Typically, instructions to imagine have involved the 
experimenter giving instructions to the recipient to form mental images, especially in empirical 
studies in psychology. Subjects are told to "form a mental picture..." or to "picture yourself in 
the situation." These instructions, however, are not part of the stimuli the subject is required to 
learn or remember, which is impractical from an advertising standpoint.
Embedding instructions to imagine within a message stimulus is a viable alternative for 
advertising. A few researchers have analyzed the effects of embedding instructions to imagine
Table 2.2
HIERARCHY OF ADVERTISING STIMULI RANKED 
IN TERMS OF MEMORABILITY (AWARENESS)
1. Dynamic concrete pictures (video)
2. Static concrete pictures (print)
3. Dynamic abstract pictures (video)
4. Static abstract pictures (print)
5. Dynamic concrete sentences or phrases (audio)
6. Dynamic abstract sentences or phrases (audio)
7. Dynamic concrete words (audio)
8. Dynamic abstract words (audio)
9. Static concrete sentences or phrases (print)
10. Static concrete words (print)
11. Static abstract sentences phrases or words 
(print)
Source: Rossiter and Percy (1983), "Visual Communication in Advertising," in Information 
Processing Research in Advertising. Richard J. Harris, ed. Hillsdale, NJ: 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associations, p. 105.
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within a promotional message (e.g., Burns et al. 1992; Bone and Ellen 1990; Gregory et al. 1982; 
Wright and Rip 1980), but results have been mixed. However, as  will be discussed, some of the 
manipulations have been Inadequate and could have been the cause of poor results.
Paivio (1971) reviewed several studies on experimenter-provided mental imagery 
instructions and concluded that such instructions facilitate learning. Another advantage of 
instructing the viewer to form their own mental image as opposed to providing a picture for 
them is that the self-generated mental imagery will probably be more personally relevant. This 
could result in self-generated persuasion and stronger attitudes (Maclnnis and Jaworski 1989). 
While Rossiter (1978) states, "high imagery visuals work far better than instructions to imagine," 
no adequate empirical study has been performed to test this hypothesis. Thus, there is a  need 
to assess the relative efficacy of instructions to imagine embedded within a  message stimulus.
Guided Imagery
Wollman (1981) discusses the employment of "guided imagery" to study social 
psychological phenomena. This strategy resembles methods used in clinical applications and is 
not practical in an advertising context for several reasons.
First, subjects must participate in relaxation exercises, which includes the suggestion 
that the forthcoming imagery they experience should be lifelike. This step requires considerable 
time and effort from both experimenter and subject alike. Second, subjects go through several 
guided-imagery exercises to become accustomed to the imagery experience. Third, subjects 
are then guided through an imagery situation concerning the phenomenon the experimenter is 
interested in. Finally, a dependent measure is taken. In sum, the imagery experience is used to 
supplant the actual behavior because it may be too impractical or costly to study the actual 
behavior.
Even though Maclnnis and Price (1987) include guided imagery as an imagery-eliciting 
strategy that may be useful to consumer researchers, it does not appear to be practical in an
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advertising context, particularly print advertisements. Thus, this imagery-eliciting strategy was 
not included in the dissertation research.
Summary
In this section, four imagery-eliciting strategies have been described: (1) pictures; (2) 
concrete words; (3) instructions to imagine; and (4) guided imagery. Two of these strategies 
were manipulated in the dissertation research. Specifically, pictures were manipulated ranging 
on a continuum of concrete/interactive, concrete/noninteractive, abstract, and no picture. 
Instructions to imagine were either embedded in the m essage stimulus or absent from the 
message stimulus. Concreteness of wording was not manipulated, but the message stimulus 
consisted of concrete copy. Finally, it was argued that guided imagery is impractical for 
advertising applications in general and print advertisements in particular.
CONSTRUCTS AND MEASURES OF INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 
IN IMAGERY PROCESSING
Individual differences in imagery processing have received attention in a number of 
studies. The areas of interest are studies of individual differences in (1) spatial ability, (2) 
imagery ability, (3) imagery content, and (4) processing style. These dimensions of individual 
differences have been studied both for their direct and indirect roles on the processing of 
information. A summary of these studies is provided in Table 2.3, and it can be seen that the 
majority have treated individual differences in imagery ability, imagery content, and/or 
processing style as a  predictor variable. Typically, these individual differences have been 
assessed, not manipulated. However, the dissertation research included individual differences 
in processing style as a moderator between the relationship of the antecedents (imagery-eliciting 
strategy) and the relevant dependent variables. These studies, as well as the scales that have 
been used to measure the individual difference variable of interest, will be discussed below.
Table 2.3




Variable (Measurement) Relevant Results
Burns, Biswas, & 
Roach (1991) 
(marketing)
1) processing style (SOPa: used visual 
and verbal components separately)
Visual dimension of style of processing was 
significant as moderator for attitude toward 
the advertisement and intentions.
Childers & Houston 
(1984) (marketing)
1) imagery vividness (VVIQb)
2) visual imagery control (Gordon's VICe)
3) processing style (VVQd)
None of the individual difference variables 
had an effect.
Childers, Houston, & 
Heckler 1985) 
(marketing)
1) imagery vividness 
(VVIQb: alpha = .84 & .85)
2) visual imagery control 
(VICe: alpha = .72 & .76)
3) processing style
(VVQd: alpha = .57; SOP1: alpha = .88)
SOP significantly related to both aided recall 
and recognition. Negative correlation 
indicates that retention was strongest among 
verbally-oriented processors.




1) imagery content (IPl“) Neurotic-anxious absorption in daydreaming 
decreased with increasing age.
Gould (1990) 
(marketing)
1) processing style (SOP*: alpha for 
visual = .67; verbal = .77)
High verbals and high processors tend to be 
less involved with TV and more involved with 
books.
High processors were more involved with 
magazines than high verbals or high visuals 
alone.
High visual and high processors were more 
likely to visualize or plan a shopping trip and 
to be most publicly and privately self- 
conscious. rv>to
T ab le  2 .3  (C o n tin u e d )




Variable (Measurement) Relevant Results
Holbrook, Chestnut, 
Oliva, & Greenleaf 
(1984) (marketing)
1) processing style (V/V Index') Individual differences in processing style did 
not have an effect on performance.
More favorable emotional response to a 
match between style of processing and game 
format.
Maclnnis and Price 
(1990) (marketing)
1) tendency to engage in vivid imagery 
(alpha = .83)
2) use of imagery to plan future (alpha = .78)
3) tendency to engage in fantasy (alpha = .56) 
(All measured with modified IPI°)




1) visual imagery vividness (VVIQb: test- 
retest = .74; split-half = .85)
Subjects who reported vivid visual imagery 
were more accurate in recall than those who 
reported poor visual imagery.
McKelvie and Demers 
(1979) (psychology)
1) visual imagery vividness (VVIQb) High visualizers better than low visualizers on 
all three types of items (abstract and 
concrete words; pictures) in short-term recall, 
but they were only superior on the concrete 
words and pictures in long-term recall. Both 
groups performed equally well on recognition 
test.
Oliver, Robertson, & 
Mitchell (1989) 
(marketing)
1) imagery vividness (VVIQb: alpha = .87)
2) processing style (SOP*: alpha = .63)
Only processing style was marginally 
positively related to imaging.
COo
T ab le  2 .3  (C o n tin u e d )




Variable (Measurement) Relevant Results
Rossiter & Percy 
(1978) (marketing)
1) processing style (VVQd) Visualizers showed greatest degree of 
affective learning overall. The relationship 
between visual imaging preference and brand 
attitudes induced by visually-oriented ads 
appears to hold only for the combination of 




1) imagery vividness (Betts' QMI°) Vivid imagers accurately reproduced the 
stimulus as they perceived it. Familiarity with 
the object imagined makes for more vivid 




1) visual imagery ability (8etts* QMI°: visual 
section only
Imagery ability had no effect on recall of 
either words or pictures.
*SOP - Style of Processing Questionnaire (Childers, Houston, and Heckler 1985) 
bVVIQ - Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (Marks 1973)
‘Gordon's VIC - Gordon's Test of Visual Imagery Control (Richardson's (1969) version) 
dVVQ - Visualizer-Verbalizer Questionnaire (Richardson 1977)
•IPI - Imaginal Process Inventory (Singer and Antrobus 1963)
'V/V Index - Visualizer/Verbalizer Index (Holbrook, Chestnut, Oliva, and Greenleaf 1984)
"Betts' QMI - shortened form of Betts' Questionnaire Upon Mental Imagery (given in Sheehan 1967)
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While there has been a  dearth of acceptable m easures of imagery processing per se, there has 
been considerable effort in the development of scales measuring individual differences on one of 
the dimensions mentioned above. These scales are summarized in Table 2.4 with the exception 
of scales of spatial ability. While there are several scales of spatial ability (e.g., Bennett, 
Seashore, and Wesman 1947; Likert and Quasha 1970; Thurstone 1938; Thurstone and Jeffrey 
1956), these are not included in Table 2.4 because they have been found to be insignificantly 
correlated to  imagery ability measures (Sheehan et al. 1983) and have rarely been applied in 
imagery studies.
Imageiy Ability
Imagery ability refers to vividness and controllability of an individual’s  mental imagery 
(Maclnnis 1987). Vividness refers to clarity of mental imagery, while control implies an 
individual's ability to perform manipulations such as mental rotations (Childers et al. 1985).
These dimensions focus on one’s cognitive ability as the determinant of type of processing 
strategy evoked. Ability has typically been treated as a predictor variable (e.g., Childers et al. 
1985; Marks 1973; McKelvie and Demers 1979; Oliver et al. 1989; Slee 1978) or as a covariate 
(e.g., Childers and Houston 1984; Sheehan 1966), but results have been mixed. Before 
discussing these studies, a brief description of scales that have been used to measure imagery 
ability is warranted.
Scales of Imagery Ability. Three scales have been widely used to measure imagery 
ability, two of which concentrate on imagery vividness. The oldest established scale developed 
to  measure imagery vividness was developed by Betts (1909), and a  shortened version was 
developed by Sheehan (1967). From the visual portion of Betts’ (1909) questionnaire, Marks 
(1973) developed the Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (WIG) to  measure visual 
imagery vividness. Finally, Gordon (1949) developed a test of imagery control, which has been 
revised by Richardson (1969).
T ab le  2 .4
SCA LES O F INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN IMAGERY ABILITY/PROCESSING
Scale and Authors Description of Scale
Scales o f imagery vividness:
Betts Questionnaire Upon Mental Imagery 
(QMI): Betts (1909); Sheehan (1967)
Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire 
(VVIQ): Marks (1973)
Betts' version: 150 items investigating imagery in 7 modalities: visual, auditory, 
cutaneous, kinaesthetic, gustatory, olfactory, organic.
Sheehan's version: 35 items to measure imagery vividness in same 7 modalities. 
An extended 16-item version of the QMI visual imagery subscale.
Scale o f imagery control:
Gordon's Test of Imagery Control (VIC): 
Gordon (1949); Richardson (1969)
Scale o f imagery content:
Imaginal Process Inventory (IPi):
Singer & Antrobus (1963); Huba et al. (1982)
Scales o f processing style:
Verbalizer-Visualizer Questionnaire (VVQ): 
Richardson (1977)
12-item test to differentiate autonomous from controlled visual imagery. 
Richardson revised it with a true/false or unsure response format.
2 of the 28 scales relevant to imagery:
Visual Imagery in Daydreams & Auditory Imagery in Daydreams 
Huba et al.'s shorter version taps imagery vividness and use/usefulness of imagery 
in various applications.
8 items tapping visual processing and 7 items for verbal processing utilizing a 
true/false response format.
Style of Processing Questionnaire (SOP): 
Childers et al. (1985)
Visualization/Verbalization Index (V/V Index): 
Holbrook et al. (1984)
11 items tapping verbal preference and 11 tapping visual preference utilizing a 4 
response format.
10 items utilizing both pictorial and verbal anchors for each item.
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Betts' Questionnaire Upon Mental Imagery (QMI) consists of 150 items investigating 
imagery vividness in seven modalities (visual, auditory, cutaneous, kinaesthetic, gustatory, 
olfactory, and organic), but Sheehan’s (1967) version was reduced to  35 items to measure 
imagery vividness in the sam e seven modalities (five items per modality). For example, in the 
visual modality, respondents rate the visual clarity of the sun as it drops below the horizon on a 
7-point response scale with (1) indicating the image as perfectly clear and a s  vivid as the actual 
experience and (7) indicating no imagery present. In a  review, Maclnnis (1987) reports that this 
scale has attained test-retest reliabilities ranging from .59 (for longer intervals) to  .91 and 
reliability coefficients ranging from .91 to .95.
Marks’ (1973) Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (WIQ) is an extended 16-item 
version of the visual imagery subscale of the QMI because the QMI was often improperly used 
to predict performance on visual tasks (Maclnnis 1987). This measure is designed to specifically 
assess  vividness of visual images. A 5-point scale is used to indicate vividness of familiar 
scenes that are visualized. Test-retest reliabilities range from .67 to .74, and reliability 
coefficients range from .84 to .96 (Maclnnis 1987). As can be seen from Table 2.3, the WIQ has 
been used more frequently than the Betts QMI, which is mostly due to its concentration on 
visual imagery vividness.
Gordon’s Test of Visual Imagery Control (VIC, 1949; Richardson 1969) is a  12-item test 
to differentiate autonomous from controlled visual imagery. The original version consisted of a 
yes/no only response format, but Richardson (1969) revised it with a  true/false or unsure 
response format and shortened it to 11 items. Respondents are asked if they can see various 
modifications on images of an object. For example, they are asked to visualize an automobile, 
then to picture it standing at a garden gate or to picture it lying upside down. Test-retest 
reliabilities range from .83 to .84, and reliability coefficients range from .64 to .95 (Maclnnis 
1987). If imagery control is measured, this is the scale that has been used.
Studies of Imagery Ability. Most studies of imagery ability have examined a memory 
variable (i.e., recall and /o r recognition) as  the dependent variable, and results are equivocal.
For example, Childers and Houston (1984) included imagery vividness (WIQ: Marks 1973) and 
visual imagery control (VIC: Richardson 1969) as covariates assuming that individual differences 
may have an effect. However, it was found that the assumption of within-factor homogeneity 
among the regression coefficients was met, and thus individual differences in imagery ability did 
not have an effect. Childers et al. (1985) included imagery vividness (WIQ: Marks 1973) and 
visual imagery control (VIC: Richardson 1969) predictor variables, but they found that neither 
w as correlated with aided recall or recognition of print advertising stimuli. Furthermore, Slee 
(1978) examined the relationship between visual imagery ability (QMI: Sheehan 1967) and recall 
of words (concrete and abstract) and pictures, but she also failed to find an effect on the recall 
of either words or pictures. On the other hand, Marks (1973) found that vivid visualizers were 
more accurate in recall than poor visualizers, with visual imagery vividness measured by the 
W IQ (Marks 1973). Similarly, McKelvie and Demers (1979) found that vivid visualizers (WIQ: 
Marks 1973) performed better than low visualizers on three types of items (abstract words, 
concrete words, and pictures) in short-term recall, and they were superior for concrete words 
and pictures in long-term recall. In sum, no concise statement can be proclaimed concerning 
the relationship between individual differences in imagery ability and retention.
Other studies have analyzed an individual’s imagery ability, namely vividness, and its 
impact on imaging. Oliver et al. (1989) found that imagery vividness (WIQ: Marks 1973) was 
not related to the type of processing that occurred (i.e., imaging or analyzing). Sheehan (1966), 
however, found that vivid imagers (QMI: Sheehan 1967) accurately reproduced the stimulus as 
they perceived it, and he also found that more vivid imagery of familiar objects resulted only in 
those who had the ability to image vividly. Thus, on the one hand, it appears that imagery 
ability, specifically vividness, may influence imagery processing (Sheehan 1966), and, on the 
other hand, it may not (Oliver et al. 1989).
36
Summary. Review of the studies analyzing individual differences in imagery ability does 
not allow strong conclusions to  be drawn. For this reason, imagery ability was not included as 
an individual difference variable in the dissertation research.
Imagery Content
Individuals also differ with respect to general content of their images and fantasies as 
well as their use of imagery in everyday life. This construct reflects individual tendencies to 
engage in vivid imagery, to use imagery to plan the future, and to engage in fantasy (Maclnnis 
and Price 1990). Very few researchers, however, have studied this individual difference variable, 
and those who have (e.g., Glambra 1977; Maclnnis and Price 1990), have found disappointing 
results.
Scale of Imagery Content. Singer and Antrobus (1963) developed the Imaginal Process 
Inventory (IPl), which is a 344 item inventory of 29 subscales assessing individual differences in 
daydreaming content, frequency, controllability, vividness, and general attitudes about 
daydreaming (Maclnnis 1987). While several of the subscales tap other dimensions, such as 
vividness and control, two of them are relevant to imagery content, namely, Visual Imagery in 
Daydreams and Auditory Imagery in Daydreams (Sheehan et al. 1983). Items are scored on a  1- 
to 7-polnt scale. Reported reliabilities have been poor, with test-retest reliabilities ranging from 
.49 to .86 and reliability coefficients ranging from .31 to .95 (Maclnnis 1987).
Huba, Singer, Aneshensel, and Antrobus’ (1982) revised version (45 items) of the IPl 
taps imagery vividness and the use/usefulness of imagery in various applications such as 
fantasy and problem solving. In a recent application, Maclnnis and Price (1990) used a modified 
version of this scale and reported reliabilities ranging from .56 to .83.
Studies of Imagery Content. In contrast to imagery ability and style of processing, 
individual differences in imagery content are infrequently studied. Giambra (1977) used the IPl 
(Singer and Antrobus 1963) and correlated imagery content with chronological age. He was
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only able to find, however, that “Neurotic-anxious absorption in daydreaming" decreased with 
increasing age. Similarly, Maclnnis and Price (1990) found that individual differences in the 
tendency to engage in vivid imagery, the use of imagery to plan the future, and the tendency to 
engage in fantasy were unrelated to imagery processing when students were retrospectively 
asked if they had imagined their spring break vacation prior to the actual trip.
Summary. Imagery content is an infrequently used individual difference variable. 
Moreover, from the scant research that has analyzed this variable, ft appears unlikely that it 
would have a moderating effect on relationships between imagery-eliciting strategies and 
consequence variables. For these reasons, the dissertation research did not address this 
individual difference variable.
Style o f Processing
Similar to imagery ability, style of processing (or processing preference) has been 
examined in several studies, especially in marketing. In contrast to imagery ability, however, this 
individual difference variable has received more support as being effective as a predictor variable 
(e.g., Childers et al. 1985; Gould 1990; Holbrook et al. 1984; Oliver et al. 1989; Rossiter and 
Percy 1978) and as a moderating variable (Burns et al.1991).
While imagery ability and style of processing may appear to be similar constructs, 
Richardson (1977) argues that they are independent dimensions, and Childers et al. (1985) 
provides support for this argument. Recall that ability refers to an individual’s basic cognitive 
ability. Preference for using a specific processing style (i.e., discursive (verbal) or imagery 
(typically visual)) reflects one’s tendency to utilize one type of processing style. More 
specifically, Childers et al. (1985, p. 130) conceptualize processing style "as a  preference and 
propensity to engage in a verbal and/or visual modality of processing." Thus, while an individual 
may possess a strong imagery or verbal ability, he/she may be indifferent as to the style of 
processing preferred. Indeed, Betts (1909) found that most, if not all, individuals possess some
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imagery ability and can imagine when asked to do so. Therefore, processing preference may be 
the superior, differentiating individual difference variable.
Scales o f Processing Style. Three scales have been developed to assess style of 
processing, the first two of which have been frequently used: Verbalizer-Visualizer Questionnaire 
(WQ: Richardson 1977), Style of Processing Questionnaire (SOP: Childers et al. 1985), and the 
Visualization/Verbalization Index (V/V Index: Holbrook et al. 1984). Each is relatively short and 
simple to administer.
The Verbalizer-Visualizer Questionnaire (WQ) consists of 8 items tapping visual 
processing and 7 items for verbal processing. This scale utilizes a true/false, 2-response format. 
Respondents are asked to indicate the extent to which visual or verbal processes are normally 
engaged in activities such as work or daydreaming. Reported reliabilities have been poor, with 
test-retest reliabilities ranging from .29 to .91 and reliability coefficients ranging from .54 to .66 
(Maclnnis 1987). This may be due to the multidimensionality of the scale, for Childers et al. 
(1985) found that the scale items loaded on three factors (vividness, control, and preference) 
rather than on one (preference). They pointed out that some of the visual items of the scale 
were assessing ability rather than preference. To compensate, Childers et al. (1985) revised and 
expanded the W Q into the Style of Processing Questionnaire (SOP).
The SOP Questionnaire incorporates several changes made to the WQ, and it exhibits 
better internal consistency, discriminant validity, and criterion validity than the W Q  (Childers et 
al. 1985). The first change involved expanding the 2-response format to a  4-response format 
(i.e., (1) Always true; (2) Usually true; (3) Usually false, and (4) Always false). The original W Q 
was given to 41 subjects with 20 subjects receiving the original 2-response format and 21 
subjects receiving the revised 4-response format. Alphas increased from .69 to .76 for the visual 
component and from .61 to .74 for the verbal component. Thus, the 4-response format was 
more consistent and was subsequently used in the revised measure. The second change
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involved following Churchill’s (1979) paradigm for developing better measures. More items were 
generated and pretested, resulting in a  final scale of 22 items (11 verbal and 11 visual).
Finally, to a ssess  reliability and validity of the SOP, 106 subjects evaluated ten print 
advertisements while also completing the SOP (54 subjects), the W Q  (52 subjects), the WIQ, 
the VIC, and Crowne and Marlowe's (1964) social desirability scale. Alpha for the SOP w as .88, 
for the W Q  it was .57, for the W IQ it w as .84 and .85, and for the VIC it was .72 and .76. A 
confirmatory factor analysis indicated that all items of the SOP loaded as  hypothesized. The 
SOP exhibited low intercorrelations with the two m easures of imagery ability, thus indicating 
discriminant ability. Also, it did not correlate with the measure of social desirability. The W Q  
also dem onstrated discriminant validity. The SOP was significantly correlated with both aided 
recall and recognition, while neither the W Q , the W IQ, nor the VIC did so. Thus, the SOP 
dem onstrated criterion validity. In sum, the SOP exhibits psychometric properties superior to 
those of the W Q , which is presumably also a measure of processing style.
Holbrook et al. (1984) have developed a  scale to assess  processing preferences called 
the Visualization/Verbalization Index (V/V Index). Since it could be argued that verbal scales 
are inappropriate for measuring nonverbal phenomena, Holbrook et al. (1984) combined verbal 
and nonverbal reference points to  measure processing style. Each of the ten items contains a 
stimulus (a word or a picture) and an anchor (a word or a  picture). Subjects are asked to place 
a check closer to  the anchor that is more strongly associated with the stimulus. Thus, if an 
individual responds closer to the picture end of the response scale regardless of whether the 
stimulus is verbal or visual, he /sh e  would be indicating a  visual preference. Similar to  the SOP, 
an individual may indicate no preference for verbal or visual processing. Holbrook et al. (1984) 
report an  alpha of .67 in their first application of the scale.
Studies of Processing Style. The majority of studies analyzing style of processing as an 
individual difference variable have treated it as a predictor variable. Childers et al. (1985) found 
a  significant negative correlation between style of processing (SOP: Childers et al. 1985) and
retention, which indicated that retention of the 10 print advertising stimuli was strongest among 
verbally-oriented processors. By dividing the SOP into its two subscales, Gould (1990) found 
that high verbals and high processors were less Involved in television and more involved with 
books than high visuals and low processors. Additionally, he found that high processors were 
more involved with magazines than were high verbals or high visuals alone. Finally, he also 
found that high visuals and high processors were more likely to plan a  shopping trip as  well as 
being more publicly and privately self-conscious. Holbrook et ai. (1984) also found that 
respondents exhibited favorable emotion when the game format (visual or verbal) was congruent 
with their preferred style of processing (visual or verbal measured by the V/V Index: Holbrook et 
al. 1984), but style of processing did not have an effect on their actual performance of the game. 
Oliver et al. (1989) found that style of processing (SOP: Childers et al. 1985) was marginally 
positively related to imagery. Thus, respondents that preferred an imagery style of processing 
exhibited more imaging than analyzing processing. Finally, Rossiter and Percy (1978) found that 
visualizers (WQ: Richardson 1977) showed the greatest degree of affective learning overall. 
However, the relationship between a visual processing preference and brand attitudes appeared 
to hold only for the combination of a visually-oriented advertisement (i.e., a large picture instead 
of a small picture) and abstract copy.
As a moderating variable, style of processing has received support, albeit minimal.
Burns et al. (1991) hypothesized that individual differences in processing preferences (SOP: 
Childers et al. 1985) would moderate effects of high/low imagery words and familiar/unfamiliar 
stimuli on attitudes and intentions. However, only the visual dimension achieved significance as 
a moderator for attitude toward the ad and purchase intentions. Finally, similar to imagery 
ability, Childers and Houston (1984) found that processing style (WQ: Richardson 1977) did not 
have an effect on memory when analyzed as a covariate.
Summary. Style of processing has been widely applied in empirical studies as a 
predictor variable (e.g., Childers et al. 1985; Gould 1990; Holbrook et al. 1984; Oliver et al. 1989;
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Rossiter and Percy 1978) or as a  moderating variable (e.g., Burns et al. 1991; Childers and 
Houston 1984), especially in marketing. Three scales exist to assess  this individual difference 
variable (WQ, SOP, and V/V Index), but Childers et al. (1985) have shown the W Q  to be 
inadequate.
Summary
Several individual difference variables, scales to measure them, and studies 
incorporating them have been reviewed. First, Imagery ability refers to one’s cognitive ability to 
image vividly a s  well as control the image. Three scales (QMI, WIQ, and VIC) have been widely 
used to assess  this construct. The results, however, have been equivocal a s  to the usefulness 
of this variable in imagery studies.
Second, imagery content refers to the general content, frequency, and use of imaging 
by an individual. One scale, the IPI, exists to measure imagery content. However, the 
appropriateness and usefulness of this construct in marketing studies in general and the 
dissertation research in particular is questionable; indeed, it has been included in very few 
studies, and results have been dismal.
Finally, the third individual difference variable reviewed was style of processing, which 
appears to hold more relevance to the dissertation research. Three scales exist to assess  this 
construct (WQ, SOP, and V/V Index), however, it has been shown by Childers et al. (1985) that 
the W Q  is inadequate. Therefore, they developed a better measure, the SOP Questionnaire to 
assess style of processing. Though typically treated as a predictor variable, the dissertation 
research included style of processing as a  moderating variable between imagery-eliciting 
strategies and consequence variables.
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MEASURING IMAGERY PROCESSING
Instead of scales or manipulation checks to  assess imagery processing, the majority of 
researchers have relied on criterion-based responses (Macinnis and Price 1987). Typically, an 
imagery-eliciting strategy is manipulated, and imagery processing is inferred from the results. 
Thus, it is assum ed that imagery processing was the causal factor In the positive responses for 
the imagery-eliciting condition.
Some researchers, however, have either attempted to measure imagery processing or 
attempted to provide manipulation checks. These efforts are summarized in Tables 2.5 and 2.6 
and will be discussed in this section. As can be seen from the tables, these attempts have been 
haphazard and inconsistent in nature. Ellen and Bone (1991) provide the only systematic 
attempt to develop a  scale to measure stimulus-evoked imagery processing, however, they did 
not follow the paradigm for developing better m easures set forth by Churchill (1979). Thus, 
there is a clear need for rigorous and systematic scale development in this area - a need the 
dissertation attempted to fulfill.
Alternative Approaches to Measuring Imagery Processing
While a  paper and pencil scale to measure stimulus-evoked imagery processing was 
developed in the dissertation research, there have been other approaches to  measuring imagery 
processing. One approach involves interrupting an individual involved in imagery processing, 
which is referred to as “thought sampling" or "event sampling" (Klinger 1978). Another approach, 
called Experiential Analysis Technique (EAT), involves videotaping individuals as they are 
imagining and later having them interpret the video (Sheehan et al. 1983). Finally, physiological 
m easures have also been used to assess imagery processing. Each will be discussed along 
with reasons why they were not utilized in the dissertation.
'Thought sampling" (Klinger 1978) requires the experimenter to interrupt individuals 
involved in imagery processing. Subjects are then asked to describe the content of their
images. In a similar vein, "event sampling" requires individuals to indicate whenever a certain 
type of image is aroused. However, the assumptions surrounding these techniques open them 
up for criticism. First, it is assumed that individuals are articulate about their experiences and 
are able to translate their imagery into verbal responses (Sheehan et al. 1983). Thus, individual 
differences in verbosity or vocabulary could lead the researcher to misinterpret the degree of 
imagery processing (Maclnnis and Price 1987). Second, since conscious events involving 
imagery are subtle, variable, and complex, the experimenter may resort to  providing assistance, 
resulting in the possibility of experimenter bias. Finally, asking individuals to describe their 
imagery may not be measuring the content of the image, but rather individuals’ ability to control, 
or hold, an image in their head while describing it (Maclnnis and Price 1987). In sum, not only 
does this method of assessing imagery processing entail considerable intervention from the 
researcher, it also suffers from severe criticism. Thus, it does not appear to be a  superior 
alternative to a  paper and pencil assessm ent of imagery processing.
A technique that has been used in an attempt to overcome the above criticisms is 
referred to as the Experiential Analysis Technique (EAT: Sheehan et al. 1983). While it is similar 
in some respects to "thought sampling," EAT attempts to provide a  more objective assessm ent 
of imagery processing. The technique involves video protocols of an individual while imagining. 
Thus, this technique is still subject to the criticism that individuals must be articulate about their 
imagery. However, to interpret the protocol, the videotape is then played back to the individual 
in the presence of an independent investigator who prompts the individual to describe his/her 
experience at the time of the taping. Therefore, the tape is used a s  an aid to recalling feelings, 
imagery, and cognitions that occurred at the time. The investigator’s role is to focus on the 
individual’s experiences while minimizing the cues as to "appropriate" responses (Sheehan et al. 
1983). Again, however, this is a  subjective technique and was not used in the dissertation.
Finally, physiological reactions, such as brain wave patterns, have been used as 
indicators of imagery processing (Maclnnis and Price 1987). These techniques may provide a
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superior assessm ent of imagery processing. However, not only are these measures inferential, 
highly obtrusive, and require technical sophistication, they were neither practical nor feasible for 
the dissertation.
Clearly, there is a need to conceptualize and objectively measure imagery processing. 
Thus, a  paper and pencil test in line with extant practices in the literature (Churchill 1979) was 
developed to measure imagery processing. Though this technique is also open to criticism, we 
are dealing with a  process of successive approximation in all of our research, and this method is 
the best possible alternative at the present time (Hunt 1983).
Measurement ‘Attempts' in Psychology
The title of this subsection is actually a misnomer for the studies in psychology have not 
really attempted to measure the extent of imagery processing. The attempts discussed here 
were, at best, performed as manipulation checks and are summarized in Table 2.5. These 
attempts can be classified into three groupings: (1) asking subjects to rate the vividness of their 
imagery (e.g., Anderson and Hidde 1971; Grossberg and Wilson 1968; Rigney and Lutz 1976; 
Sheehan 1966); (2) asking subjects what learning strategy they had used (e.g., Elliott 1973; 
Erdelyi and Becker 1974; Milgram 1967; Nelson and Brooks 1973); or (3) experimenter checking 
the subject-provided written or verbal record of what they had done (e.g., Anderson 1983; Bull 
and Wittrock 1973; Nappe and Wollen 1973; Wortman and Sparling 1974). Studies utilizing 
these checks have typically manipulated instructions that are given to respondents or the 
presentation format of the stimuli. Furthermore, the type of manipulation check employed has 
been fairly consistent within a given manipulation.
Manipulation Checks for Instructions to Imagine. While all three types of manipulation 
checks have been employed, when the experiment involved instructions to imagine, the most 
commonly used checks have been the third and first types, respectively. Anderson (1983)
T ab le  2 .5
MEASUREMENT OF IMAGERY PROCESSING IN PSYCHOLOGY
Authors Description of Measurement
Anderson and Hidde (1971) 
Anderson (1983)
Elliott (1973)
Erdelyi & Becker (1974) 
Grossberg & Wilson (1968)
Milgram (1967)
Nappe & Wollen (1973)
Nelson & Brooks (1973)
Rigney & Lutz (1976) 
Sheehan (1966)
Wortman & Sparling (1974)
Subjects rated vividness of imagery in imagery instruction condition.
Subjects drew cartoons that experimenter analyzed to ensure proper scenario was 
imagined.
Subjects answered a questionnaire designed to verify the learning strategy used.
The subjects in Study 2 that did improve said they tried to form an image to aid recall.
"1. How vivid and clear were the scenes that you were told to imagine? (1) realistically 
vivid; (2) very clear: (3) moderately clear; (4) dim image; (5) little or no picture."
"2. How well were you able to picture yourself actually being in the imagined scene, 
rather than here in this room? (1) scene felt very real to (5) I felt like a spectator."
Subjects were asked what, if anything, they had done to more easily learn the right 
answers. Then specifically asked if they had said anything to themselves or had imagined 
any pictures in their mind.
Subjects gave a self-paced verbal description of the image just formed. Four judges rated 
each as (1) common to (6) bizarre (interjudge reliability: .65-.S2).
Subjects asked how each pair was learned. Experimenter classified description as rote, 
verbal mediation, or imagery.
Subjects asked to rate the vividness of their mental visualizations elicited from the lesson.
Imagery-instructed group rated vividness of image on a 7-point scale.




instructed subjects to draw cartoons of various scenarios, and he later examined them to ensure 
that the proper scenario was imagined, which was confirmed. Bull and Wittrock (1973) 
manipulated the type of instructions -- self-discovered imagery, imagery-given, or verbal -  given 
to fifth grade students in which they had to  draw their image, trace the given image, or write a  
definition, respectively. The authors then inspected the booklets to  ensure that subjects drew, 
traced, or wrote as  per instruction, which was confirmed. Nappe and Wollen (1973) instructed 
subjects to form a  bizarre image for each of 24 noun pairs and a common image for each of 
another 24 noun pairs, following which the subject gave an audio-taped, self-paced verbal 
protocol of the image formed for each pair. Afterward, four judges rated each description on a 
scale from (1), for very common image, to  (6), very bizarre image. It was found that subjects 
were generally able to form the appropriate type of image, and interjudge reliability ranged from 
.65 to .82. Wortman and Sparling (1974) required subjects to write down either a description of 
the image they had formed or the actual verbal connection they were instructed to construct. In 
sum, these studies manipulated the instructions given and checked these manipulations by 
requiring subjects to generate a record, typically written or drawn, of what they had actually 
done in the experiment. These records were then examined to verify that subjects had followed 
the specific instructions given to  them.
The first type of check -  asking subjects to rate the vividness of their imagery -  has 
aiso been commonly employed when instructions have been manipulated. Subjects were given 
either imagery instructions or pronunciability instructions for a  set of sentences in a  study by 
Anderson and Hidde (1971). Those in the imagery instruction condition were told to  form an 
image of the event described in each sentence and to rate the vividness of that image, whereas 
those in the pronunciability instruction condition were told to repeat the sentence three times 
and to rate the pronunciability of that sentence. However, the rating scale is not given by the 
authors. They found that vivid images were better recalled than vague images, but only weakly 
so. Ratings of pronunciability were not related to recall. Grossberg and Wilson (1968)
instructed subjects to imagine a  neutral scen e and a fearful scen e that were described to them, 
and then the experimenter asked them to rate the vividness of the scen es  that they were told to 
imagine and to rate how well they were able to picture them selves in the scen es. The 
researchers were interested in the effect of imaging neutral and fearful scen es on heart rate, skin 
conductivity, and forehead m uscle activity, but they only found that heart rate increases were 
significantly correlated with subjects’ reports of their su c c ess  in visualizing the scenes.
However, no other results are given with respect to  the success of the manipulation. Finally, 
Sheehan (1966) instructed subjects to form an image, to  form an image after a  twice-perceived 
stimulus display (referred to as re-image condition), or to  simply recall a  pattern of blocks given 
on a  screen. In the image conditions, subjects rated the vividness of their images from 7 (no 
image), through 5 (vague and dim) to 1 (perfectly clear and vivid). However, in the recall 
condition, the instructions stated, "Do not try to evoke any mental image or picture of the 
pattern" (p. 1019), and no manipulation check was performed. By simply mentioning not 
forming an image, however, the experimenters may have actually encouraged image formation, 
which would dam age their manipulation. Unfortunately, there is no way to determine the 
success of the manipulation.
The only study to manipulate instructions and utilize the second type of check -- asking 
subjects what learning strategy they had used -- was performed by Elliott (1973). Subjects were 
given either imaginal or rote repetition instructions upon presentation of 64 sets of 3 nouns for 
later recall. To ensure the instructions were followed, subjects answered a  questionnaire 
designed to  verify the learning strategy they had used. While the authors do  not report results 
concerning the manipulation check, it is assum ed that they were successful.
Manipulation Checks for Presentation Format. Of the studies that have manipulated 
presentation format of the stimuli, most have asked subjects what learning strategy they had 
used (except Rigney and Lutz 1976). Erdelyi and Becker (1974) used either words or pictures 
as stimuli. While not formally checking manipulations, the authors did ask subjects in the word
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condition that did Improve in performance what strategy they had employed. It was found that 
the ones that tried to form a  mental image of the input items performed better than the ones that 
tried to form meaningful categories. Milgram (1967) also manipulated verbal or visual 
representation of a  series of sentences. Subjects were asked to answer freely concerning what, 
if anything, they had done to more easily learn the right answer. Then they were specifically 
asked if they had imagined any pictures in their mind or had said anything to themselves. Since 
the sample consisted of 4-, 7-, and 9-year old children, it was difficult to analyze their responses 
as many were incomprehensible. Nevertheless, two judges concluded that the verbal category 
was reported most frequently in the verbal condition group, but the visual category was only 
reported by 6 of the 30 subjects in the visual condition group. Finally, Nelson and Brooks
(1973) manipulated the type of representation as a  picture, a  picture with a  name, or a word. 
Subjects were asked to describe how each pair was learned, and the experimenter classified the 
strategy as rote, verbal mediation, or imagery mediation. It was found that the tendency to 
utilize imagery mediation varied with type of representation. Specifically, imaging was reported 
most often in the picture condition, next often in the picture-name condition, and least often in 
the word conditions, but this does not represent a  statistically significant difference.
Utilizing the first type of manipulation check, Rigney and Lutz (1976) attempted to 
measure mental imagery by asking subjects to rate the strength (interpreted as vividness here) 
of their visualizations elicited from either a verbal format or verbal and visual format computer- 
assisted instruction lesson. However, the authors lead one to believe that the manipulation was 
unsuccessful because they state, "however, self-report has shortcomings in providing convincing 
evidence that external imagery elicits mental imagery" (p. 311). No further discussion of the 
attempt to measure imagery processing is provided by the authors.
Summary. In this section, attempts to check for imagery processing in psychology 
studies have been discussed. These attempts can be classified into three groups: (1) asking 
subjects to rate the vividness of their imagery; (2) asking subjects what learning strategy they
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had used; or (3) experimenter checking the subject-provided written or verbal record of what 
they had done. Typically, experiments that manipulated the instructions given to respondents 
have relied on the third (e.g., Anderson 1983; Bull and Wittrock 1973; Nappe and Wollen 1973; 
Wortman and Sparling 1974) or first (e.g., Anderson and Hidde 1971; Grossberg and Wilson 
1968; Sheehan 1966) type of manipulation check, while those manipulating presentation format 
of the stimuli have typically relied on the second type of manipulation check (e.g., Erdelyi and 
Becker 1974; Milgram 1967; Nelson and Brooks 1973). These attempts are summarized In Table 
2.5.
None of these checks constitute an effort to really measure the presence and extent of 
imagery processing. Several researchers in marketing, however, have been a little more diligent 
in this regard. These efforts are the topic of the next subsection.
Measurement Attempts in Marketing
While researchers in psychology only attempted to perform manipulation checks, those 
in marketing have attempted to develop scales to indicate the presence of imagery processing 
as well as the content and elaboration of that processing (except Holbrook and Moore 1981 and 
Lutz and Lutz 1977). With exception of Ellen and Bone (1991), however, actual 
conceptualization and scale development of imagery processing has been lacking. In this 
section, these measurement attempts (summarized in Table 2.6) will be reviewed with special 
attention given to Ellen and Bone’s (1991) proposed conceptualization of dimensions of 
communication-evoked imagery processing and the scale developed to assess these 
dimensions. However, at the conclusion of this review it will be clearly apparent that theoretical 
grounding and scale development is necessary in this area, which echoes the plea by Maclnnis 
and Price (1987).
Measurement attempts can be grouped into three classifications: (1) manipulation 
checks (e.g., Holbrook and Moore 1981; Lutz and Lutz 1977); (2) protocols (e.g., Rethans and
T ab le  2 . 6
MEASUREMENT OF IMAGERY PROCESSING IN MARKETING STUDIES
Authors Description of Measure
Bone & Ellen (1990) 1 item: "Did you experience any imagery?" yes/no
If yes, then completed 7-item imagery scale (alpha = .87):
1. "The imagery from the ad was aroused" anchored "with great difficulty" and "with great ease."
2. "The imagery from the ad was" anchored with "not at all vivid, a very vague image almost like 
nothing at all" and "very vivid, image was almost like a real experience."
3. Final 5 items were 7-point Likert items (e.g., "I had no difficulty imagining the scene in my head," 
and "All sorts of pictures, sounds, and smells came to my mind while I listened to the ad").
Ellen & Bone (1991) Quantity/Ease Dimension (alpha = .88 & .91):
1. "As you listened to the ad, to what extent did any images come to mind? (To a very small
extent...To a very great extent)"
2. "While listening to the ad, I experienced (Lots of images...Few or no images)"
3. "All sorts of pictures, sounds, tastes and/or smells came to my mind while I listened to the ad. 
(Strongly Agree...Strongly Disagree)"
4. "How difficult or easy were the images to create? (Extremely Easy...Extremely Difficult)"
5. "How quickly were the images aroused? (Very Quickly...Not quickly at all)"
6. "I had no difficulty imagining the scene in my head. (Strongly Agree...Strongly Disagree)" 
Vividness and Paleness Dimensions (alphas = .84 to .89):
"The imagery which occurred while I listened to the ad was: clear; pale; fuzzy; detailed; weak; vivid; 
intense; vague; lifelike; sharp; well-defined. (Does not Describe at All...Describes Perfectly)"
Links Dimension (alpha = .91 & .93):
1. "The ad reminded me of other times in my life. (Strongly Agree...Strongly Disagree)"
2. "The ad brought back memories of events that happened to me in the past. (Strongly
Agree...Strongly Disagree)"
Holbrook & Moore "When I rated the sweaters, I tried to form a mental picture of what each sweater would look like."
(1981)
T ab le  2 . 6  (C on tinued )
MEASUREMENT OF IMAGERY PROCESSING IN MARKETING STUDIES
Authors Description of Measure
Lutz & Lutz (1977) Type of processing was assessed by self-report nominal scale for the following question: 
"What best describes how you spent the time looking at each page of the booklet?” 
Forced choices: visual, verbal, and task-unrelated processing
Maclnnis and Price 
(1990)
4 items to assess the extent to which consumers generated imagery about spring break (alpha = .84)
e.g., "When I thought about spring break, my thoughts included the sights, smells, and/or sounds of the 
activities I would be engaged in."
5 items to assess the extent to which they imagined many different scenarios (alpha = .85) 
e.g., "In my mind, I played out many different scenarios of what I was going to do."
1 item to measure time spent imagining:
"I spent considerable time imagining what I would do."
All reported on a 1-7 scale.
Oliver, Robertson, & 
Mitchell (1989)
Rethans & Hastak 
(1982)
7 items for analyzing
e.g., "Did you analyze its pros and cons?"
7 items for imaging
e.g., "Did you visualize this new printer on your desk?"
After verbal protocols, subjects responded to 1 item:
"Virtually none of my thoughts were in picture or image form" to "virtually all of my thoughts were in 
picture or image form."
Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (Marks 1973) was used to evaluate the vividness of the evoked
imagery.
Smith, Houston, & 
Childers (1984)
Written protocols:
1. Subjects rated each action in terms of whether they had visualized or verbalized it.
2. If visualized, evaluated whether image was vivid (clear) or pale (indistinct).
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Hastak 1982; Smith et al. 1984); or (3) scales (e.g., Bone and Ellen 1990; Ellen and Bone 1991; 
Maclnnis and Price 1990; Oliver et al. 1989). Each will be discussed separately below.
Manipulations Checks. Manipulation checks to assess imagery processing have been 
used in two studies in marketing. Lutz and Lutz (1977), in the first application of imagery in 
marketing, simply used a nominal, self-report item to classify whether visual, verbal, or task- 
unrelated processing had been used. As in most imagery studies in psychology, it was 
assum ed that subjects in the imagery-eliciting condition -- in this case, interactive and 
noninteractive pictures -  would more likely use mental imagery than those in a nonimagery- 
eliciting condition. This assumption was verified by Lutz and Lutz (1977) for they found that 
experimental subjects reported greater frequency of visual processing than did control subjects. 
Holbrook and Moore (1981) utilized four items to represent task-related processing strategy, only 
one of which, however, relates to  mental imagery. Subjects responded to  the statement, "When 
I rated the sweaters, I tried to form a mental picture of what each sweater would look like" on a 
7-point strongly disagree to strongly agree scale. Though no effect of mental imagery occurred, 
the authors did report a significant interaction indicating the use of mental imagery in reducing 
the relative advantage of pictures over words in evoking feature interactions. However, this 
measure was collected some undisclosed time after the subjects had actually participated in the 
study.
Protocols. Some researchers have used items in conjunction with protocols (e.g., 
Rethans and Hastak 1982; Smith et al. 1984). Rethans and Hastak (1982) asked subjects to 
provide protocols concerning knowledge of product-based hazards and to indicate whether their 
thoughts were in picture or image form. Subjects then evaluated the vividness of the imagery. 
The authors concluded that images and information contained in them were being activated, 
and, thus, research on information representation may be incomplete if it only concentrates on 
linguistic information. Smith et al. (1984) asked respondents to list actions when using the 
Placement Service at their school and then indicate whether they had visualized or verbalized
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each action. Furthermore, if visualized, they were asked to evaluate whether the image was 
vivid or pale. As hypothesized, it was found that schematic subjects visualized more of the 
actions than did aschematics, and their images were reported as more vivid as well.
Sca/es. In contrast to the studies in psychology, several attempts have been made in 
marketing to utilize a  scale to  measure imagery processing. These attempts have been very 
recent, which is another indication that this is a necessary attempt in studies involving imagery.
Oliver et al. (1989) developed a scale to measure imaging and analyzing in a study 
investigating pre-decision Imagery and analyzing of consumption with respect to  the adoption 
process. The authors generated a  list of 20 items pertaining to analyzing-type thoughts and 
imaging-type thoughts. Pretesting revealed a  two-factor solution explaining 52% of the variance. 
Fourteen of the original items were retained for use in the study (7 for analyzing and 7 for 
imagining). Items from the analyzing scale refer to considering pros and cons of the stimulus 
(i.e., a computer printer) or analyzing the features, while the imaging items refer to visualizing 
the new printer on a desk or imaging oneself using the printer. Responses range from "no not 
at all," to "yes, once," "twice," and “more than twice." Reliability for the analyzing scale was .77, 
and for the imaging scale it was .75. The authors found that analyzing was more prevalent than 
imaging, which really is not surprising due to the utilitarian nature of the stimulus. There were, 
however, reasonable, but not high, levels of imaging.
Maclnnis and Price (1990) used 10 items to assess imagery processing -- 4 to  assess 
the extent to which subjects generated imagery (alpha = .84), 5 to assess the extent to which 
many different scenarios were imagined (afpha = .85), and 1 to assess time spent imagining. 
Correlations among these scales ranged from .60 to .64. Thus, consumers who do image seem 
to generate many scenarios and to  spend a greater amount of time imaging than those who do 
not generate imagery. The authors used the scale to examine the relationship between imagery 
processing and satisfaction, and they found that imagery processing had a  positive effect on 
satisfaction.
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Bone and Ellen (1990) provided a clear definition of imagery to respondents and used 
one yes/no  question to determine if they had used imagery. If yes, then the subjects responded 
to a  7-item imagery scale (alpha = .87). The items given by the authors as examples, however, 
appear to be measuring ability, specifically vividness, rather than the degree of elaboration of 
Imagery processing. In a  more recent attempt, Ellen and Bone (1991) developed a  scale 
specifically intended to measure communication-evoked imagery processing.
Scale Developed by Ellen and Bone (1991). In a more diligent effort to measure 
communication-evoked imagery processing, Ellen and Bone (1991) proposed that 
communication-evoked imagery may be reflected in five dimensions: vividness and /or clarity, 
quantity, ease, and links experienced from the message. Vividness has been identified as the 
major dimension of imagery and usually indicates the quality of the imagery (Morris and 
Hampson 1983). This dimension is similar, but not identical, to the dimension of clarity. Clarity 
refers to detail while vividness refers to intensity (Ellen and Bone 1991). However, this 
distinction is not very clear in the literature. For example, Childers et al. (1985) define vividness 
as "the clarity of the mental image an individual evoked” (p. 126). Nevertheless, these 
dimensions were initially considered separately.
Quantity refers to the number of different images evoked Irrespective of quality or clarity. 
A few or many very vague images may be evoked, or a few or many very vivid images may be 
evoked.
The authors also propose ease of imagining as another dimension. They argue that the 
more information an individual has concerning a subject, the easier it is to generate images.
This is a result of familiarity with the stimulus, which influences an individual’s ability to generate 
images since he/she has a sufficient knowledge base to do so (Maclnnis and Price 1987).
The final dimension proposed by Ellen and Bone (1991) is imagery links. Links refer to 
the association of information in working memory with information stored in long-term memory.
It is proposed that imagery processing allows activation of stored information via more paths
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than simply semantic links. Thus, an individual is better able to  access information and 
elaborate further on it due to  the greater relative availability as compared to verbal processing.
As a result, when it is time to make a judgment or decision, information is probably more 
available (Ellen and Bone 1991). The is probably the most important dimension of imagery 
processing, and, unfortunately, Ellen and Bone only generate two items to tap this dimension.
While Ellen and Bone (1991) proffer a  scale, their attempt suffers from a  number of 
criticisms, which the dissertation attempted to  overcome. First, the authors did not generate a 
very large inventory of items to begin with; indeed, they started with nineteen items and ended 
with nineteen items. Second, they used radio ads from their previous study as stimuli (see Bone 
and Ellen 1990), which may have resulted in demand characteristics since six out of the seven 
ads were high imagery-eliciting ads beginning with the statement "Imagine this." It may be more 
appropriate to use a  spectrum of stimuli that range from high to low imagery-eliciting 
characteristics. Third, the authors only collected data once to  develop the scale (although they 
did use two studies with one data collection each). This is inconsistent with the paradigm 
proposed by Churchill (1979) in which new data is recommended to purify the measure and 
assess validity. Furthermore, when attempting to assess  validity, it appears that subjects from 
only 2 out of the 7 cells in their study were used. Finally, the authors changed the dimensions 
in the process. Specifically, the quantity and ease dimensions became the quantity/ease 
dimension, and clarity becam e paleness. In a three factor solution, vividness and paleness 
loaded together, but the four factor solution was significantly better. It appears that this attempt 
does not clarify the appropriate dimensions of imagery processing.
Summary. Two conclusions becom e apparent as a result of the review on measurement 
attempts in marketing. First, several researchers recognize the need to measure imagery 
processing in imagery studies. Any study on imagery will not be acceptable to  peers in the area 
without an effort to measure imagery processing. Thus, there is a need for an acceptable scale, 
and the best method for developing one involves a  rigorous and systematic effort. This is
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something that yet needs to be done. Second, the scales available are unacceptable. Even 
though Ellen and Bone (1991) propose a scale, the development of the scale was not much 
different than the haphazard attempts that preceded it.
Summary
In this section, attempts to measure imagery processing (summarized in Tables 2.5 and 
2.6) have been reviewed. Researchers in psychology have been much less diligent in this effort; 
indeed, the majority of what has been done in this body of literature can merely be classified as 
manipulation checks. Researchers in marketing recognize the need to assess imagery 
processing, and recent studies reflect this concern. Manipulation checks, protocols, and scales 
have been used to measure imagery processing. The only conceptual development and 
measurement effort has been put forth by Ellen and Bone (1991).
Ellen and Bone (1991) proposed five dimensions of imagery processing (vividness 
and /or clarity, quantity, ease, and links to one's past); however, they found four (vividness, 
paleness, quantity/ease and links). Their attempt suffers from several criticisms and should only 
be considered a preliminary effort in this regard.
There is clearly a need for conceptualization and scale development of this construct. A 
process of scale development in accordance with Churchill (1979) is called for. Not only is an 
acceptable scale necessary for the study proposed In this dissertation, but other researchers as 
well will benefit from such a scale. Research in imagery has moved beyond the stimulus- 
response paradigm prevalent in the 1970’s and requires further investigation into explanation, not 
merely prediction.
AWARENESS AS A DEPENDENT VARIABLE
Rossiter and Percy (1983) list five types of communication effects in advertising: 
awareness, beliefs, attitudes, intentions, and choice rules. The first type of communication
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effect, awareness, is reviewed in this section, and a substantial number of studies both in 
psychology and marketing have analyzed this effect. Awareness is a  communication effect of 
special interest to advertisers. It allows the prospective buyer to Identify the product or brand to 
enable purchase and varies on a continuum ranging from recognition to recall (Rossiter and 
Percy 1983). In contrast with recognition, which involves 100 percent cue-target similarity, recall 
may involve varying degrees of similarity between the cue and target responses. Thus, 
awareness is the class of communication effects that captures memory in the form of 
recognition and recall.
The general findings in the literature indicate that stimuli presented via high imagery- 
eliciting strategies are better remembered than presentations low in imagery-eliciting ability. 
Several studies have found that concrete words, which are typically considered high-imagery 
words, are better remembered than abstract words (see Table 2.1 for summary). Similarly, two 
other imagery-eliciting strategies, pictures and instructions to imagine, have also been shown to 
be superior in memory applications. While these two strategies have been studied 
independently or in conjunction with concreteness of wording, the relative efficacy of each with 
respect to memory applications has not been addressed (exceptions include Levin, Davidson, 
Wolff and Citron 1973 and Rasco, Tennyson, and Boutwell 1975). Therefore, studies examining 
awareness (recall and/or recognition) as a dependent variable will be reviewed in this section. 
First, studies manipulating pictures (i.e., presentation format) will be reviewed with respect to 
general findings in psychology (i.e., cognitive psychology, educational psychology, and 
education) followed by marketing applications. Then, studies manipulating the instructions given 
to respondents will be reviewed in a similar manner.
Pictures as Independent Variables
The studies reviewed in this subsection include those that have tested the effects of 
supplanting or supplementing verbal material with pictorial material. The dependent variable in
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the psychology studies has been awareness in general and recall, recognition, or both in 
particular. These studies will be reviewed under general findings In the order of those examining 
recall, recognition, then both recall and recognition. The marketing applications reviewed have 
all examined recall a s  the awareness dependent variable. All of the studies reviewed in this 
subsection are summarized in Table 2.7.
General Findings. While a  few studies have found that words are better than pictures 
(e.g., Milgram 1967) or equal to  pictures in facilitating recall (e.g., Reese 1965), several studies 
have found that pictures are recalled better than words (e.g., Erderlyi and Becker 1974; Lesgold, 
Levin, Shimron, and Guttman 1975; Nelson and Brooks 1973; Rohwer, Lynch, Levin, and Suzuki 
1967). The result of the two studies that have found no or opposite effects may be attributed to 
the age of the subjects. However, two other studies (e.g., D'Agostino, O’Neill, and Paivio 1977; 
Nelson, Reed, and Walling 1976) have also looked at the effect of pictures and words, and these 
studies have found limiting conditions (i.e., beside age) which mitigate or reverse the picture 
superiority effect. However, in general, it has been found that pictures alone or pictures in 
conjunction with verbal information are superior to verbal information alone in facilitating recall.
Milgram (1967) studied the effect of using a  verbal context or a  visual compound in 
paired-associate learning by 4-, 7-, and 9-year old children. Children learned a paired-associate 
picture list by verbal context, which involved reciting a sentence that interacted the two items 
pictured, or by visual compound, which consisted of viewing a picture that combined the items 
in an interactive picture equivalent to  the verbal context sentence. Though the verbal context 
and visual compound were superior with respect to recall over the control group, which simply 
traced around the picture pairs, the verbal context group was superior overall. These results 
along with posttest interviews with the children led Milgram (1967) to conclude that young 
children preferentially utilize the verbal mode of representation. Reese (1965) also found that 
verbal compounds and visual compounds were equally effective, and both facilitate recall 
performance over a unit-only response format. Thus, better performance cannot be attributed to
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(n = 90 Navy enlisted personnel)
1) picture-word format (various combinations 
of pictures and words)
Pictorial information is important for speed, but print 
information is necessary for accuracy. 
Comprehension of instructions in all three tasks was 
most efficient in the pictorial-related print and 
pictorial-redundant print conditions.
D'Agostino, O'Neill, & 
Paivio (1977)* 
(cognitive psychology)
(n = 72 undergraduates)
1) type of stimulus (abstract word; concrete 
word; picture)
2) processing task (structural; phonemic; 
semantic)
3) response judgment (yes; no)
Memory performance increased as a direct function 
of the processing-task variable only under the 
concrete word condition.
Pictures were superior to words after structural 




(n = 60 2nd graders)
Used pictures as stimuli and manipulated: 
1) condition (exposure; pairs named; 
proposition; sentences; interactive 
picture)
Facilitation as a result of introducing mediating links, 
but effect was same for minimum and maximum 
cues.
Erdelyi & Becker 
(1974)* (cognitive 
psychology)
Study 2: (n = 48 undergraduates)
1) stimuli (pictures; words)
2) recall task (no interval; think)
Picture recall increased with retrieval attempts and 
word recall remained roughly constant.
Holliday (1975)b 
(education)
(n = 80 10th graders)
1) presentation (words; pictures/words)
Pictures plus word group performed better than 
word-only group.
w----------------------------------------------------------------------------  <n
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Lesgold, Levin, 
Shimron & Guttman 
(1975)* (educational 
psychology)
Studies 1-3: (n, = 24  1st graders; n2= 48  
1st graders; n3= 3 6  1st graders)
1) task (illustrate; control)
Illustration facilitated recall only when subject given 
correct pieces for illustration or when experimenter 
provided the illustration.
Lippman & Shanahan 
(1973)' (educational 
psychology)
Study 1: (n = 80 3rd graders)
1) condition (accentuation; picture; word) 
Study 2: (n = 240  kindergartners, 2nd, & 4th 
graders)
1) condition (control; accentuation; picture; 
verbal context; picture interaction)
Study 1: Subjects performed best on accentuated 
items.
Study 2: Interaction resulted in best word-pair 
learning.
McKelvie & Demers 
(1979)e (cognitive 
psychology)
(n = 70 high school students)
Used pictures, abstract words, and concrete 
words and examined individual differences in 
visual imagery vividness (low; high)
High visualizers were better on all 3 types of items in 
short-term recall, but only concrete words and 
pictures in long-term recall.





(n = 90 4, 7, & 9 year old children) 
1) presentation (pictures; words)
No difference in recall for pictures or words.
Nelson & Brooks 
(1973)* (cognitive 
psychology)
(n = 96 undergraduates)
1) presentation (picture; picture-name; word)
2) phonetic similarity of words (low; high)
Pictures associated with faster acquisition.
Similarity among verbal stimuli interfered with 
performance.
...................  3
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Nelson, Reed, & 
Walling (1976)c 
(cognitive psychology)






(n = 256  undergraduates)
1) stimulus (picture; word)
2) schematic similarity (low; high)
3) conceptual similarity (low; high)
4) presentation rate (slow; fast)
Study 1: (n = 96 undergraduates)
1) stimulus (picture; concrete word; 
abstract word)
2) presentation rate (slow; fast)
3) memory task (immediate memory span; 
free recall)
Study 2: (n = 192 undergraduates)
Same as Study 1 with the addition of 2 
memory tasks (serial learning; recognition 
memory)
(n = 60 children ages 3-8 years)
1) content of response item (visual; verbal)
2) type of response item (interactive; 
noninteractive)
High schematic similarity eliminated the pictorial 
superiority effect at the slow rate and completely 
reversed it at the fast rate.
Memory for pictures was inferior to words only in the 
sequential learning tasks and at a fast rate.
Both pictures and concrete words were superior to 
abstract words in serial learning at slow rate.
Pictures > concrete words > abstract words at slow  
rate in both nonsequential tasks.
Retention superior when seeing or hearing an 
interaction between paired stimulus and response 
elements.
Rigney & Lutz (1976)c (n = 40  undergraduates)
(educational 1) format of lesson (verbal; verbal/graphic)
psychology)
Better recognition/recall for imagery group.
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Rohwer & Harris 
(1975)' (educational 
psychology)
Rohwer, Lynch, Levin, 
& Suzuki (1967)' 
(educational 
psychology)
(n = 168 4th graders-low SES/high SES)
1) media condition (oral; print; picture; 
all combinations)
2) response method (verification; short- 
answer; free recall)
3) number of intervening sentences (0;1;3;5)
(n = 96 3rd graders & 96  6th graders)
1) grade (3rd; 6th)
2) materials (printed; pictorial)
3) verbalization (conjunction; proposition; 
verbal; control)
For low SES children, combination or oral and 
pictures superior to single-media conditions. 
Among high SES children, combinations of media 
were of little benefit.
Learning was more effective for pictorial materials.





(n = 64  4th graders)
1) presentation (print; picture)
2) population (high SES; tow SES)
3) test conditions (inspection; memory)
4) assertion set (1 ;2)
Study 1: (n = 17 undergraduates)
1) 270  frequent nouns and adjectives
2) 270  rare nouns and adjectives 
Study 2: (n = 17 undergraduates)
1) 612  sentences
Study 3: (n = 34  undergraduates)
1) 612 pictures
2) time delay (2 hours; 3 days; 1 week; 4 
months)
Pictures facilitate aural comprehension and learning 
of noun pairs even testing conditions differ from 
those used in noun-pair tasks.
Study 1: 92.5% correct recognition for rare words; 
84.4% for frequent words.
Study 2; 88% correct recognition.
Study 3: immediate - 98.5% correct recognition
2 hour - 99 .7  % correct
3 day - 92% correct
1 week - 87% correct
4 month - 57.7%
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(n = 63 undergraduates)
1) adjunct aid (experimenter-provided; 
reader-generated; picture; both)
2) position (before; after)
3) scales (practiced; non-practiced)
Reader-generated pictures were as effective as 
experimenter-provided questions over control group.
Marketing Applications:
Childers & Houston 
(1984)*
(n = 271 undergraduates)
1) stimulus (pictorial; verbal)
2) depth of processing (sensory; semantic)
3) level of meaning (low; high)
4) distinctiveness (color; black & white)
Pictorial ads were recalled better than verbal-only ads 
when encoding was sensory.
A picture superiority effect is evident under both 
levels of processing when memory is measured over 
time.
Edeli & Staelin (1983)* (n = 27 undergraduates)
1) structure of ad (verbal; pictorial­
framed; pictoriai-unframed)
2) content (objective; subjective; 
characterization)
3) product class (car, calculator; camera)
Superior recall for ads containing framed pictures 
over both unframed pictures and verbal-only ads.
Gardner & Houston 
(1986)*
(n=64 undergraduates)
1) exposure time (short; long)
2) time of measure (immediate; delayed)
3) content of stimulus (varied favorability 
of pictorial and verbal content)
Effect of pictures is longer lasting than the effects of 
words.
a
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Houston, Childers, and Studies 1 & 2: (n, = 112; n2= 1 16 Superior memory for interactive discrepant ads.
Heckler (1987)* undergraduates)
1) pictures (interactive; noninteractive)
2) verbal material (consistent; discrepant)
Lutz & Lutz (1977)* (n = 72 undergraduates) Interactive pictures facilitate recall over
1) stimulus type (words; interactive picture; 
noninteractive picture)
noninteractive pictures and words only.
'Recall as dependent measure 
bRecognition as dependent measure
eBoth recall and recognition examined as dependent measures
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pictures per se, but rather to the interactive nature of the compound provided. Similar to 
Milgram (1967), this study used young children (i.e., 3- to 8- year olds), which could have 
influenced the results.
Apart from the above studies, several researchers have demonstrated the superior effect 
of pictures alone or pictures in conjunction with words on recall memory. Erderiyi and Nelson
(1974) demonstrated a hypermnesic memory function for pictures but not for words in a  sample 
of undergraduate students, in other words, with pictures, performance improved with repeated 
recall, but with words, a fiat, nonincremental function was obtained. In a  study of first grade 
children, Lesgold et al. (1975) found that those performing an illustration task (i.e., picture 
condition) performed better on the recall task than control subjects that performed a  simple 
geometric filler task. However, this was only true when the correct pieces were provided to 
develop the illustration or when the experimenter provided the illustration. Thus, a visual 
mediation task was superior to no mediation task. Nelson and Brooks (1973) found that pictures 
were associated with faster acquisition relative to their verbal representations in a  sample of 
undergraduate students. While phonetic similarity among the verbal stimuli interfered with 
performance, label similarity within the picture condition did not. This led the authors to 
conclude that easily recognized pictures can function as independent memory codes. Rowher 
et al. (1967) also found that second and sixth grade students demonstrated better recall for 
pictorial material than printed material. In sum, the studies reviewed illustrate the superiority of 
pictures, either supplanting or supplementing verbal material, over purely verbal information on 
recall memory.
While not disputing the picture superiority effect, two studies have identified conditions 
under which this effect is mitigated or reversed. D’Agostino et al. (1977) looked at processing 
task (i.e., structural, phonemic, or semantic) in addition to the type of stimulus (i.e., abstract 
word, concrete word, or picture) and recall for a  sample of undergraduate students. They found 
that picture recall was superior to word recall, but only under structural and phonemic
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processing. For the semantic processing condition, however, there were no differences between 
recall for pictures and concrete words, but both were superior to abstract words. Nelson et al. 
(1976) found that pictures that were highly similar (e.g., a  knife, a bat, a  screwdriver) did not 
result in a  picture superiority effect; indeed, at a  fast rate of presentation, it completely reversed 
this effect. Even though these limiting conditions have been identified, the superior recall effect 
of pictures over words still holds in most instances.
Fewer studies have examined recognition as  the aw areness dependent variable, but, as 
with recall, the results generally support the hypothesis that pictures facilitate memory. Lutz and 
Lutz (1978) note that one of the earliest cited studies demonstrating the picture superiority effect 
is that of Shepard (1967). While not actually manipulating pictures versus words, Shepard 
(1967) exposed subjects to 612 colored pictures of objects cut out from print advertisements 
and found that subjects were able to achieve 98.5% correct recognition when shown 68 pairs of 
pictures containing a previously seen picture and a  novel one for an immediate test, 99.7% after 
a two-hour delay, 92% after a three-day delay, 87% after a one-week delay, and 57.7% after a 
four-month delay. Even though Shepard did not examine pictures versus words per se, he did 
perform similar tests using words, sentences, and pictures, and the results indicate better 
recognition in the picture tests. Similar to Shepard, Davidson (1964) did not actually manipulate 
pictures, but he used pictures as stimuli and manipulated mediation conditions. While mediation 
conditions were equally effective, all recognition scores were very high, which could have been 
due to using only pictures as stimuli.
Other studies have manipulated pictures as independent variables and examined the 
effect on recognition. Holliday (1975) found that tenth grade students performed better on a 
recognition task when pictures supplemented verbal materials rather than verbal materia! alone. 
On a  sample of fourth grade students, it was found that pictures facilitated aural comprehension 
and learning of noun pairs even when testing conditions were not the sam e as learning 
conditions (Rohwer and Matz 1975). Finally, Snowman and Cunningham (1975) found that
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reader-generated pictures facilitated recognition over no adjunct learning aid, but experimenter- 
provided questions were equally facilitative. Thus, regardless of being pictorial or verbal, an 
adjunct aid In general facilitated recognition in this study, (n sum, the studies analyzing the 
effect of pictures on recognition are supportive of a picture superiority effect.
The remaining studies examining the impact of pictures on memory have analyzed both 
recognition and recall a s  dependent variables. Rigney and Lutz (1976) varied the format of a 
com puter-assisted chemistry lesson and found that the group exposed to a  lesson com posed of 
verbal and visual presentation performed better on recall and recognition tasks than those 
exposed to  a verbal-only lesson. Booher (1975) also found that pictures supplementing print 
facilitated performance of Navy enlisted personnel in learning proceduralized instructions.
Som e limiting conditions have also been identified. For instance, Paivio and Csapo 
(1969) examined presentation rate and type of memory task in addition to  stimulus type. It was 
found that pictures were superior to  concrete words, which were superior to abstract words at 
the slow presentation rate in nonsequential learning tasks. They also found that pictures and 
concrete words were superior to  abstract words at the slower rate in a  serial learning task.
Finally, memory for pictures was actually inferior to words In sequential learning tasks but only at 
a fast presentation rate. This last finding could have been due to the nature of the sequential 
learning task because subjects are unable to label a picture at the fast rate for this type of task. 
Lippman and Shanahan (1973) found that interaction was necessary for the facilitation of word- 
pair learning. McKelvie and Demers (1979), while presenting all subjects with pictures, concrete 
words, and abstract words, found that high visualizers performed better on all three types of 
stimuli in short-term recall and concrete words and pictures in long-term recall. However, both 
groups performed equally well on a  recognition test. Thus, visual imagery ability influenced 
recall performance. Finally, Rohwer and Harris (1975) varied media conditions a s  either oral, 
picture, print, and all combinations of the three for a  group of low socioeconomic status black 
and high socioeconom ic status white fourth grade students, it w as found that while
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combinations of media conditions were of little benefit for high SES white children, low SES 
black children performed better in the condition that combined oral and picture presentations 
over single-media conditions. Thus, it appears that som e type of ability variable may be playing 
a role.
In summary, several studies have investigated the Impact of pictures on memory ~  
recall, recognition, or both. While there are exceptions, the general findings indicate a superior 
effect of pictures on memory.
Marketing Applications. In an attempt to understand the conditions leading to picture 
superiority, several studies in marketing have been conducted. While the studies in the 
psychology literature have concentrated on learning, marketing studies have applied Imagery 
concepts in an advertising context. Ail of the studies in marketing have examined recall a s  the 
dependent measure, and the independent variables and results are summarized in Table 2.7.
Lutz and Lutz (1977) used advertisements taken from the Yellow Pages and compared 
the impact on brand name recall of interactive pictures, noninteractive pictures, and verbal 
counterparts. Interactive pictures depicted the brand name and product class in a  pictorial 
format (e.g., Rocket Messenger Service illustrates a m essenger in flight with a  rocket strapped to 
his back), whereas the noninteractive picture condition depicted the brand or product separately 
(e.g., O’Bear Abrasive Saws simply included a picture of a  bear holding a letter "O” on the left). 
Thus, the noninteractive picture did not integrate the brand name with the product class. The 
verbal-only condition consisted only of the brand name and product class with no 
accompanying picture. In a test of brand name recall, only interactive pictures were superior to 
the verbal-only condition. Thus, the pictures must be interactive in nature to facilitate recall 
compared to words only.
Childers and Houston (1984) also examined the effect of interactive pictures versus 
verbal referents on immediate and delayed brand name recall. Furthermore, they examined the 
effect of depth of processing -  sensory versus semantic. They found a picture superiority effect
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for immediate recall only when the ads were processed at a sensory level. However, when 
memory was measured over time, the picture superiority effect was evident at both levels of 
processing.
Edell and Staelin (1983) manipulated framed pictures, unframed pictures, and verbal-only 
ads, and they found differential effects on recall of brand items and elements of the 
advertisements. A framed picture condition is one in which the verbal material is equivalent in 
content to the picture, whereas the unframed picture condition consisted of a picture differing in 
content from the verbal material. The verbal-only condition consisted only of a verbal message. 
The authors reported superior recall for ads containing framed pictures over both the unframed 
picture condition and the verbal-only condition.
Gardner and Houston (1986) investigated verbal and nonverbal elements in a within- 
message context. They examined the relative effects of pictures versus words in messages for 
restaurants under immediate and delayed recall conditions for different exposure times. Four 
messages were developed and consisted of a color photograph of the interior of a restaurant 
and a set of verbal descriptors of the restaurant's food, service, portion size, and price level.
Two of the messages had favorable pictures and unfavorable words, and two had unfavorable 
pictures and favorable words. Recall measures were broken down as general recall, general 
picture recall, general verbal recall, specific picture recall, and specific verbal recall. It was 
found that the effects of pictures are longer lasting than the effects of words. It is important to 
point out, however, the usefulness (or lack of usefulness) of this study. Why would an advertiser 
include unfavorable information (verbal or pictorial) in an advertisement? It does not seem 
reasonable that this would ever occur.
Houston et al. (1987) examined the effect of picture-word consistency on memory. They 
empirically challenged the normative belief that the pictorial and verbal components of an ad 
should convey the same meaning. They examined ads in which the semantic content of 
pictorial material was consistent with or discrepant from the verbal copy. Thus, it appears that
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the manipulation is similar to framed and unframed pictorial ads studied by Edell and Staelin 
(1983). Additionally, similar to Lutz and Lutz (1977), the authors also manipulated the interactive 
nature of the pictures. Three studies were conducted showing superior recall for ads in which 
an interactive picture is discrepant from the verbal copy, which is inconsistent with what Edell 
and Staeiin (1983) found for framed and unframed pictorial advertisements. However, this 
superior effect diminished with reduced exposure time. Therefore, the authors conclude that the 
discrepant verbal and visual information resulted in more elaborate processing and associative 
linkages in memory. The fact that the effect diminished with reduced exposure time lends 
further support for this explanation for subjects in this condition did not have enough time to 
elaborate on the information provided.
Finally, in a more recent study, Unnava and Burnkrant (1991) examined effects of 
pictures and verbal information. They found that verbal product attribute information in a print 
advertisement enhances ad recall only when the verbal information is of low imagery value (i.e., 
abstract instead of concrete words). They argued that high imagery verbal information resulted 
in self-generated images, which minimized the effect of externally provided pictures on recall of 
verbal information. Thus, the picture superiority effect with respect to recall of verbal information 
was only evident when the verbal copy in the message consisted of abstract rather than 
concrete words and phrases. Compared to the condition with no picture but concrete copy, 
there was no difference in recall between this group and the group receiving a picture along with 
concrete copy.
In summary, the evidence from marketing applications lends support to a picture 
superiority effect. In all of the studies from the marketing literature, pictures were superior in 
terms of recall. While limiting conditions have been identified (i.e., interactive pictures, framed 
pictures, and pictures discrepant from verbal copy), it can be concluded that pictures in general 
facilitate recall (brand and ad) from print advertisements.
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Summary. Several studies from the psychology literature in general and the marketing 
literature in particular support a picture superiority effect on memory. While som e of the studies 
reviewed have simply manipulated presentation format of the stimuli a s  either pictures or words, 
most have analyzed supplementing words with pictures.
Several conclusions can be drawn from this review. First, in general, pictures are 
superior to words in facilitating aw areness (e.g., all studies in Table 2.7 except Milgram 1967 and 
Reese 1965). Second, interactive pictures are more effective than both noninteractive pictures 
or words in facilitating awareness (e.g., Childers and Houston 1984; Lippman and Shanahan 
1973; Lutz and Lutz 1977). Third, the superiority of pictures over words on awareness 
diminishes as exposure time decreases (e.g., Gardner and Houston 1986; Houston et al. 1987; 
Paivio and Csapo 1969). Fourth, imagery ability may moderate the pictorial superiority effect 
(e.g., McKelvie and Demers 1979; Rohwer and Harris 1975). Finally, type of processing 
influences the pictorial superiority effect (e.g., Childers and Houston 1984; D’Agostino et al.
1977; Paivio and Csapo 1969).
Instructions to Imagine as an Independent Variable
Several studies, summarized in Table 2.8, in the psychology literature have examined the 
Impact of giving subjects imagery instructions on awareness. Overwhelming support has been 
provided for the relative efficacy of imagery instructions over verbal instructions (e.g., Anderson 
and Hidde 1971; Bower 1970; Bull and Wittrock 1973; Elliott 1973; Griffith and Johnston 1973; 
Kerst and Levin 1973; Peterson and McGee 1974; Robbins, Bray, Irvin, and Wise 1974; Sheehan 
1966; Slee 1978) or the relative efficacy of imagery instructions over no instructions at all (e.g., 
Kulhavy and Swenson 1975; Pressley 1976). Exceptions include Montague and Carter (1973), 
Nappe and Wollen (1973), Wittrock and Goldberg (1975), and Wortman and Sparling (1974), 
who did not find differences among instructions given to  subjects. However, none of these 
exceptions conclude that verbal instructions or no instructions at all are better than imagery
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1) instructions (imagery; pronunciability)
(n = 30 non-student adults)
11 instructions (rote repetition;
interactive-imagery; separation-imagery)
(n = 87 5th graders)
1) instructions (self-discovered imagery; 
imagery-given; verbal)
Imagery instruction group recalled greater than 3 
times more sentences.
Sentences evoking vivid images were better recalled 
than those evoking dim images, but the effect was 
not strong.
Recall highest for interactive imagery and lower and 
equal for rote repetition and separation imagery 
groups.
No differences in stimulus recognition among groups.
Self-discovered imagery condition better than 
imagery-given and verbal instruction conditions on 1 - 
week recognition of definition learned.
Elliott (1973)' 
(cognitive psychology)




1) instructions (imagery; rote repetition)
2) word imagery value (low; high)
3) interpolated task activity (visual; auditory)
(n = 64 undergraduates)
1) instructions (rote repetition; imagery)
2) item imagery value (low; high)
3) signal type (aural; visual)
Recall was superior for imagery instructions group. 
Visual language task and auditory non-verbal task 
interfered with imagery and rote repetition 
conditions, respectfully.
Imagery instructions group superior on recall. 
Processing capacity expended lower under imagery 
instructions and with high imagery items.
-j
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Kerst & Levin (1973)b
(educational
psychology)
Kulhavy & Swenson 
(1975)* (educational 
psychology)
<n = 119 4th & 5th graders)
1) instructions (imagery; sentence; none)
2) who provided strategy (experimenter; 
subject)
(n = 119 5th & 6th graders)
1) instructions (imagery; none)
2) position of first test (immediate; delayed)
Imagery and sentence instructions facilitated 
recognition over no instruction group, which 
persisted over 1 week.
Who provided strategy made no difference.
Imagery instruction group recalled better in both 
immediate and delayed test.
Imagery instructions group recalled more semantic 
than verbal test items.
Montague & Carter 
(1973)' (educational 
psychology)
(n = 44  undergraduates)
1) instructions (imagery; none)
2) syntactic organization (ordered; random)
3) vividness of narrative (low; high)







(n = 32  undergraduates)
1) instruction of image type (common; 
bizarre)
Study 1: (n = 64 undergraduates)
1) instructions (imagery; rote repetition)
2) imagery rating of nouns (low; high) 
Studies 2 & 3: (n2=64; n3 = 192  
undergraduates)
1) instructions (imagery; rote repetition)
2) imagery rating of nouns (low; high)
3) number of dictionary meanings (low; high)
No difference on recall for common and bizarre 
images. Bizarre images took longer to form.
Overall, imagery instructions produced superior 
recognition and recall.
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(n = 86 3rd graders)
1) instructions (imagery; none)
(n = 60 undergraduates)
1) instructions (interactive imagery; 
separation imagery; rote repetition)
2) imagery ratings of nouns (HH; HL; LH; LL)
Study 1: (n = 85 undergraduates)
1) analysis (prior; no prior)
2) instructions (image; re-image; recall) 
Study 2: (n = 30 undergraduates)
1) instructions (imagery; recall)
Imagery group performed better.
Interactive imagery instructions led to superior recall, 
but only with high imagery cues.
Study 1: Recall group had more original responses 
and inversions than imagery groups.
Study 2: Imagery group had better recall.
Slee (1978)* (cognitive 
psychology)
Wittrock & Goldberg 
(1975)' (cognitive 
psychology)
Study 1; (n = 40 undergraduates)
1) stimulus concreteness (concrete; abstract)
2) instructions (imagery; verbal)
3) imagery ability (low; high)
Study 2: (n = same 40 as Study 1)
1) instructions (imagery; none)
2} imagery ability (low; high)
Studies 1 & 2: (n ,= 48  undergraduates; 
n2= 48  6th graders)
1) instructions (imagery; story; sentence; 
none)
2) imagery value of noun (low; high)
3) meaningfulness of word (high; low)
Study 1: Concrete stimulus, imagery instructions, 
and high imagery ability groups had better recall. 
Study 2: No significant main effects.
No effect for instructions.
•*1
T a b le  2 . 8  (C o n tin u e d )
EMPIRICAL STUD IES INVESTIGATING A W A R E N E SS  A S  A  DEPENDENT VARIABLE
AND INSTRUCTIO NS TO IMAGINE A S  AN INDEPENDENT VARIABLE
Source Independent Variables Relevant Results
Wortman & Sparling (n=36 undergraduates) No effect for instructions.
(1974)' (cognitive 1) instructions (bizarre image; common
psychology) image; verbal)
2) concreteness (concrete; abstract)
'Recall as dependent measure 
bRecognition as dependent measure
cBoth recall and recognition examined as dependent measures
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instructions, only that no differences in performance were found am ong the types of instructions. 
Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that imagery instructions facilitate memory performance.
In contrast with the general studies, no studies in marketing have examined the impact 
of instructions to  imagine on awareness. As will be discussed later, however, marketing 
applications have investigated the effects of imagery instructions on attitudes and intentions. 
Thus, in this section, no marketing applications will be reviewed.
Since the general studies concentrate on learning rather than advertising applications, 
the instructions have been provided by the experimenter, not em bedded in the stimulus to  be 
learned. This is not unreasonable from a  learning perspective since a teacher can instruct 
students in using imagery as  a  learning aid. From an advertiser’s  point of view, however, this is 
not reasonable. Thus, an advertisement utilizing instructions to  imagine as an imagery-eliciting 
strategy would necessarily have to  embed the instructions within the m essage itself. Therefore, 
the results reviewed in this section will have to be interpolated to m essage-em bedded 
instructions.
General Findings. Similar to the studies that have used pictures as an independent 
variable, studies manipulating instructions can be broken down into those investigating the 
impact on recall, recognition, or both recall and recognition. The majority, however, have 
examined recall as the aw areness dependent variable. These studies will b e  reviewed first 
followed by those examining recognition or both recognition and recall, respectively. All studies 
are summarized in Table 2.8.
Most of the recall studies have examined the impact of different types of instructions. 
Anderson and Hidde (1971) manipulated imagery instructions or pronunciability instructions and 
found that better recall of sentences occurred in the imagery instruction group; indeed, the 
imagery instruction group recalled greater than three times more sentences than the 
pronunciability group. The authors also found that sentences evoking vivid images were better 
recalled than those evoking dim images, but the effect was not strong.
The most common manipulation involved imagery instructions versus rote repetition 
instructions. Elliott (1973) instructed subjects to use imagery or rote repetition to  learn 64 pairs 
of nouns. Imagery value of the nouns and an interpolation task activity (either visual or auditory) 
were also manipulated, and it was found that recall was superior under the imagery instruction 
condition and for high imagery words. He also found that a visual language task and an 
auditory nonverbal task interfered with imagery and rote repetition conditions, respectively, but a  
visual pictorial task had only negligible interference. Griffith and Johnston (1973) also 
manipulated imagery instructions versus rote repetition instructions as  well a s  imagery value and 
signal type (aural or visual) on learning of 23 pairs of nouns. Similar to Elliott (1973), it was 
found that the imagery instruction group, as well as the high imagery words, resulted in superior 
recall. They also found that the processing capacity expended was lower under imagery 
instructions and with high imagery items. Robbins et al. (1974) also manipulated instructions as 
either interactive imagery, separation imagery, or rote repetition and found that interactive 
imagery instructions led to superior recall, but only with high Imagery cues. Thus, similar to 
pictures, interaction may be a necessary condition for superior performance effects. Sheehan 
(1966) instructed subjects to use either imagery or recall methods (i.e., rote repetition) to 
facilitate recall of patterns of geometric forms. He also reported better performance in the group 
given imagery instructions. Partial support for imagery instructions over verbal instructions is 
provided by Siee (1978) for she found the imagery group to exhibit superior recall in one study 
but no differences in the other study. Wittrock and Goldberg (1975) instructed subjects to form 
an image, make up a story, make up a  sentence, or no instructions and found no effect of 
instructional set on recall. Similarly, Wortman and Sparling (1974) instructed subjects to  form 
bizarre images, common images, or to use verbal mediation, but they also failed to find an effect 
on recall. While a  few exceptions have been reported, in general, it has been found that 
instructing individuals to form a mental image over instructing them to use som e type of verbal 
mediation (i.e., rote repetition) is more effective on recall.
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Three studies have manipulated the effect of providing imagery instructions or no 
instructions at all on recall with favorable results for imagery instructions In two of the studies. 
Kulhavy and Swenson (1975) found that the imagery-instructed group performed better on both 
an immediate and delayed recall test. Furthermore, it was found that the Imagery-Instructed 
group recalled more semantic than verbal items. Pressley (1976) also found that third grade 
children given instructions to form a mental image of prose they had read performed better on a 
recall test of the passage. Montague and Carter (1973), on the other hand, did not find any 
effect for the instructions to imagine group. However, the authors also manipulated the 
syntactic ordering of a passage, with half of the subjects receiving the passage in syntactic 
order and the other half receiving it in random order. While the researchers found that better 
recall occurred in the group receiving the passage in order, this manipulation may have 
influenced the instruction manipulation. Indeed, regardless of instruction, the subjects must 
have had a very difficult time making sense out of a  random ordering of several words.
Therefore, while only three studies have examined the impact of instructions to imagine versus 
no instructions on recall, it can be concluded that instructions to imagine facilitate recall.
Finally, two studies did not actually manipulate instructions to imagine but included them 
in their studies. Lippman (1974) instructed all subjects to form a mental image to help them 
recall a list of enactive imagery pairs. The combination of enactive Imagery ratings for each 
word in the pair was manipulated, and similar to Paivio (1969), the pair with the highest enactive 
imagery combination was recalled best. Nappe and Wollen (1973) instructed subjects to 
generate common or bizarre images as a retention aid. While no differences between the 
groups were found, the authors did not examine whether these instructions are superior to no 
mediating imagery instructions.
Only a few studies have investigated recognition as a dependent variable, but results are 
supportive of imagery instructions. Bull and Wittrock (1973) instructed fifth grade students to 
form a mental image of a definition, trace the picture provided of the definition, or repeatedly
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write the definition for a list of 18 words. Children in the self-discovered imagery group 
performed better on a one-week recognition test than the other two groups. Kerst and Levin 
(1973) provide partial support for the superior effect of imagery instructions on recognition.
They instructed fifth and sixth grade students to form a  mental image, form a  sentence, or no 
instructions in a paired-associate task. They also manipulated who provided the mediation aid, 
either the experimenter or subject. It was found that both imagery and sentence instructions 
facilitated recognition over the no instruction group, and the effect persisted over one week. 
Furthermore, it did not matter who provided the image or sentence. Thus, it appears that for 
young children, any mediation aid (imagery or verbal) facilitates recognition.
Peterson and McGee (1974) instructed subjects to form an image or use rote repetition 
to facilitate recall and recognition of 36 nouns. The researchers also manipulated imagery rating 
and number of definition meanings of the nouns. Again, the imagery group, as  well as the high 
imagery nouns, produced better recall and recognition, while the number of dictionary meanings 
had no effect. Bower (1970) also found that imagery instructions were superior to rote repetition 
instructions but only for recall, not recognition. Moreover, similar to Robbins et al. (1974), it was 
found that interactive imagery was necessary.
Summary. The studies reviewed in this section include those that have manipulated the 
instructional set given to subjects. Typically, researchers have given subjects instructions to 
imagine or rote repetition instructions to facilitate recall, recognition, or both. Others have 
simply manipulated instructions to imagine versus no instructions at all. The results provide 
overwhelming support for the relative efficacy of instructions to imagine with only a few 
exceptions. Thus, it can be concluded that instructing individuals to form a mental image o f a 
word, sentence, o r passage results in  better awareness.
It must be noted, however, that all studies reviewed in this subsection came from the 
psychology literature for there have been no marketing applications examining the impact of 
instructions to imagine on awareness. Furthermore, the studies reviewed have all examined
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experimenter-provided instructions, not instructions em bedded within a  stimulus message. 
Nevertheless, the dissertation included instructions to imagine as an imagery-eliciting strategy, 
and these instructions were em bedded within m essage stimuli. -It was expected that the 
instructions to  imagine condition would result in better recall than the no instructions to imagine 
condition.
Summary
The studies reviewed in this section have ail examined awareness as  a  dependent 
variable. Awareness is a general class of memory variables and is comprised of recall and 
recognition. While some studies have examined both memory variables, the majority have 
investigated the effect of an imagery-eliciting strategy on recall.
Studies that have manipulated the two imagery-eliciting variables of interest to  the 
dissertation research have been reviewed with respect to their impact on awareness.
Specifically, studies manipulating presentation format (i.e., pictures versus words) and studies 
manipulating instructions given to respondents have been independently reviewed. These two 
imagery-eliciting strategies have been reviewed independently for they have not been compared 
in the sam e study before. Two exceptions exist, however. Levin et al. (1973) manipulated 
pictures versus words as well as the instructions given, and Rasco et al. (1975) also manipulated 
drawings versus no drawings and imagery strategy instructions versus no instructions. While 
these two studies have already manipulated the two independent variables of interest in the 
dissertation research, in both instances the instructions to imagine have been experimenter- 
provided external to the stimuli. Thus, it would still be of relevance and benefit to advertisers to 
study the impact of message-embedded instructions to  imagine and pictures on awareness.
Several conclusions can be drawn from the review of studies manipulating presentation 
format (see Table 2.7 for a summary of studies). First, in general, pictures are superior to words 
in facilitating awareness (e.g., all studies in Table 2.7 except Milgram 1967 and Reese 1965).
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Second, interactive pictures are more effective than both noninteractive pictures or words in 
facilitating awareness (e.g., Childers and Houston 1984; Lippman and Shanahan 1973; Lutz and 
Lutz 1977). Third, the superiority of pictures over words on awareness diminishes as  exposure 
time decreases (e.g., Gardner and Houston 1986; Houston et al. 1987; Paivio and Csapo 1969). 
Fourth, imagery ability may moderate the pictorial superiority effect (e.g., McKelvie and Demers 
1979; Rohwer and Harris 1975). Finally, type of processing influences the pictorial superiority 
effect (e.g., Childers and Houston 1984; D’Agostino et al. 1977; Paivio and Csapo 1969).
The main conclusion that can be drawn from the review of studies manipulating 
instructions given to respondents is that imagery instructions facilitate aw areness (see Table 2.8 
for a  summary of studies). This was supported regardless of whether the instructions 
manipulation involved imagery versus verbal instructions (typically rote repetition) or imagery 
versus no instructions. However, no marketing applications have investigated the impact of 
imagery instructions on awareness, which indicates a need to do so because awareness is an 
important communication effect.
BELIEFS AS DEPENDENT VARIABLES
The first type of communication effect, awareness, has been reviewed, and it was shown 
that a  substantial number of studies have analyzed this effect. The last four effects enumerated 
by Rossiter and Percy (1983) are "preferential" for they allow consumers to  make a choice 
between products as opposed to simply being aware of them. Three of these preferential 
communication effects were studied in the dissertation: beliefs, attitudes, and intentions.
Rossiter and Percy (1983) point out, however, that while "it seem s highly probable that visual 
content in advertisements can affect product beliefs, research evidence on this phenomenon is 
virtually nonexistent" (p. 110). As will be seen in the next section, several imagery studies have 
analyzed attitudes and a  few intentions, but only a handful have investigated imagery and 
product beliefs (e.g., Dickson et al. 1986; Edell and Staelin 1983; Mitchell 1986; Mitchell and
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Olson 1981). Also, Imagery studies that have examined beliefs have manipulated pictures as  the 
imagery-eliciting strategy.
Mitchell and Olson (1981) manipulated the presentation format of four print 
advertisements for a  hypothetical brand of facial tissues. (They also manipulated repetition but 
were unable to  show any effects.) One ad was verbal-only stating that "Brand I facial tissues are 
soft." The other three ads contained only a  picture along with the brand name. The pictorial 
stimuli consisted of a  fluffy kitten, a  picture of a  sunset, and an abstract painting. While the 
kitten generated the strongest softness belief, the sunset and abstract painting resulted in 
subjects believing that the tissue cam e in many colors, and the abstract painting resulted in 
beliefs that it w as less absorbent, did not tear as  easily, and w as more economical than the 
other brands. Thus, visual com ponents in print ads convey information that influences brand 
beliefs.
Edell and Staelin (1983) measured beliefs in their advertising study on framed pictures, 
unframed pictures, and verbal-only copy. Brand attribute beliefs were unique to each subject 
and the m easure was based on attributes that were either a  priori important to  the individual in 
evaluating a  brand within the product class, listed by the subject during the elicitation task, or 
one of the three attributes in the ad. Thus, the m easures of brand attribute beliefs consisted of 
asking the subjects to indicate how likely it was that each brand possessed  the attributes they 
had indicated (7-point scale). It was found that if the ad  contained an unframed picture instead 
of a  framed picture or verbal-only m essage, the average subject w as not a s  likely to  give any 
support or counterargument on an a priori important attribute. The authors concluded that 
subjects forget or are distracted from their brand evaluation task when viewing unframed 
pictorial advertisements.
Dickson et al. (1986) evaluated, attempted to replicate, and improved upon a  study 
performed by Kisielius and Sternthal (1984, discussed in detail in next section). Using the stimuli 
from Kisielius and Sternthal’s study, Dickson et al. included belief m easures in addition to
attitude measures. The first factor manipulated the initial instruction in the experimental booklet, 
which involved the presence or absence of instructions to  imagine. The second manipulation 
involved verbal-only phrases at the bottom of each page of the 13 pages, picture-words in which 
the picture w as presented above the verbal phrase (similar to  Kisielius and Stemthal), or words- 
picture in which the position of the picture and words w as reversed. Furthermore, the verbal 
phrase w as enlarged in the last condition. Subjects responded to 11 general belief statem ents 
about the brand of sham poo advertised and 16 very specific belief judgm ents from the 
advertising copy but including three false product claims. It was found that som e, but not all, 
beliefs were influenced by the m essage manipulation, and pictures enhanced beliefs about the 
product.
Mitchell (1986) also examined beliefs generated as a  result of manipulating the type of 
picture in a  print advertisement. He measured salient beliefs determined by pretests as well as 
using a free elicitation procedure. There were no significant differences found on the number of 
product attribute beliefs by picture type or product.
Summary
Since beliefs have not been studied very extensively with respect to imagery processing, 
it w as included in the dissertation as  an exploratory variable. While there is no strong theoretical 
or empirical grounding for the influence of imagery-eliciting strategies and imagery processing 
on brand beliefs, it can be speculated that the two imagery-eliciting strategies will result in 
differential beliefs about the brand advertised. Furthermore, one imagery-eliciting strategy may 
result In a greater number of beliefs as well as different brand belief strengths.
ATTITUDES AS DEPENDENT VARIABLES
In contrast with studies examining aw areness as  a dependent variable, studies 
investigating the effect of an imagery-eliciting strategy, either pictures or instructions to imagine,
on attitude have been less numerous. However, while only a  few studies in psychology exist 
(e.g., Gregory et al. 1982; Rigney and Lutz 1976), several studies in marketing have analyzed 
attitude as a  dependent variable. While the majority of studies in marketing have concentrated 
on attitude toward the brand or object (e.g., Bone and Ellen 1990; Bums et al. 1991; Dickson et 
al. 1986; Edell and Staelin 1983; Gardner and Houston 1986; Holbrook and Moore 1981; Kisielius 
and Sternthal 1984; Mitchell 1986; Mitchell and Olson 1981; Oliver et al. 1989; Rossiter and 
Percy 1978, 1980; Wright and Rip 1980), some have also investigated attitude toward the act of 
purchasing and using the product (e.g., Edell and Staelin 1983; Mitchell 1986; Mitchell and Olson 
1981) and attitude toward the advertisement (e.g., Bone and Ellen 1990; Burns et al. 1991; 
Mitchell 1986; Mitchell and Olson 1981). The marketing applications have been performed within 
an advertising context (c.f., Holbrook and Moore 1981), which could be an explanation for the 
emphasis on attitude as a dependent variable since this variable is one of the communication 
effects listed by Rossiter and Percy (1983).
Similar to the studies on awareness, either pictures or instructions to imagine have been 
the independent variables, but typically both have not been manipulated in the same study (c.f., 
Dickson et al. 1986; Kisielius and Sternthal 1984). Thus, studies manipulating pictures as the 
independent variable will be reviewed first followed by those manipulating instructions to 
imagine. These studies are summarized in Tables 2.9 and 2.10.
Pictures as Independent Variables
Several marketing applications have investigated the impact of pictures on attitudes, 
while only one study from the psychology literature has done so. While not merely examining 
the impact of pictures versus words as in many of the studies examining memory as the 
dependent variable, several of the marketing applications have manipulated the valence of the 
pictures (i.e., positive, neutral, or negative) used as stimuli. However, it will become obvious that 
pictures, in general, generate more favorable attitudes than no pictures, and that favorably
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evaluated pictures generate the most positive attitudes. The general finding in psychology will 
be reviewed followed by the findings from marketing, and all of the studies are summarized in 
Table 2.9.
General Finding. Rigney and Lutz (1976) manipulated the format of a  computer-assisted 
chemistry lesson as verbal-only or verbal and graphics. As already discussed in the section on 
memory, they found greater recall and recognition in the imagery group. Furthermore, they also 
investigated the impact on attitude toward the treatment as well as  attitude toward the computer- 
assisted lesson. Not only did the imagery group learn more, but they also generated more 
positive attitudes. This group rated the lesson more fun than the group receiving the verbal 
manipulation, but they did not rate the lesson as necessarily more important than the verbal-only 
group. In sum, the imagery group liked the computer-assisted lesson more than the verbal-only 
group.
Marketing Applications. The studies in marketing can be grouped according to  what 
type of attitude has been analyzed. As mentioned in the introduction to this section, several 
studies have investigated the effect of pictures on brand attitudes (or attitude toward the object), 
attitude toward the act of purchasing and using the brand or object, and attitude toward the 
advertisement. All three will be reviewed in turn.
Attitude Toward the Brand. Only two studies have analyzed the impact of verbal-only 
information versus pictorial and verbal information on attitude toward the brand, and the results 
conflict with each other. Kisielius and Sternthal (1984) performed a pilot study in which 
presentation format was manipulated as verbal-only statements or pictures In conjunction with 
each verbal statement. Thus, each statement appeared on a separate page and each was or 
was not accompanied by a line drawing depicting the verbal statement. The results indicated 
that the picture condition produced less favorable attitudes toward the brand of shampoo 
advertised. They then performed a  study in which instructions in the experimental booklet 
included or did not include instructions to imagine as well as the presentation format
T a b le  2 .9
EM PIRICAL STU D IES INVESTIGATING A TTITU DES A S  DEPENDENT VARIABLES
AND PICTU RES A S  AN INDEPENDENT VARIABLE
Source Variables Relevant Results
General Finding: 
Rigney & Lutz (1976)
Marketing Applications:
Dickson, Burnkrant, 
Miniard, and Unnava 
(1986)
Edell & Staelin (1983)
(n = 40  undergraduates)
Independent Variables:
1) format of lesson (verbal; verbal & 
graphics)
Attitude Dependent Variables:
1) attitude toward format
2) attitude toward the computer-assisted 
lesson
In = 555 undergraduates)
Independent Variables:
1) instructions (imagery; none)
2) presentation format (verbal; picture top & 




(n= 27  undergraduates)
Independent Variables:
1) structure of ad (verbal; pictorial-framed; 
pictorial-unframed)
2) message content (objective; subjective; 
characterization)
Imagery group had more positive attitudes. 
Imagery lesson was rated more fun, but not more 
useful than verbal lesson.
Imagery group liked lesson more.
Pictures had a significant positive effect on attitude.
Pictorial-unframed ads elicited more positive 
attitudes.
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Edell & Staelin (1983) 
(continued)
3) product class (car, calculator, camera) 
Attitude Dependent Variables:
1) brand attitude
2) attitude toward the act of purchasing
Gardner & Houston 
(1986)
(n = 64 undergraduates)
Independent Variables:
1) exposure time (short; long)
2) time of measure (immediate; delayed)
3) content of stimuli (varied favorability 
of pictorial & verbal content)
Attitude Dependent Variable:
1) store evaluation
Relative contributions of pictures with respect to 
evaluation increased with delayed measure.
For immediate evaluation, pictures play a greater role 
under limited processing than under more extensive 
processing.
Verbal material contributed to store evaluation to a 
greater extent than nonverbal material.
Holbrook & Moore 
(1981)
(n = 59 graduate students) 
Independent Variable:
1) presentation format (verbal; visual) 
Dependent Variable:
1) judgements (feature interactions)
An additive strategy reduced the relative tendency 
for pictures to produce more feature interactions.
Use of mental imagery reduced the relative 
advantage of pictures over words in evoking feature 
interactions.
Mental imaging produced a significant main effect of 
pictures versus words on number of feature 
interactions.
Kisielius & Sternthal 
(1984)
Pilot studv: In= 4 3  underoraduates and 
graduate students)
Independent Variable:
1) presentation (verbal; verbal/picture)
Pilot study: Picture condition produced less favorable 
attitudes.
CD-------------------------------------------------------------------------------  -*j
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Kisielius & Sternthal 
(1984) (continued)
Mitchell (1986)
Study 1: In = 90 undergraduates)
Independent Variables:
1) presentation (verbal: verbal/pictures)
2) instructions (imagery; none)
Study 2: (n = 58 undergraduates)
Independent Variables:
1) presentation (verbal; verbal/pictures)
2) speed of presentation (slow; fast)
Study 3: (n= 58 undergraduates)
Independent Variables:
1) presentation (verbal; verbal/pictures)
2) extra information (favorable; control) 
Attitude Dependent Variable for all studies:
1) brand attitude (alpha = .59-.61)
(n = 69 undergraduates)
Independent Variables:
1) picture type (none; positive; neutral; 
negative)
2) product (toothpaste; pen; cola; deodorant) 
Attitude Dependent Variables:
1) brand attitude
2) attitude toward act of purchasing
3) attitude toward the ad
Study 1: Absence of instructions and verbal 
condition produced more favorable attitudes.
Study 2: When speed of presentation was slow, 
more favorable attitudes in verbal condition; when 
fast, presentation format had no effect.
Study 3: Control condition had more favorable 
attitudes in verbal condition; favorable 
communication resulted in less favorable attitudes in 
verbal condition.
Ad with positively evaluated picture resulted in most 
favorable brand attitude and attitude toward the act. 
Different attitudes were created for products that 
have the same product attribute beliefs.
Attitude toward the ad based on entire ad, not just 
valenced pictures.
s
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Mitchell & Olson 
(1981)
(n = 71 undergraduates)
Independent Variables:





2) attitude toward act of purchasing
3) attitude toward the ad
Kitten and sunset pictures included in the ad created 
more positive brand attitudes than abstract painting 
or verbal-only.
Kitten and sunset pictures resulted in more positive 
attitude toward the act of purchasing than abstract 
painting.
Attitude toward the ad influences brand attitude.
Rossiter & Percy 
(1978, 1980)
(n = 88 non-student adults)
Independent Variables:
1) visual (strong; weak)
2) copy (concrete; abstract)
3) visual imagery ability (verbal; visual) 
- 1978 study only.
Attitude Dependent Variable:
1) brand attitude
More positive brand attitude for ad with strong visual 
component.
Strongest attitude elicited by combination of strong 
visual and concrete copy.
Visualizers showed greatest degree of affective 
learning overall • greater under strong visual and 
abstract copy.
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manipulation. While there was no effect found for the instruction manipulation, it was again 
found that the verbal-only condition produced more favorable brand attitudes. A second study 
manipulated speed of presentation as well as presentation format. Again, it was found that the 
verbal-only condition resulted in a  more favorable brand attitude, but only in the slow condition. 
Finally, in a  third study the researchers manipulated a  priori extra communication given to 
subjects as either favorable or irrelevant In addition to the presentation format manipulation. 
Again, in the control group, more favorabte attitudes resulted in the verbal-only condition, but in 
the favorable communication group, a less favorabte attitude resulted in the verbal-only 
condition.
To explain these results, Kisielius and Sternthal proposed the "availability-valence" 
hypothesis. They felt that the verbal-picture condition resulted in more cognitive elaboration, but 
the valence of the information was less positive than the verbal-only condition, which was 
assum ed to be very positive. Thus, less positive attitudes resulted in the verbal-picture 
condition. Since presentation format had no effect at the fast presentation rate, it was believed 
that further support for their hypothesis was attained because respondents are not able to 
cognitively elaborate at the faster rate. Moreover, by providing favorable extra communication, 
the verbal-only condition did not produce more positive attitudes, which further supported their 
hypothesis.
This study has been criticized by other researchers. First, Edell and Staelin (1983) found 
effects opposite to those of Kisielius and Sternthal (1984) and suggest that perhaps the stimuli in 
Kisielius and Sternthal’s study did not consist of equivalent messages. Second, Dickson et al. 
(1986), using the actual stimuli provided by Kisielius and Sternthal, found opposite results. Thus, 
in an attempt to evaluate, replicate, and expand on the Kisielius and Sternthal study, Dickson et 
al. (1986) performed a  study similar to Kisielius and Sternthal’s second study in which 
instructions and presentation format were manipulated. Additionally, since Kisielius and 
Sternthal's reported alphas ranged from only .59 to .61 for their attitude measure, additional
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attitude m easures were used. Contrary to Kisielius and Sternthal, Dickson et al. report a  positive 
effect on attitude in the picture-verbal condition. This effect was found using a  more reliable 
measure of brand attitude (alpha = .85). However, no difference in attitude was found using 
Kisielius and Sternthal's attitude measure.
Gardner and Houston (1986) manipulated the favorability of pictorial and verbal content 
in a  m essage describing restaurants. They found that brand attitudes for m essages with 
favorable pictures and unfavorable verbal content increase in delayed measures, but the 
opposite w as found for m essages with unfavorable pictures and favorable verbal content. In the 
immediate response condition, it was found that unfavorable pictures combined with favorable 
words resulted in more positive brand attitudes under the long exposure condition, but the 
pattern was reversed for the favorable picture and unfavorable word combination. However, as 
mentioned In the section on awareness, it appears that the manipulations in this study hold little 
relevance for advertisers since the inclusion of either an unfavorable picture or words is unlikely.
While not in an advertising context, Holbrook and Moore (1981) manipulated 
presentation format, either visual or verbal, of several combinations of sweater features. They 
measured respondents’ judgments of each combination and found a greater number of feature 
interactions (i.e., greater judgments) for the picture condition. However, for those subjects using 
mental imagery in either condition, it was found that the relative advantage of pictures over 
words in evoking feature interactions was reduced. Thus, respondents using imagery 
processing regardless of the presentation condition had a greater effect.
Rossiter and Percy (1978, 1980) manipulated the visual as well as the verbal 
components of a  print advertisement for beer. The visual was either strong (i.e., a  large picture) 
or weak (i.e., a  small picture), and the verbal copy was either concrete or abstract. While both 
studies used the sam e data, the 1978 study also analyzed visual imagery ability as a  predictor 
variable. It was found that a more positive brand attitude resulted from the ads containing the 
large picture. The strongest brand attitude was elicited by the combination of large picture and
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concrete copy, but for visualizers this was true for the larger picture and abstract copy 
condition.
Attitude Toward the Brand and Act. Edell and Staelin (1983) examined the impact of 
ads containing a framed picture, an unframed picture, or verbal-only copy on brand attitude and 
attitude toward the act of purchasing the brand. While there was no difference between the 
pictorial-framed and verbal-only ads, it was found that pictorial-unframed ads resulted in more 
positive brand attitudes and attitudes toward the act of purchasing the product. Thus, simply 
adding a picture does not imply greater attitudes. In this case, a picture that did not merely 
reflect the verbal copy was more effective.
Attitude Toward the Brand. Act, and Ad. Finally, Mitchell (1986) and Mitchell and Olson 
(1981) examined the effect of pictures on attitude toward the brand, attitude toward the act of 
purchasing and using the brand, and attitude toward the ad. In both studies, the type of picture 
was manipulated. Ads contained either no picture, a positively-valenced photograph (i.e., a 
kitten in Mitchell and Olson (1981) and a sunrise in Mitchell (1986)), a neutral photograph (i.e., a 
sunset and an abstract painting in Mitchell and Olson (1981), an abstract photograph of an aerial 
view of a field of crops in Mitchell (1986)) o ra  negatively-valenced photograph in Mitchell (1986) 
(i.e., a wildcat). While the ads containing pictures in Mitchell and Olson (1981) did not contain 
verbal copy, all ads in Mitchell (1986) contained approximately 50 words of copy. In both 
studies, it was found that the ad with the positive photograph resulted in the most favorable 
brand attitudes and attitudes toward purchasing the brand. It was also found that attitude 
toward the ad influenced attitude toward the brand and act. While the studies did not explicitly 
study the impact of the manipulation or attitude toward the ad, Mitchell did conclude that 
attitude toward the ad is based on the entire ad, not simply the valenced visual component.
Summary. With the exception of Kisielius and Sternthal (1984), studies manipulating 
pictures as an independent variable have generally found that pictures result in more positive 
attitudes (studies summarized in Table 2.9). Only one study in psychology has examined
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pictures and attitudes (e.g., Rigney and Lutz 1976), but several marketing studies have (e.g., 
Dickson et al. 1986; Edell and Staelin 1983; Gardner and Houston 1986; Holbrook and Moore 
1981; Kisielius and Sternthal 1984; Mitchell 1986; Mitchell and Olson 1981; Rossiter and Percy 
1978, 1980). Moreover, positively-valenced pictures (e.g., Mitchell 1986; Mitchell and Olson 
1981) and unframed pictures (e.g., Edell and Staelin 1983) have resulted in more positive brand 
attitudes and attitudes toward the act of purchasing and using a brand over neutral or 
negatively-valenced pictures and pictorial-framed ads, respectively. Finally, white the studies 
measuring attitude toward the ad have not explicitly examined the impact of pictures (e.g., 
Mitchell 1986; Mitchell and Olson 1981), it has been found that attitude toward the ad mediates 
brand attitudes and that the entire ad, not only a  valenced photograph, influences attitude 
toward the ad.
Instructions to Imagine as an Independent Variable
There are not as  many studies examining the Impact of instructions to imagine on 
attitudes as  there are for aw areness as a  dependent variable. Only one general study (e.g., 
Gregory et al. 1982) and five marketing applications (e.g., Bone and Ellen 1990; Burns et al.
1991; Dickson et al. 1986; Kisielius and Sternthal 1984; Wright and Rip 1980) have been 
conducted with these independent and dependent variables. Moreover, Bone and Ellen (1990) 
and Burns et al. (1991) did not actually manipulate instructions to  imagine as an independent 
variable, but they did include instructions to  imagine em bedded within the stimulus m essage.
The studies reviewed in this subsection are summarized in Table 2.10.
While the general finding supports the hypothesis that instructions to imagine result in 
more positive attitudes, the results from marketing have been dismal. However, each study 
manipulating instructions to imagine is subject to a  flaw that may have influenced the results.
General Finding. Gregory et al. (1982) report results from four experiments, but the 
fourth one holds relevance to  this review. While this study w as published in the social
Table 2 .1 0
EMPIRICAL STUDIES INVESTIGATING ATTITUDES AS DEPENDENT VARIABLES
AND INSTRUCTIONS TO IMAGINE AS AN INDEPENDENT VARIABLE
Source Variables Relevant Results
General Finding:
Gregory, Cialdini, & Study 4: (n=49 non-student adults) Imagery group exhibited more positive attitude.
Carpenter (1982) Independent Variable:
1) instructions (imagery embedded; none)
Attitude Dependent Variable:
1) attitude toward cable TV
Marketing Applications:
Bone & Ellen (1990) (n = 142 undergraduates) The six high-imagery groups did not experience more
Six radio ads all contained high imagery imagery than the low-imagery control, but the high-
wording and instructions to imagine; control imagery processing group (based on reported
ad using low imagery words and no imagery, not manipulation) exhibited greater brand
instructions. attitude and attitude toward the ad.
Independent Variables:
1) self-relatedness (self; other)
2) plausibility/distinctiveness 
(plausible;indistinct; plausible- 




2) attitude toward the ad
Dickson, Bumkrant, 




1) presentation (verbal; verbal/picture)
2) instructions (imagery; none) 
Attitude Dependent Variable:
1) brand attitude
No effect for instructions to imagine.
£
T ab le  2 .1 0  (C o n tin u e d )
EM PIRICAL STU D IES INVESTIGATING A TTITU D ES A S  DEPENDENT VARIABLES
AND IN STRU CTIO N S TO  IMAGINE A S  AN INDEPENDENT VARIABLE
Source Variables Relevant Results
Kisielius & Sternthal 
(1984)
Study 1: (n = 90 undergraduates) 
Independent Variables:
1) presentation (verbal; verbal/picture)
2) instructions (imagery; none) 
Attitude Dependent Variable:
1) brand attitude
No effect for instructions to imagine.
Wright & Rip (1980) (n = 144 10th graders in both studies)
Study 1: "describe and praise messages" 
Study 2: "frame it my way messages"
In both studies, the high similarity condition 
did or did not embed imagery instructions. 
Attitude Dependent Variable:
1) brand attitude
No effect for instructions to imagine.
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psychology literature, It is actually a marketing application. The authors were interested in 
whether or not scenarios could be used as a compliance technique. Thus, to study this, the 
authors manipulated the instructions given to respondents for a scenario concerning cable 
television. Two conditions were examined: an information-only (control) condition and an 
"imagination" (experimental) condition. The imagery condition involved instructions to imagine 
embedded within the message. For example, statements such as, "Take a  moment and imagine 
how CATV will provide you with...," and "Take a moment and think of how...." The information- 
only condition did not contain these two phrases at the beginning of these sentences.
The experimenter contacted each subject by going door-to-door and read the script to 
them. A series of questions pertaining to how likely the subject felt that CATV would be as 
popular as regular TV and how likely they thought CATV would be something they wanted as 
well as attitudes toward CATV were asked. Behavior measures were taken in addition to 
likelihood and attitude measures. Not only were behavioral intentions with respect to requesting 
more information and actually subscribing, but actual behavior was also measured from 
company records 2 to 3 months after the interview contact.
The results indicate a favorable effect for the imagery condition. Subjects in this group 
exhibited greater likelihoods, attitudes, behavioral intentions, and actual behavior. Thus, support 
is provided for embedding imagery instructions within a  message stimulus.
It would be remiss, however, not to point out one factor other than the instructions to 
imagine that may have caused the results. In the information-only condition the message did 
not target the respondent in the scenario, while the imagery condition did. Instead of saying 
"You can plan...," (like in the imagery condition) the wording was "A person can plan..." or "you 
will be able to spend your time...," versus “more time can be spent...." Thus, the imagery 
condition was also self-related, while the information condition was not. It has been found that 
self-related ness of a message influences responses such as likelihood (e.g., Anderson 1983), 
attitudes, and intentions (e.g., Bone and Ellen 1990). Therefore, the m essages were not
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equivalent with respect to self-relatedness, and this could have actually been the causal factor 
for the differences found.
Marketing Applications. While not actually manipulating imagery instructions to imagine, 
Bone and Ellen (1990) and Burns et al. (1991) did incorporate them into the m essage stimulus. 
Bone and Ellen (1990) manipulated self-relatedness and plausibility/distinctiveness in six high- 
imagery radio ads. The high-imagery scenario ads all consisted of concrete words, actionable 
sentences, present tense, and began with the statement, "Imagine this." A low-imagery control 
ad, on the other hand, consisted of abstract words, more complex sentence structure, passive 
tense, and no instruction to imagine. It was found, however, that subjects in the six hlgh- 
imagery conditions did not report experiencing more imagery than the low-imagery control 
group. Thus, subsequent analyses were based on reported imagery, not the manipulation 
condition. It was found that the self-reported high-imagery processing group exhibited greater 
brand attitude and attitude toward the advertisement.
Burns et al. (1991) manipulated concreteness of wording and brand name familiarity in 
their experiment. Each ad stimulus contained instructions to imagine em bedded within the 
message. It was found that concrete wording led to more positive attitudes toward the ad and 
brand.
Studies manipulating instructions to Imagine have been few (e.g., Dickson et al. 1986; 
Kisielius and Sternthal 1984; Wright and Rip 1980), and only Wright and Rip (1980) have 
em bedded the instructions within the message. As discussed previously, Dickson et al. (1986) 
simply attempted to  replicate and Improve upon Kisielius and SternthaPs (1984) second study in 
which presentation format and instructions given to respondents differed. In both studies, 
however, the instructions to imagine were not embedded within the ad, but rather, they were 
included as part of the experimental instructions at the beginning of the booklet. The 
experimenter did not read the instructions to the subjects as many have done in the psychology 
literature when manipulating instructions and studying the impact on awareness. Thus, there is
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no way of knowing whether or not the subjects actually read the instructions. This could have 
been the reason why the instructions to  imagine manipulation did not have an  effect on brand 
attitudes.
Wright and Rip (1980), on the other hand, did manipulate instructions to imagine 
em bedded within a  m essage stimulus. However, they also failed to achieve significant 
differences on attitudes. But this lack of effect could be due to two factors. First, their 
manipulation was fairly weak in the second study, but it appears to  be adequate in the first 
study. The first study was comprised of "describe and praise" m essages. However, similar to 
Gregory et al. (1982), the no imagery instruction m essage is not self-related while the imagery 
condition is, but this did not seem  to have an impact (probably due to the next factor to  be 
discussed). The second study was comprised of "frame it my way" m essages in which subjects 
were encouraged to use various attributes, such as  size, when evaluating a  college. The 
imagery manipulation in this study was very weak, probably due to  the type of m essage. A 
second, and probably more important, factor contributing to the lack of effect concerns subjects’ 
ability to  imagine the scenarios described. Subjects consisted of high school sophom ores, and 
the context of the studies involved evaluating colleges based on information provided. As 
Maclnnis and Price (1987) point out, these individuals may not have sufficient knowledge 
structures to  enable them to imagine anything. Indeed, very few high school sophom ores 
possess enough familiarity with the stimulus studied by Wright and Rip (1980).
Summary. While the results of studies manipulating instructions to  imagine on attitude 
(summarized in Table 2.10) are not encouraging, strict experimental design may overcome som e 
of the factors that may have attributed to the lack of an effect. First, it is imperative that 
m essage stimuli be equivalent with regard to everything but the instructions manipulation. For 
example, it has been pointed out that Gregory et al. (1982) and Wright and Rip (1980) did not do 
this. Second, a manipulation check should be performed to  ensure subjects realize the 
presence of instructions to imagine. Dickson et al. (1986) and Kisielius and Sternthal (1984) did
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not perform this check, and there is no way of knowing whether or not subjects actually read 
the instructions. Finally, it Is necessary that subjects possess adequate familiarity and 
knowledge to imagine the experimental stimuli. This could have been the reason why Wright 
and Rip (1980) did not find an effect for the Instruction manipulation.
Summary
Studies investigating the impact of pictures (summarized in Table 2.9) or instructions to 
imagine (summarized in Table 2.10) on attitude have been reviewed in this section. Very few 
studies from the psychology literature have been conducted (e.g., Gregory et al. 1982; Rigney 
and Lutz 1976), but several marketing applications exist (e.g., Bone and Ellen 1990; Burns et al. 
1991; Dickson et al. 1986; Edell and Staelin 1983; Gardner and Houston 1986; Holbrook and 
Moore 1981; Kisielius and Sternthal 1984; Mitchell 1986; Mitchell and Olson 1981; Oliver et al. 
1989; Rossiter and Percy 1978, 1980; Wright and Rip 1980). In marketing, attitude toward the 
brand or object, attitude toward the act of purchasing and using the brand or object, and 
attitude toward the advertisement have been examined as the attitude dependent variables.
In general, the results indicate that pictures or pictures in conjunction with words elicit 
more favorable attitudes than words only (c.f., Kisielius and Sternthal 1984). Moreover, 
positively-valenced pictures (e.g., Mitchell 1986; Mitchell and Oison 1981) and unframed pictures 
(e.g., Edell and Staelin 1983) have resulted in more positive brand attitudes and attitudes toward 
the act over neutral or negatively-valenced pictures or pictorial framed ads, respectively.
Mitchell (1986) also concludes that the entire ad influences attitude toward the ad.
Manipulating instructions to imagine, however, has produced dismal results with respect 
to attitudes. One general study, Gregory et al. (1982), did find more favorable attitudes in the 
condition that embedded instructions to imagine within a stimulus, but this study could have 
been confounded by self-relatedness of the message, which was not intentionally manipulated.
In marketing, no study supports differences in attitudes as a result of manipulating instructions to
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imagine. However, these studies are riddled with problems such as weak manipulation (e.g., 
Dickson et al. 1986; Kisielius and Sternthal 1984; Wright and Rip 1980) and using stimuli that 
respondents may not have been familiar enough with to use imagery (e.g., Wright and Rip 1980). 
Thus, an attempt was made to mitigate these influences in the dissertation research.
BEHAVIORAL INTENTION AS A DEPENDENT VARIABLE
Considerably less research has examined the effect of imagery-eliciting strategies on 
behavioral intentions. However, this is a third type of preferential communication effect 
enumerated by Rossiter and Percy (1983) that may be influenced by nonverbal content in an 
advertisement as well as nonverbal processing by the recipient. A few studies in social 
psychology (e.g., Anderson 1983; Gregory et al. 1982) and marketing (e.g., Bone and Ellen 
1990; Burns et al. 1991; Edell and Staelin 1983; Mitchell 1986; Mitchell and Olson 1981; Rossiter 
and Percy 1980) have included intention as a dependent variable, and these studies will be 
reviewed in this section. Similar to previous sections, studies manipulating pictures as  an 
independent variable will be reviewed followed by those manipulating instructions to imagine.
Pictures as Independent Variables
All studies manipulating pictures have been from the marketing literature. Thus, no 
general findings can be reported.
Marketing Applications. The studies that have included intention measures have also 
investigated the effect of manipulating pictures on attitudes (e.g., Edell and Staelin 1983; Mitchell 
1986; Mitchell and Olson 1981; Rossiter and Percy 1980). in all studies, the effects on intentions 
were similar to the effects on attitudes, albeit slightly weaker. Since these studies have been 
addressed in previous sections, only the impact on intentions will be highlighted.
Edell and Staelin (1983) found that unframed pictorial advertisements resulted in greater 
purchase intentions than ads containing either framed pictures or no pictures at all. Mitchell
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(1986) and Mitchell and Olson (1981) found that print ads containing positively-valenced 
photographs produced the greatest behavioral intentions. Finally, Rossiter and Percy (1980) 
found that a strong visual component combined with concrete copy favorably Influenced 
behavioral intentions.
Instructions to imagine as an Independent Variable
Four studies have investigated imagery instructions and behavioral intentions (e.g., 
Anderson 1983; Bone and Ellen 1990; Burns et al. 1991; Gregory et al. 1982), but only one has 
actually manipulated instructions to imagine (e.g., Gregory et al. 1982).
General Findings. Recall that Gregory et al. (1982) manipulated the instructions to 
imagine embedded within a message concerning cable television. As with attitudes, the 
imagery-instructed group reported significantly greater intentions to request additional 
information and to subscribe to CATV. Moreover, in terms of actual behavior, this group 
exhibited a greater actual subscription rate. However, recall that this study may have been 
confounded by the inadvertent manipulation of self-relatedness in the message stimuli.
Anderson (1983), while not actually manipulating instructions to Imagine, asked subjects 
to draw a cartoon of a behavior and manipulated who the main character was (i.e., self, close 
friend, or disliked acquaintance). He found that subjects drawing themselves in the cartoon 
exhibited greater intention changes to perform that behavior, while drawing others did not have 
an effect. Thus, even though a subject produced imagery about the other characters, it did not 
have an impact on one’s own behavioral intentions.
Marketing Applications. No studies in marketing have manipulated instructions to 
imagine and studied behavioral intentions. However, recall that Bone and Ellen (1990) did use 
six high-imagery ads and one low-imagery control ad, but they used reported use of imagery to 
conduct their analyses. They found that the high-imagery processing group exhibited greater 
behavioral intentions indirectly through attitude toward the ad. Furthermore, similar to Anderson
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(1983), self-related imagery produced a greater direct effect on behavioral intentions. Bums et 
al. (1991) included instructions to imagine in all experimental stimuli, but no effect was found on 
behavioral intentions for the other variables manipulated (i.e., concreteness of wording and 
brand familiarity).
Summary
Not many imagery studies have included behavioral intention a s  a  dependent variable. 
However, ones that have manipulated pictures have found similar effects to  those found for 
attitudes; that is, pictures, especially positively-valenced or unframed pictures, favorably 
influence behavioral intentions (Edell and Staelin 1983; Mitchell 1986; Mitchell and Olson 1981; 
Rossiter and Percy 1980). Only Gregory et al. (1982) studied the impact of instructions to 
imagine versus no instructions to imagine on behavioral intentions. Again, similar to their results 
for attitudes, the instructions to  imagine condition resulted in greater behavioral intentions as  
well as  actual behavior. However, it has been shown that the self-relatedness of the Imagery 
influences behavioral intentions (Anderson 1983; Bone and Ellen 1990).
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This chapter consists of eleven sections: (1) Introduction; (2) Definition of Mental 
Imagery; (3) Overview of Gaps in Imagery Research; (4) Brief History of Imagery Research; (5) 
Imagery-Eliciting Strategies; (6) Constructs and Measures of Individual Differences in Imagery 
Processing; (7) Measuring Imagery Processing; (8) Awareness a s  a  Dependent Variable; (9) 
Beliefs a s  Dependent Variables; (10) Attitudes as  Dependent Variables; and (11) Behavioral 
Intention as a  Dependent Variable. Each section is briefly summarized below.
While there are many types of imagery, thought (or memory) imagery is relevant to  a 
consum er context in general and an advertising context in particular. The definition used in the 
dissertation research is the sam e as that espoused by Maclnnis and Price (1987, p. 473):
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"Mental imagery is a process by which sensory information is represented in working memory," 
and ft is in the absence of genuine and perceptual counterparts (Richardson 1969). Therefore, 
unlike discursive processing, which is symbolic or language-like Information processing, imagery 
processing can be multisensory. Thus, imagery can involve images made up of sight, smell, 
taste, sound, and feeling sensations.
Several gaps in imagery research are enumerated in the third section. Thus, a preview 
of relevant constructs along with their measures and empirical studies investigating them is 
provided.
Holt (1964) provides a thorough history of imagery research, which is recapitulated in 
the fourth section of this chapter. Basically, the history of imagery research has undergone 
three distinct eras that have mirrored developments in psychology (Holt 1964): concentration on 
introspection, banishment of mentalistic concepts, and “return of the ostracized." While the early 
1960’s and 1970’s saw the greatest increase in imagery research in psychology, it has only been 
during the last decade that imagery has enjoyed prominence in the marketing literature.
Since the dissertation research included two imagery-eliciting strategies, the fifth section 
introduces and conceptualizes four imagery-eliciting strategies derived from the literature. They 
are: (1) pictures: (2) concrete words; (3) instructions to imagine: and (4) guided imagery 
(Alesandrini and Sheikh 1983; Lutz and Lutz 1978; Maclnnis and Price 1987). Several studies, 
summarized in Table 2.1, have manipulated concreteness of wording or concreteness of wording 
and one other imagery-eliciting strategy, and the results are unequivocal with regard to the 
ability of concrete words to generate greater retention or attitudes over abstract words. Thus, 
this imagery-eliciting strategy was not manipulated in the dissertation research, and only 
concrete copy was utilized in the experimental stimuli. Furthermore, guided imagery Is primarily 
applied in clinical settings and requires considerable effort and training on the part of both the 
researcher and the subject. For this reason, this type of imagery-eliciting strategy was not 
utilized in the dissertation as it appears to hold little relevance for marketers. Pictures can range
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on a continuum from concrete to abstract, and concrete pictures can be interactive or 
noninteractive. Thus, a hierarchy of pictures from most to least effective in terms of eliciting 
imagery can be conceptualized as concrete/interactive, concrete/noninteractive, abstract, and, 
finally, no picture at all. Instructions to imagine involve prompting an individual to use mental 
imagery processing. Thus, this is the most direct way to encourage imagery processing.
The sixth section reviews constructs and measures of individual differences in imagery 
processing. The primary areas of interest in studies of individual differences include: (1) 
imagery ability, (2) imagery content, and (3) processing style. Review of each individual 
difference variable covered several scales that have been developed to measure each 
(summarized in Table 2.4) as well as studies including that variable (summarized in Table 2.3). 
Review of the studies analyzing individual differences in imagery ability and imagery content 
does not allow strong conclusions to be drawn. Processing style, however, has been found to 
be an effective predictor variable and moderator in several studies. Two scales from the 
marketing literature (e.g., SOP: Childers et al. 1985; V/V Index: Holbrook et al. 1984) exist and 
were utilized in the dissertation research to assess an individual's style of processing. This 
variable was treated as a moderating variable between imagery-eliciting strategies and 
consequence variables and between imagery-eliciting strategies and dimensions of imagery 
processing.
Measurement attempts to assess imagery processing were reviewed in the seventh 
section. These efforts are summarized in Tables 2.5 and 2.6. Attempts in psychology have been 
nothing more than manipulation checks. However, in marketing, several attempts have been 
made to develop scales to measure the presence and elaboration of imagery processing. The 
scale developed by Ellen and Bone (1991) was reviewed in detail, and it is obvious that the 
authors did not follow the paradigm set forth by Churchill (1979) for developing a better 
measure. Thus, there is a clear need for rigorous and systematic scale development in this 
area - a need the dissertation attempted to fulfill.
The eighth section reviewed studies from both the psychology and marketing literatures 
that have examined aw areness as a  dependent variable (summarized in Tables 2.7 and 2.8). Of 
specific interest in this section were those studies that have manipulated either pictures or 
instructions to imagine a s  one of the independent variables in the study since these two 
imagery-eliciting strategies were manipulated in the dissertation research. Several conclusions 
can be drawn from the review of studies manipulating presentation format. First, in general, 
pictures are superior to  words in facilitating awareness (e.g., ail studies in Table 2.7 except 
Milgram 1967 and Reese 1965). Second, Interactive pictures are more effective than both 
noninteractive pictures or words in facilitating aw areness (e.g., Childers and Houston 1984; 
Lippman and Shanahan 1973; Lutz and Lutz 1977). Third, the superiority of pictures over words 
on aw areness diminishes as exposure time decreases (e.g., Gardner and Houston 1986;
Houston et al. 1987; Paivio and Csapo 1969). Fourth, imagery ability may moderate the pictorial 
superiority effect (e.g., McKelvie and Demers 1979; Rohwer and Harris 1975). Finally, type of 
processing influences the pictorial superiority effect (e.g., Childers and Houston 1984;
D'Agostino et al. 1977; Paivio and Csapo 1969). While there are exceptions (e.g., Montague and 
Carter 1973; Wittrock and Goldberg 1975; Wortman and Spading 1974), the main conclusion 
that can be drawn from the review of studies manipulating instructions to imagine is that imagery 
instructions facilitate aw areness (e.g., Anderson and Hidde 1971; Bower 1970; Bull and Wittrock 
1973; Elliott 1973; Griffith and Johnston 1973; Kerst and Levin 1973; Kulhavy and Swenson 1975; 
Peterson and McGee 1974; Pressley 1976; Robbins et al. 1974; Sheehan 1966; Slee 1978). 
However, none of these studies represent marketing applications for no studies in marketing 
have analyzed the relationship between instructions to imagine and awareness. In general, then, 
pictures or pictures in conjunction with words are better facilitators of aw areness, and imagery 
instructions versus no or verbal instructions facilitate aw areness. However, the relative efficacy 
of these two strategies has neither been examined in the sam e study nor in an  advertising 
context.
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Beliefs have not been very widely studied in imagery studies, and those including them 
as dependent variables have all been in marketing (e.g., Dickson et al. 1986; Edell and Staelin 
1983; Kisielius and Sternthal 1984; Mitchell 1986; Mitchell and Olson 1981). Since this variable 
has not been studied very extensively with respect to imagery processing, it was included in the 
dissertation as an exploratory variable. While there is no theoretical or empirical grounding for 
the influence of imagery-eliciting strategies and imagery processing on brand beliefs, it can be 
speculated that the two imagery-eliciting strategies will result in differential beliefs about the 
brand advertised. Furthermore, one imagery-eliciting strategy may result in a greater number of 
beliefs as well as different brand belief strengths.
The ninth section reviewed studies investigating attitudes as dependent variables 
(summarized in Tables 2.9 and 2.10). With the exception of Kisielius and Sternthal (1984), 
studies manipulating pictures as an independent variable have generally found that pictures 
result in more positive attitudes toward the brand or object (e.g., Dickson et al. 1986; Edell and 
Staelin 1983; Gardner and Houston 1986; Holbrook and Moore 1981; Mitchell 1986; Mitchell and 
Olson 1981; Rigney and Lutz 1976; Rossiter and Percy 1978, 1980) and the advertisement (e.g., 
Mitchell 1986; Mitchell and Olson 1981). While Gregory et al. (1982) did find more favorable 
attitudes in the imagery-instructed group, studies in marketing have not found this effect (e.g., 
Dickson et al. 1986; Kisielius and Sternthal 1984; Wright and Rip 1980). However, these studies 
suffer from several problems that may have influenced the results.
The final section reviewed behavioral intention as a dependent variable. While not many 
imagery studies have included this variable, the results have been similar to those for attitudes. 
Dickson et al. (1986), Edell and Staelin (1983), Kisielius and Sternthal (1984), Mitchell (1986), and 
Mitchell and Olson (1981) have all manipulated pictures as the independent variable and found 
favorable results for behavioral intentions. Finally, Gregory et al. (1982) found that the imagery- 
instructed group exhibited greater behavioral intentions as well as greater actual behavior.
CHAPTER THREE 
CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT AND METHODOLOGY
INTRODUCTION
This chapter provides an overview of the dissertation research, it specifies procedures that 
were followed to develop the scale to assess imagery processing and the experiment conducted 
to  examine two imagery-eliciting strategies as well as provide a  test toward nomological validity 
of the imagery processing construct. First, a conceptual framework is given in which 
antecedent, moderating, processing, and consequence variables are illustrated. Second, 
constructs given in the framework are conceptualized. Third, specific hypotheses that the 
dissertation research tested are stated. While some hypotheses are well-supported in the 
literature, others are tentative, for they are based on proposed dimensions of imagery 
processing. Finally, the methodology outlining the experimental stimuli development, the 
experimental design, the experimental procedure, and the measurement of variables is given.
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
A general conceptual framework of the dissertation study is presented in Figure 3.1. It 
follows the general stimulus-organism-response framework proffered by Maclnnis and Price
(1987), in which antecedent variables (the imagery-eliciting strategies, namely, pictures and 
instructions to imagine), a  moderating variable (processing style), processing (imagery 
processing), and consequences (memory, beliefs, attitudes, and intentions) are specified.
Most studies reviewed in Chapter Two have not examined the processing that has taken 
place. Thus, antecedents were manipulated and consequences were measured, and sometimes 
moderating variables were examined, which is represented by Path c in the Framework. The 
proposed framework opens up the "black box" by attempting to  measure imagery processing, 
which involves analyzing Paths a  and b in the Framework. Therefore, the framework serves two
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purposes. One is to provide a test toward nomological validity of the imagery processing scale, 
and the other is to examine mediating effects of imagery processing on relationships between 
independent and consequence variables.
CONCEPTUALIZATION OF CONSTRUCTS
Dimensions of Imagery Processing
As pointed out by Ellen and Bone (1991), a  need for a scale measuring communication- 
evoked imagery processing exists. This construct is a function of both an individual’s ability and 
the stimulus. Therefore, the scales discussed in Chapter Two concerning individual differences 
in imagery processing ability and preferences, which are trait scales, are inadequate for this 
purpose (Maclnnis 1986). Furthermore, scales that have been developed in marketing to 
measure communication-evoked imagery processing are also inadequate, for the construct is 
most likely a  multi-dimensional construct (Ellen and Bone 1991).
The dimensions proposed and empirically explored by Ellen and Bone (1991) provide a 
basis from which to develop an adequate imagery processing scale. As noted earlier, they 
proposed five dimensions (vividness, quantity, ease, clarity, and links) but empirically found four 
(vividness, paleness, quantity/ease, and links). However, a  three-factor solution resulted in the 
vividness and paleness dimensions loading on the same factor; indeed, examination of the items 
making up these dimensions reveals that they are essentially polar opposites. Even though the 
three-factor solution was significantly poorer than the four-factor solution, this result could have 
been due to the scale development process adopted by the authors. Therefore, in an attempt to 
provide a more rigorous scale development process, the dissertation proposed three dimensions 
based on extant literature and Ellen and Bone’s (1991) attempt: quality, quantity, and 
elaboration.
Quality. Though it has typically been conceptualized as vividness, quality has been 
espoused as a major dimension of imagery (Betts 1909; Cartwright et al. 1978; Ellen and Bone
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1991; Maclnnis and Price 1987; Marks 1973). Initially, Ellen and Bone treated vividness and 
clarity as  separate dimensions based on a discussion by Morris and Hampson (1983), in which it 
was stated that they may be related dimensions, but sufficient empirical or theoretical support 
for treating them as the sam e dimension is lacking. However, they both tap  the quality of 
imagery evoked; indeed, Morris and Hampson (1983) point out that vividness is an indicant of 
quality. According to Webster’s Dictionary, vividness is defined as "producing a  strong or clear 
impression on the senses," and clarity is defined as "the quality or state of being clear." 
(Webster’s Dictionary 1987). Therefore, treating vividness and clarity as  separate dimensions 
appears inappropriate, for a  vivid image is necessarily a  clear Image, also. Childers et al. (1985, 
p. 126) also define vividness as "the clarity of the mental image an individual evokes." Moreover, 
they both loaded on one factor In Ellen and Bone's three-factor solution. Thus, it appears that
vividness and clarity are related to one single dimension: quality.
In the dissertation, quality was defined as the vividness and clarity of a mental image. 
Quality was proposed as one dimension of communication-evoked imagery processing, and 
indicants of quality relate to vividness and clarity of evoked images.
Quantity. A second dimension proposed in the imagery processing scale was quantity.
This dimension refers to the number of separate images evoked by a  communication 
irrespective of the quality of imagery. Thus, one individual may form few or several vivid images, 
while another may form few or several images that are much less vivid. Therefore, aside from 
qualitative differences in evoked imagery, there may also be quantitative differences (Ellen and 
Bone 1991; McGill and Anand 1989; Smith et al. 1984). In the dissertation research, quantity 
was defined as the number of discrete mental images generated. Therefore, an individual may 
experience several or few different scenarios irrespective of quality and the next proposed 
dimension, elaboration. The quantity dimension was operationalized by examining whether few 
or several different scenarios were imaged.
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This dimension is similar to the quantity /ease  dimension found by Ellen and Bone. Though 
initially proposed as two separate dimensions, it was found that both loaded on the same factor. 
This result is not surprising, however, for if it is relatively easy to generate images from a  
communication, it follows that more images may be formed.
This dimension may have an important impact on consequence variables, especially 
memory. If several images are formed, regardless of the quality of the imagery, then several 
retrieval paths may become available at the time of recall, thus increasing the probability that 
information will be remembered.
Elaboration. While the previous two proposed dimensions tap the presence of mental 
imagery, the third proposed dimension attempted to tap the elaboration of that imagery, which 
was defined as the activation of stored information in the production of mental images. This is 
similar to Ellen and Bone's links dimension. This dimension may be the most important in terms 
of effects on attitudes, for it may result in self-generated persuasion (Maclnnis and Jaworski 
1989). Not only is this an important dimension of imagery processing (Paivio 1986), but it is an 
important dimension of information processing in general (Greenwald and Leavitt 1984; Maclnnis 
and Jaworski 1989).
Degree of elaboration is similar to depth of processing (Craik and Lockhart 1972; Maclnnis 
and Jaworski 1989; Paivio 1986). Maclnnis and Jaworski (1989) proposed six levels of 
processing with representative operations of feature analysis, basic categorization, meaning 
analysis, information integration, role-taking, and constructive processes. However, elaboration 
appears to be related primarily to constructive processes. Thus, the levels of elaboration 
proposed by Paivio (1986) appear to be more adequate for the way elaboration was defined in 
the dissertation.
The levels identified by Paivio (1986, p. 86) are representational, referential, and associative, 
and they vary according to the degree of cognitive elaboration. Representational refers to the 
mere reproduction of a nonverbal stimulus in working memory. At this level, verbal stimuli do
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not generate imagery processing and nonverbal stimuli generate imagery processing similar to 
eidetic imagery (which is similar to perception). Thus, even though imagery processing is taking 
place (i.e., one can see a ‘picture in their mind"), it is a t a low level of elaboration. Referential 
implies the generation of metal Imagery from verbal stimuli. Thus, words generate Images in 
one’s mind. This involves a higher level of elaboration. Finally, associative involves the highest 
level of elaboration in which representations in working memory generate further representations. 
Thus, a mental image may trigger more images from one’s memory or one’s Imagination.
Antecedents
The dissertation study manipulated two of the four imagery-eliciting strategies discussed in 
Chapter Two: pictures and instructions to imagine. As noted earlier, pictures can be concrete 
or abstract and interactive or noninteractive in nature. Thus, the picture manipulation included 
concrete/interactive, concrete/noninteractive, abstract, and no picture conditions. Instructions 
to imagine were either present or absent from the message copy in the print advertisement.
A picture is defined as  "any two-dimensional representation in which the stimulus array 
contains at least one element that is not alphabetic, numeric, or arithmetic" (Lutz and Lutz 1978, 
p. 611). A concrete picture is one of a person, place, or object that is easily identifiable; 
whereas, an abstract picture is one that is not easily identifiable (Rossiter and Percy 1983). For 
example, an advertisement containing a  realistic picture of a product is more concrete than one 
that contains a silhouette. An interactive picture is one in which a  person and /o r objects are 
figurally integrated in such a manner as to be associated in som e mutual or reciprocal actions, 
such as a product in use. In contrast, a  nonlnteractive picture depicts items side by side 
(Alesandrini and Sheikh 1983). Thus, a noninteractive picture might simply depict a  product, but 
there would be no indication of the product in use.
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Consequences
Rossiter and Percy (1983) enumerate several important advertising communication effects: 
awareness, beliefs, attitudes, intentions, and choice rules. Awareness (or memory) is the basic 
and minimal communication response, and it allows prospective buyers to identify products or 
brands to enable purchase. This effect varies on a continuum ranging from recognition to  recall 
(Rossiter and Percy 1983). While recognition involves 100 percent cue-target similarity, recall 
involves varying degrees of similarity between cue and target responses. Awareness is an 
important consequence variable in imagery research as evidenced by the large number of 
studies reviewed in Chapter Two that have analyzed this construct as a consequence variable.
Three of the remaining four communication effects enumerated by Rossiter and Percy 
(1983) were included as consequence variables in the dissertation research. Not only are 
beliefs, attitudes, and intentions Important advertising effects, but they have also been included 
as consequence variables in imagery research. While several studies reviewed in Chapter Two 
have analyzed effects of imagery-eliciting strategies on attitudes and intentions, very few have 
included brand beliefs.
Beliefs were included as a dependent variable primarily as an exploratory variable, for few 
studies have examined relationships between imagery-eliciting strategies and product attribute 
beliefs. Moreover, the few studies examining beliefs (e.g., Dickson et al. 1986; Edell and Staelin 
1983; Mitchell 1986; Mitchell and Olson 1981) do not lend strong theoretical or empirical support 
for any effect of an imagery-eliciting strategy on brand beliefs. Some differences, however, in 
brand beliefs have been found, perhaps because imagery-eliciting strategies may encourage 
cognitive elaboration, verbal and/or visual. Thus, beliefs were included as a consequence 
variable to examine (1) whether or not imagery-eliciting strategies influence beliefs and (2) if so, 
whether or not imagery processing mediates these relationships. If imagery processing does 
not, then some other form of processing may mediate relationships between imagery-eliciting 
strategies and beliefs. Since beliefs represent the cognitive component of attitudes, it was felt
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that examining them with respect to imagery-eliciting strategies would offer further insight into 
the effects of imagery-eliciting strategies on attitudes.
While Mitchell (1986) did not find significant differences among salient beliefs when 
manipulating pictures as an independent variable, others have found differences. For example, 
Mitchell and Olson (1981) found different belief strengths among 15 salient beliefs for ads 
containing a  picture of a kitten, a  sunset, an abstract painting, or no picture. The authors 
concluded that the ad content had substantial multiple effects on product attribute beliefs. 
However, no clear, concise statement can be made regarding pictures and beliefs. Edell and 
Staelin (1983) also found that subjects exposed to ads containing an unframed picture were 
more likely to report attributes that were derived from the ad itself instead of ones they reported 
a  priori as being important. The framed ad and verbal-only condition subjects reported more a 
priori important attributes.
The above studies, however, have not examined pictures and instructions to imagine, which 
are the two imagery-eliciting strategies of interest in the dissertation research. Although Dickson 
et al. (1986) examined the relationship between both pictures and instructions to imagine and 
brand beliefs, the instructions to imagine manipulation failed to produce a significant effect on 
any dependent variables, including beliefs, but for those beliefs that were affected by the picture 
manipulation, beliefs were enhanced.
Moderator
Style of processing (or processing preference) is an individual difference variable that has 
been examined in several studies, especially in marketing. Childers et al. (1985. p. 130) 
conceptualize processing style "as a preference and propensity to engage in a  verba! and/or 
visual modality of processing." Thus, while an individual may possess a  strong imagery or 
verbal ability, he/she may be indifferent as to style of processing preferred, in contrast to 
imagery ability, style of processing has received more support as being effective as a  predictor
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variable (e.g., Childers et al. 1985; Gould 1990; Holbrook et al. 1984; Oliver et al. 1989; Rossiter 
and Percy 1978) and as  a moderating variable (Burns et al. 1991); indeed, Betts (1909) found 
that most, If not all, individuals possess som e Imagery ability and can imagine when asked to  do 
so. Therefore, processing preference may be a  superior differentiating individual difference 
variable.
Consequently, style of processing w as included as  a  moderator between imagery-eliciting 
strategies and consequence variables (Path c in Figure 3.1) and between imagery-eliciting 
strategies and dimensions of imagery processing (Path a in Figure 3.1). Specific relationships 
are discussed in the next section.
HYPOTHESES
In this section, specific hypotheses are offered. Some are well-supported by previous 
empirical studies, while others are based on conceptual theory, assumptions, and logic. 
H ypotheses are presented in the following order: relationships between imagery-eliciting 
strategies and consequences (Path c in Figure 3.1), relationships between imagery-eliciting 
strategies and dimensions of imagery processing (Path a  in Figure 3.1), and relationships 
between dimensions of imagery processing and consequences (Path b in Figure 3.1). The first 
section concerning imagery-eliciting strategies and consequences is basically consistent with 
previous studies that have examined overall input and output variables. However, no previous 
studies have examined the continuum of pictures examined in the present experiment. 
Hypotheses regarding effects of imagery-eliciting strategies on proposed dimensions of imagery 
processing are given in the second section. Finally, relationships between dimensions of 
imagery processing and consequence variables are given in the last section.
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Imagery-Eliciting Strategies and Consequences
Hypotheses In this section are similar to those that have been studied previously and are 
represented by Path c  in Figure 3.1. Main effects of each manipulated imagery-eliciting strategy 
are hypothesized, followed by contrasts of individual cells in the picture condition.
Consequence variables are memory, attitude toward the brand, attitude toward the 
advertisement, behavioral intentions, and brand attribute beliefs.
Pictures versus No Pictures. Hypotheses in this section concern overall effects of pictures 
in a print advertisement. Effects of pictures versus no pictures are addressed. The hypotheses 
follow the picture superiority effect, which holds that visual Information tends to  be remembered 
over verbal information. Paivio's (1986) dual code theory posits that not only do pictures 
activate a visual encoding process, but they also activate a verbal encoding process. Moreover, 
visual codes are thought to be qualitatively superior to verbal codes. Thus, two retrieval paths 
can be activated at the time of recall, which increases recall.
The majority of research has concentrated on effects of pictures versus words on memory. 
In terms of memory (or awareness), the dependent variable most widely studied has been recall, 
but several researchers have found that pictures are more effective than no pictures in 
recognition tasks (e.g., Holliday 1975; Rasco et al. 1975; Rohwer and Matz 1975; Shepard 1967; 
Snowman and Cunningham 1975). For recall, however, overwhelming support for the relative 
efficacy of pictures over no pictures can be found in both psychology (e.g., Booher 1975; 
D’Agostino et al. 1977; Erderlyi and Becker 1974; Lesgold et al. 1975; Levin et al. 1973; Lippman 
and Shanahan 1973; Nelson and Brooks 1973; Nelson et al. 1976; Paivio and Csapo 1969;
Rigney and Lutz 1976; Rohwer et al. 1967) and marketing (e.g., Childers and Houston 1984;
Edell and Staelin 1984; Gardner and Houston 1986; Lutz and Lutz 1977). These results are 
consistent with Paivio’s dual code theory.
Although not as much attention has been given to attitudes and intentions as  dependent 
variables, several studies do provide evidence for the relative efficacy of pictures over no
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pictures. For example, Rigney and Lutz (1976) reported more positive attitudes by students 
receiving a  graphic version of a computer-assisted chemistry lesson versus a  similar verbal 
version. In an advertising context, it has been found that including pictures in a  print 
advertisement can lead to more favorable brand attitudes (e.g., Dickson et al. 1986; Edell and 
Staelin 1983; Gardner and Houston 1986; Holbrook and Moore 1981; Mitchell 1986; Mitchell and 
Olson 1981; Rossiter and Percy 1978,1980), attitudes toward the advertisement (e.g., Mitchell 
1986; Mitchell and Olson 1981), and greater behavioral intentions (e.g., Mitchell 1986). These 
results can be explained through Kisielius and Sternthal’s  (1984, 1986) Availability-Valence (A-V) 
Hypothesis, which states that cognitive elaboration may lead to less favorable attitudes. Kisielius 
and Sternthal (1986) hypothesize that greater cognitive elaboration may lead to less favorable 
attitudes because individuals may be elaborating with idiosyncratic information unrelated to the 
m essage, which is more likely to  be less favorable toward the advocacy than are m essage 
associations. Thus, pictures may lead to more positive attitudes than no pictures, but only if the 
valence of the available information is more favorable than the advocacy in the no picture 
condition. Based on Paivlo's dual code theory and Kisielius and Sternthal’s A-V Hypothesis, the 
following five hypotheses were tested:
H I: As compared to not including a  picture in an advertisement, including a  picture will 
result in:
a. greater memory of ad information
b. stronger brand beliefs
c. more positive brand attitudes
d. more positive attitudes toward the advertisement
e. greater behavioral intentions
Thus, print ads containing pictures versus those not containing pictures will result in greater 
recall of brand information, stronger brand beliefs, more positive attitudes toward the ad and 
brand, and greater behavioral intentions to purchase the product.
Comparisons of Picture Conditions. The preceding hypotheses concern overall effects of 
pictures versus no pictures on consequence variables. Effects of different picture conditions, 
however, can be further analyzed. Based on the review by Paivio (1969) and the study by Paivio
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and Csapo (1969), concrete pictures have been shown to be more effective than abstract 
pictures, particularly for recall, which is consistent with the dual code hypothesis since an 
abstract picture may be less likely than a  concrete picture to activate both a  visual and verbal 
encoding process because an abstract picture is less recognizable. Since an abstract picture 
may be less likely to  activate a  verbal as  well a s  a  visual encoding process, the opportunity for 
two retrieval paths being activated is less than for concrete pictures, thus leading to  poorer 
recall. With respect to  attitudes, abstract pictures will probably result in greater cognitive 
elaboration with idiosyncratic information because respondents will not possess as  complete of 
a  knowledge network when com pared to  those given concrete pictures. Thus, abstract pictures 
will result in less positive attitudes than concrete pictures because the valence of elaborated 
information is likely to  be less positive than for concrete pictures (Kisielius and Sternthal 1986).
The interactive nature of the picture is another important distinction. In term s of recall, 
Houston et al. (1987), Lippman and Shanahan (1973), Lutz and Lutz (1977), and Reese (1975) 
found that interactive pictures were more effective than noninteractive pictures. These results 
could be considered consistent with Paivio’s  dual code theory because a  more complete 
network may be activated from a concrete/interactive picture, which may lead to more verbal as 
well as  visual representations. With respect to attitudes, concrete/noninteractive pictures may 
generate more negatively-valenced cognitive elaboration than that generated from 
concrete/interactive pictures because a  concrete/interactive picture is congruent with a 
complete knowledge network, and a concrete/noninteractive picture is not. Thus, it is expected 
that concrete/interactive pictures will result in more positive attitudes than 
concrete/noninteractive pictures. Therefore, picture conditions of concrete/interactive, 
concrete/noninteractive, abstract, and no picture fall on a  continuum from least to  most 
negatively-valenced cognitive elaboration, respectively.
Based on the above discussion regarding concreteness and interactiveness of a picture, 
the following hypotheses were tested:
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H2: Greater memory for ad information will result when an advertisement contains:
a. a  concrete/interactive picture versus a  concrete/noninteractive picture
b. a  concrete/interactive picture versus an abstract picture
c. a  concrete/noninteractive picture versus an abstract picture
H3: Stronger brand beliefs will result when an advertisement contains:
a. a concrete/interactive picture versus a concrete/noninteractive picture
b. a concrete/interactive picture versus an abstract picture
c. a  concrete/noninteractive picture versus an abstract picture
H4: More positive brand attitudes will result when an advertisement contains:
a. a concrete/interactive picture versus a  concrete/noninteractive picture
b. a  concrete/interactive picture versus an abstract picture
c. a  concrete/noninteractive picture versus an abstract picture
H5: More positive attitudes toward the advertisement will result when an
advertisement contains:
a. a  concrete/interactive picture versus a  concrete/noninteractive picture
b. a  concrete/interactive picture versus an abstract picture
c. a  concrete/noninteractive picture versus an abstract picture
H6: Greater behavioral intentions wili result when an advertisement contains:
a. a  concrete/interactive picture versus a  concrete/noninteractive picture
b. a concrete/interactive picture versus an abstract picture
c. a concrete/noninteractive picture versus an abstract picture
In other words, it is hypothesized that concrete/interactive pictures included in a  print ad 
will result in the greatest memory, the strongest brand beliefs, the m ost positive attitudes, and 
the greatest behavioral intentions followed by the concrete/noninteractive picture and abstract 
picture conditions. Abstract pictures, on the other hand, should result in the poorest memory, 
the w eakest brand beliefs, the least positive attitudes, and the lowest behavioral intentions. The 
concrete/noninteractive picture condition, then, will fail between the other two conditions in 
term s of memory, beliefs, attitudes, and intentions.
Instructions to Imagine. Conceptually, including instructions to  imagine results in the 
activation of the sensory a s  well as  the verbal code (Paivio 1986). Thus, instructions to  imagine 
should encourage more retrieval paths, which aids memory. While the majority of studies 
examining the relative efficacy of instructions to imagine as  an imagery-eliciting strategy have 
manipulated this variable externally from m essage stimuli, the dissertation research examined
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instructions to imagine as part of message stimuli since this is more realistic for advertisements, 
particularly print advertisements. With the exception of Bull and Wittrock (1973), who studied 
recognition as a dependent variable, the majority of studies examining instructions to imagine 
have analyzed recall as the dependent variable, and all of these studies have been in the 
psychology literature. Providing individuals with instructions to imagine, such as instructions to 
use mental imagery to aid memory, has resulted in greater recall than providing them with some 
type of verbal instructions, such as instructions to use repetition to aid memory (e.g., Anderson 
and Hidde 1971; Bower 1970; Elliott 1973; Griffith and Johnston 1973; Peterson and McGee 
1974; Robbins et al. 1974; Sheehan 1966; Slee 1978) or no instructions at all (e.g., Kerst and 
Levin 1973; Kulhavy and Swenson 1975; Pressley 1976).
Kisielius and Sternthal (1986) also explain the effect of instructions to imagine on attitudes 
with the A-V Hypothesis. No instructions could lead to less positively-valenced cognitive 
elaboration, which could result in less positive attitudes. Results of studies examining attitudes 
have been more equivocal, however. Wright and Rip (1980) embedded instructions to imagine 
in a  message stimulus, but they were unable to find a significant effect on attitude from the 
group not receiving instructions to imagine in the message. However, their manipulations were 
fairly weak, and they also studied a product that could have been too unfamiliar to the subjects, 
possibly precluding imagery processing. Kisielius and Sternthal (1984), and a follow-up study by 
Dickson et al. (1986), were unable to find an effect for instructions to imagine. However, the 
instructions to imagine were included in the experimental instructions, not the message stimulus, 
and there is no way of determining whether or not subjects actually read the instructions 
because no manipulation check was reported. Bone and Ellen (1990) used six high imagery ads 
with instructions to imagine embedded within each and one no instruction, low imagery control 
ad, and they found significant differences on the effect of attitudes toward the brand and ad as 
well as for behavioral intentions. Gregory et al. (1982) embedded instructions to imagine within 
a message that was delivered verbally to respondents and found more positive attitudes and
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greater intentions with respect to cable television. Moreover, subjects in the instructions to 
imagine condition also exhibited greater actual subscription rates to cable TV than those not 
receiving instructions to imagine. Gregory et al.’s  (1982) study is consistent with the A-V 
Hypothesis, and the dissertation research attempted to extend the study of effects of including 
instructions to imagine in printed stimuli rather than verbal stimuli.
Based on Paivio’s dual code theory and Kisielius and Sternthal’s  A-V Hypothesis, the 
following hypotheses were tested:
H7: As compared to not including instructions to imagine in an advertisement, including 
them will result in:
a. greater memory of ad information
b. stronger brand beliefs
c. more positive brand attitudes
d. more positive attitudes toward the advertisement
e. greater behavioral intentions
Moderating Variable. Although no formal theory considers the moderating role of an 
individual’s  style of processing on the above hypothesized relationships, logically it would seem 
that a presentation format that is congruent with one’s processing style would result in enhanced 
effects (Holbrook et al. 1984). A few studies lend support for including an individual difference 
variable as a  moderator between imagery-eliciting strategies and consequence variables. It has 
been found that vivid imagers or high visualizers tend to report better recall of experimental 
stimuli (Marks 1973; McKelvie and Demers 1979; Sheehan 1966). However, these studies have 
examined individual differences in imagery ability, not individual differences in processing 
preferences.
Others, however, have found that individual differences in processing preferences have an
effect on the dependent variables of interest in the dissertation. Childers et af. (1985) found that
verbally-oriented processors exhibited better recall of advertisements. Rossiter and Percy (1978) 
showed greater attitudes toward the brand for visualizers over verbalizers. Oliver et al. (1989) 
also found that an analyzing orientation decreased attitude toward the brand and behavioral
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Intentions, while an imaging orientation enhanced them. Burns et al. (1991) found that the 
relationship between the independent variables of concreteness of wording and brand familiarity 
and attitude toward the ad were moderated by an individual's style of processing.
While Burns et al. (1991) was the only study to examine style of processing as a 
moderating variable, it was hypothesized In the dissertation research that this individual 
difference variable should influence the hypothesized relationships between imagery-eliciting 
strategies and consequence variables. Thus, the following hypothesis was tested:
H8: Relationships given in Hypotheses 1a through 7e will be stronger as individuals prefer 
a visual style of processing.
Specifically, it was expected that a higher preference for a visual style of processing will result in 
more positive relationships hypothesized in Hypotheses 1-7. Thus, the relationships will still be 
as hypothesized, but they will be greater for individuals exhibiting higher preferences for a visual 
mode of processing. Style of processing was measured with the Style of Processing 
Questionnaire (SOP: Childers et al. 1985), which is a continuous variable. In the spirit of the 
original intent of the scale, processing preference was treated as a unidimensional construct in 
which a  high score represents a visual preference, and a low score represents a non-visual 
preference.
Imagery-Eliciting Strategies and Imagery Processing
Since there is a dearth of literature in the area of imagery processing per se, the 
hypotheses put forth in this section were exploratory and tentative in nature. As little theoretical 
or empirical support exists for these hypotheses, logic played a prominent role.
A convenient framework for assessing anticipated effects of various pictures is provided in 
Table 3.1. Pictures may be assessed with respect to: (1) cues; (2) cognitive effort; and (3) 








Picture vs. No Picture Strong Weak Strong
Concrete vs. Abstract Strong Weak Weak
Interactive vs. Noninteractive Strong Weak Strong
"Relates to  quality of Imagery processing: strong Implies higher quality of imagery processing 
and weak implies lower quality of imagery processing.
bRelates to elaboration of imagery processing: strong implies greater elaboration of imagery 
processing and weak implies less elaboration of imagery processing.
"Relates to quantity of imagery processing: strong implies greater quantity of imagery 
processing and weak implies smaller quantity of imagery processing.
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much effort is necessary for an individual to form a mental image from the stimulus. Finally, 
encouragement is an attribute of the stimulus that refers to how much it invites or evokes mental 
imagery to take place. How these attributes relate to the dimensions of imagery processing is 
discussed next.
First, the quality of the imagery evoked can be a function of cues provided by the stimulus. 
For example, a stimulus that provides a strong cue such as a clear picture should result in an 
image of much higher quality than one that provides only a vague cue or no cue at all. Second, 
elaboration is a function of the cognitive effort necessary. For example, a  clear picture requires 
little cognitive effort to form a mental image since one is already provided. Thus, little 
elaboration may take place. Finally, a stimulus may also encourage the formation of mental 
images, thus resulting in the possibility of a greater number of images. For example, one type 
of picture, such as an abstract picture, may encourage the formation of several images because 
a sufficient image is not readily available from the stimulus, which another type of picture, such 
as a concrete picture, may actually stifle the number of images evoked because one is already 
provided. In summary, the quality dimension is related to the cue provided, the elaboration 
dimension is related to the cognitive effort implied by the stimulus, and the quantity dimension Is 
related to the encouragement provided by the stimulus to form mental images. These stimulus- 
based attributes of cue, cognitive effort, and encouragement and their relationships with pictures 
of interest are summarized in Table 3.1. Specific hypotheses regarding the relationships 
between types of pictures and dimensions of imagery processing were then derived from this 
table.
Pictures and Imagery Processing, The first set of hypotheses concerns the relationship of 
including pictures versus not including pictures in a print advertisement in general. Then the 
relationship of including concrete versus abstract pictures is addressed. Finally, interactive 
versus noninteractive pictures are discussed.
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!n general, including a  picture in a print advertisement is more likely to result in imagery 
taking place than not including a picture. However, even though a picture is not present, 
imagery processing may stili take place. In terms of the quality of that imagery, providing a 
picture is a  much stronger cue than not providing a picture. Thus, the ad with a  picture should 
result in higher quality mental imagery. In terms of cognitive effort, however, a provided picture 
is a ready-made image for the viewer. Thus, the cognitive effort required or implied by the 
stimulus is much lower than if a picture Is not provided. Thus, if an image is formed, the no 
picture condition should result in greater elaboration. Finally, the encouragement provided by 
the stimulus to form mental images is stronger for an ad that contains a picture over one that 
does not; indeed, even if only one image is formed in the picture condition, that is greater than 
the possibility of no image formation in the no picture condition. These relationships were 
examined through the following hypotheses:
H9: As compared to not including a picture in an advertisement, including a picture will 
result in:
a. higher quality of imagery processing
b. less elaboration of imagery processing
c. greater quantity of imagery processing
Concrete and abstract pictures both encourage imagery processing, but they may 
differentially affect the dimensions of imagery processing. For example, a concrete picture 
provides a more recognizable, and thus, stronger, cue than an abstract picture. Therefore, a 
concrete picture may result in higher quality imagery processing than an abstract picture. On
the other hand, however, a concrete picture is weaker in terms of cognitive effort required to
form an image and encouragement to form several images. Thus, Image formation from an 
abstract picture may require more cognitive effort. Similarly, an abstract picture may encourage 
more images to be formed because a sufficient image is not provided by the stimulus as  it is for 
a concrete picture, in sum, the following hypotheses were tested:
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H10: As compared to  Including an abstract picture in an advertisement, including a 
concrete picture will result in:
a. higher quality of imagery processing
b. less elaboration of imagery processing
c. smaller quantity of imagery processing
Compared to noninteractive pictures, interactive pictures provide strong cues, but they 
require less cognitive effort and may stifle further images. Providing an interactive picture, then, 
may result in a lower level of elaboration of imagery processing than providing a noninteractive 
picture because a degree of elaboration is already provided by the stimulus. The formation of 
more images may be encouraged because of the active nature of the stimulus. Thus, the 
following hypotheses were tested:
H11: As compared to including a concrete/noninteractive picture in an advertisement, 
including a  concrete/interactive picture will result in:
a. higher quality of imagery processing
b. less elaboration of imagery processing
c. greater quantity of imagery processing
Instructions to Imagine and Imagery Processing. Instructions to imagine provide a 
command to form a mental image. Thus, when compared to not including instructions,
Including instructions to imagine should result in imagery processing that is higher in quality, 
greater in elaboration, and greater in quantity. Quality may be enhanced because the command 
provides direction on what and how to imagine. Instructions to imagine encourage the
formation of at least one image, which is greater than expected in the no instruction condition.
Finally, since instructions to imagine do not provide a  ready-made image, elaboration of imagery 
processing may be enhanced. Therefore, the following hypotheses were tested:
H12: As compared to not including instructions to imagine in an advertisement, including 
them will result in:
a. higher quality of imagery processing
b. greater elaboration of imagery processing
c. greater quantity of imagery processing
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Moderating Variable. Similar to the hypotheses regarding imagery-eliciting strategies and 
consequence variables, it was expected that style of processing would moderate the 
relationships proposed by the main effects. Thus, the following hypothesis was tested:
H13: Relationships given in Hypotheses 9a through 12c will be stronger as individuals 
prefer a visual style of processing.
Imagery Processing and Consequences
The following sets of hypotheses concern relationships among dimensions of Imagery 
processing and consequence variables, which is denoted by Path b in Figure 3.1. The rationale 
for these hypotheses is based on the theoretical standpoint that imagery processing in general 
results in greater memory and attitudes (Paivio 1986) as well as the empirical findings that were 
discussed for relationships among independent variables and consequences. Thus, all 
hypothesized relationships between dimensions of imagery processing and consequence 
variables are positive:
H14: Quality of imagery processing is positively related to:
a. memory of ad information
b. brand beliefs
c. brand attitudes
d. attitudes toward the advertisement
e. behavioral intentions
H15: Elaboration of imagery processing is positively related to:
a. memory of ad information
b. brand beliefs
c. brand attitudes
d. attitudes toward the advertisement
e. behavioral intentions
H16: Quantity of imagery processing is positively related to:
a. memory of ad information
b. brand beliefs
c. brand attitudes
d. attitudes toward the advertisement
e. behavioral intentions
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Mediating Effect of Imagery Processing
The last hypothesis concerns the medlational function of imagery processing. According to 
Baron and Kenny (1986, p. 1176), "a given variable may be said to function as  a  mediator to the 
extent that it accounts for the relation between the predictor and the criterions. Mediators 
explain how external physical events take on internal psychological significance."
Thus, the following hypothesis was tested:
H17: Relationships given in Hypotheses 1a through 7e are mediated by the dimensions of 
imagery processing in the directions specified in Hypotheses 14a through 16e, 
respectively.
How this and the preceding hypotheses were tested is given in the Methodology section of this 
chapter.
METHODOLOGY
This section details how the dissertation research was carried out. First, criteria that were 
used to determine the experimental product and the procedure that was followed in developing 
the experimental advertisements are outlined. Second, the experimental design is given. Third, 
the experimental sample and sample size that was used is discussed. Fourth, an outline of the 
experimental procedure is provided. Fifth, manipulation checks that were performed during the 
final data collection are given. Finally, measurement of variables is discussed, with specific 
details given concerning how the imagery processing scale was developed, evaluated, and 
refined.
Experimental Stimuli Development
Product. Since the study used undergraduate students as subjects, it was imperative that a 
relevant experimental product be chosen. Use of undergraduate students a s  opposed to "real 
world" consumers is acceptable because the dissertation research was concerned with a mental
process instead of practical applications, and thus a homogeneous sample would be more 
appropriate to test the proposed hypotheses (Calder, Phillips, and Tybout 1981). Two criteria 
were utilized when determining the experimental product through the use of focus groups and 
pretesting. First, the product had to be one with which college students are familiar. For 
example, Wright and Rip (1980) used colleges as  products to be evaluated by high school 
sophomores, and Oliver et al. (1989) used a high-tech computer printer to be evaluated by 
college undergraduates. Both of these studies may have failed to find results because subjects 
may have been unfamiliar with the products studied, possibly precluding imagery processing. 
Indeed, Maclnnis and Price (1987) point out that one must possess adequate knowledge 
structures regarding a stimulus to be able to form images. Second, the product had to be one 
that is reasonable for imagery processing to occur. For example, Oliver et al. (1989) may have 
failed to find results also because the product used, a color computer printer, is more functional 
than experiential in nature, and it may be easier to imagine a product that is more experiential 
than functional in nature.
With the above criteria in mind, it was decided that automobiles are products with which 
college students are familiar, and they can be considered to satisfy more than purely functional 
needs. Park, Jaworski, and Maclnnis (1986) differentiate functional, symbolic, and experiential 
needs. Functional needs simply satisfy a consumption problem, which would be transportation 
with respect to automobiles, Symbolic and experiential needs may also satisfy a functional 
problem, but they may also satisfy ego-enhancement problems and desires for sensory pleasure 
or variety-seeking, respectively. Thus, it was felt that a product that can satisfy functional, 
symbolic, and experiential needs would be more likely to stimulate imagery processing than one 
that merely satisfied functional needs. Data collected in a pretest during the 1991 Spring 
semester at Louisiana State University confirmed this belief. Sixty-five respondents were given 
an advertisement with copy similar to the advertisement used in the final experiment and were 
asked some questions. (The questionnaire can be found in Appendix A.) When asked if they
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had a  car to  use, 98.5% responded "yes," and 1.5% responded "no." Of the 98.5% who had a 
car to use, 71.9% said that they owned the car, 21.9% said that their parents owned the car, and
6.2% responded that som ebody else beside themselves or their parents owned the car (e.g., 
girlfriend). Over 50% of the pretest respondents indicated that they were likely to  purchase a  
new car within the next two years, and over 70% within the next three years. Finally, for further 
support that the experimental product w as relevant to undergraduate students, respondents in 
the pretest completed Zalchowsky's (1985) 20-item involvement scale with respect to 
automobiles. Summed scores on this scale have a possible range of 20 to  140, and the actual 
range in the pretest was 105 to 140 with the mean equal to 126. A small range and high mean 
on the involvement scale, along with use and intent to  purchase statistics, provides support for 
the claim that automobiles are relevant for undergraduate students for the product to be used a s  
the experimental stimulus.
The pretest data also provided support for the contention that college students do  not view 
automobiles as  purely functional products. That is, automobiles may also satisfy symbolic and 
experiential needs, which may encourage more imagery processing. Four 5-point Likert items 
were used to investigate whether or not automobiles were considered to  serve purely functional 
purposes (e.g., "Cars are for transportation only"). The five items were sum m ed giving a  
possible range of 5 to 25, with a  low score indicating merely a functional need being satisfied. 
The actual range was 15 to 25 with the mean equal to 22, thus providing evidence that college 
students do not perceive automobiles as  serving a  purely functional purpose.
Since the purpose of the experiment w as to examine effects of imagery manipulations on 
consequence variables such a s  attitudes, a  fictitious automobile name was used to  eliminate the 
possibility of prior attitudes. In contrast to the first criterion of respondents possessing adequate 
knowledge structures for the product class (i.e., automobiles), it w as desired to  have a  brand 
that was unfamiliar to respondents to avoid confounding effects of prior brand attitudes. Thus, 
while respondents may have been unfamiliar with the actual model of automobile, sufficient
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knowledge concerning automobiles in general was present. In the pretest questionnaire, 
respondents were given a list of 16 real and fictitious automobile models and were asked to rate 
how familiar they were with each brand name (1 = not familiar at all to 5 = extremely familiar). The 
name "Concept" was of interest, which had a mean of 1.31 and standard deviation of 0.789. 
Models, such as Mustang (M=4.23, SD=1.01), that one would expect respondents to be familiar 
with did have higher ratings. As a result, the name "Concept" was used in the experimental 
stimuli.
Advertisement. Pretest respondents also provided insight into the development of the 
experimental advertisements. First, to determine the type of picture that would be appropriate 
for the concrete/interactive picture condition, respondents were asked to describe an 
appropriate picture for the advertisement (i.e., the pretest advertisement that only contained 
copy, given in Appendix A). A majority of respondents indicated that a car being driven down a 
curving road would be appropriate. Second, respondents were also asked what model car they 
might realistically purchase next. Out of the 65 responses, fewer than 7 were American 
automobiles, while most of the responses were automobiles made by Japanese manufacturers, 
such as Acura, Honda, Nissan, and Toyota. Thus, a "generic" Japanese import was used in the 
experimental stimuli.
The final experiment consisted of eight experimental advertisements (given in Appendix B). 
The concrete/interactive picture condition consisted of a car being driven down a curving road. 
The concrete/noninteractive picture condition included an identical picture of the car used in the 
concrete/interactive picture condition without the background. The picture of the car was 
simply cut out of the background and placed at the same angle as the car pictured in the 
concrete/interactive condition. The abstract picture condition was patterned after an actual 
magazine advertisement in which close-up parts of the car were pictured in three separate 
panels. Participants in a focus group indicated that the magazine advertisement was abstract, 
and the picture was not very easily identifiable as a picture of a car. The abstract stimulus was
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developed by enlarging the sam e picture of the car used in the two concrete picture conditions 
and cutting out pieces of it for each of the three panels. Thus, the three picture conditions used 
the sam e car for each. The final picture condition, no picture at all, simply left the space blank 
except for the sentence, “The finished ad  will have a picture here."
Copy for the experimental advertisements was identical for all cells except for the 
instructions to imagine. The copy included the name of the car (The 1993 Concept) and seven 
pieces of information concerning the car: sport bucket seats; 128 horsepower engine; 
aerodynamic design; performance-engineered suspension; available in 2-door coupe and 4-door 
sedan; 24 city/30 highway estimated mpg; and 1-800-CONCEPT, The difference between the 
instructions to imagine condition and the no instruction condition was five statements placed 
throughout the copy: "Imagine the Concept in your mind...," "Imagine it...," "Hear it...," "Picture 
it...," and “Feel it..." Rationale for this was based on a  study by Mowen (cited in Maclnnis and 
Price 1987), in which Maclnnis and Price noted that the possible reason for no effects of 
instructions to imagine could have been due to too many "imagine yourself' statements in the 
copy, which do not appeal to  specific senses. Also, care was taken to not make the copy, 
particularly the instructions to  imagine condition, self-relevant since others have shown that self- 
rel'atedness of the imagery is more effective (Anderson 1983). This was done by ensuring that 
the instructions to imagine condition did not instruct respondents to imagine themselves in the 
Concept, but rather, to  imagine the Concept. Thus, respondents in the Instructions condition 
were not given self-relevant instructions, which was consistent with the no instruction condition.
Manipulation Checks Performed During Stimuli Development Stage. Prior to the final 
experimental data collection, individual interviews were conducted with five judges (e.g., 
business faculty, staff, and undergraduate students at USM) to check for picture interactiveness, 
picture concreteness, whether or not they could recognize the specific model of the car in the 
advertisement, and the presence or absence of instructions to imagine in the stimulus 
advertisements.
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Picture Interactiveness. To check for the interactiveness of the concrete pictures, each 
judge was shown the advertisement with the concrete/interactive picture (i.e., product in use), or 
the ad containing the picture of a car being driven down a road, and the ad with the picture of a 
car only (i.e., product not in use), and asked whether or not he/she thought the car was moving 
(i.e., in use). Each judge stated that the ad with the picture of the car on the road was 
"probabiy moving," and each judge stated that the ad with the car only was "probably not 
moving," implying that the interactive picture condition was of a car In use while the 
noninteractive picture condition was not.
Picture Concreteness. Next, the five judges were asked to order the advertisements with 
the concrete/interactive picture, the concrete/noninteractive picture, and the abstract picture, 
from most easily recognizable as a picture of a car to least easily recognizable as a picture of a 
car. Three of the five judges ranked them in the order of concrete/interactive, 
concrete/noninteractive, and abstract, while the remaining two judges reversed the 
concrete/interactive and the concrete/noninteractive pictures. Since the concern with the 
manipulation was whether or not the concrete picture (i.e., interactive or noninteractive) was 
more easily recognizable as a picture of a car than the abstract picture, this manipulation was 
judged to be successful.
Instructions to Imagine. Each judge was given all eight advertisements and asked to 
identify those he/she felt contained instructions to imagine and those they felt did not by placing 
the ads in two separate piles - one with instructions and one without instructions. In all cases, 
the judges correctly classified the advertisements, which indicates that the instructions to 
imagine were readily apparent upon inspection.
Identity o f the Car. Finally, each judge was asked if he/she knew the specific model of 
automobile that was pictured in the advertisement because at this stage, an advertisement for a 
Toyota MR2 was reproduced as it originally appeared, but the name and Toyota emblem was 
disguised. Two of the five judges correctly said that the car was a Toyota MR2. As a result, the
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advertisements were revised to disguise the automobile by eliminating the spoiler and covering 
up a vent on the side of the car, which were features the two judges said they used to  identify 
the car.
Checks o f the Revised Advertisements. The revised advertisements were then subjected to 
all of the manipulation checks and procedures described above with five new  judges (i.e., 
business faculty, staff, and undergraduate students). Every manipulation check w as judged to 
be successful, and none of the judges could identify the specific model of automobile pictured in 
the advertisements, not even a  Toyota MR2 owner. Thus, it was judged that the advertising 
stimuli successfully manipulated the independent variables of concrete/interactive picture, 
concrete/noninteractive picture, abstract picture, no picture, and instructions/no instructions to 
imagine prior to final data collection. An example of the advertisement containing a 
concrete/interactive picture and instructions to imagine is given in Figure 3.2.
Experimental Design
The experiment consisted of a 4 (pictures) X 2 (instructions to  imagine) factorial between 
subjects design. Pictures were broken down into concrete/interactive pictures, 
concrete/noninteractive pictures, abstract pictures, and no pictures. Instructions to imagine 
were either present in the advertising copy or absent from it. A diagram in which each 
experimental cell is labeled is given in Figure 3.3.
Other variables included in the experiment were a  moderating variable, consequence 
variables, and mediating variables. An individual’s style of processing represented the 
moderating variable. Consequence variables included brand attribute beliefs, attitude toward the 
advertisement, attitude toward the brand, behavioral intentions, and memory of ad Information. 
The mediating variable was assessed through the dimensions of imagery processing.
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Figure 3.2
EXAMPLE ADVERTISEMENT: CONCRETE/INTERACTIVE PICTURE 
WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO IMAGINE
THE 1993 CONCEPT
Imagine the Concept In your mind...
A car that fits your image. O ne that's fun to 
drive and to be seen  in.
Imagine ft...
The Concept has contoured sport bucket seats. 
Hear it...
The engine fires up and the 128 horsepower 
engine quivers.
Picture it..
The sporty, aerodynamic design cuts through 
the wind like no other car in its class.
Peel ft..
The performance-engineered suspension glides 
across the rolling planes or attacks curves and 
climbs hills.
Available in 2-door coups and 4-door sadan.
24 biy/30 highway •stm atod  mpg.
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Subjects and Final Experiment Sample
Subjects in the final experiment were 273 undergraduate students enrolled in several large 
sections of a Principles of Marketing course at the University of Southern Mississippi. A total of 
22 subjects was eliminated from analyses due to unusable questionnaires (8), subjects correctly 
guessing the purpose of the study (6), subjects rating the advertisement as  "not believable at air
(2), or subjects identifying the car used in the advertisement (6). Thus, the final sample size for 
the experiment was 251: 34 for cell 1, 31 for cell 2, 30 for cell 3, 33 for cell 4, 31 for cell 5, 31 
for cell 6, 31 for cell 7, and 30 for cell 8. The breakdown of the sample by class was: 0.8% 
sophomores, 61.9% juniors, 37.8% seniors, and 0.4% graduate students. Fifty-four percent of 
the sample were male and forty-six percent were female.
Experimental Procedure
The final experiment was conducted in classroom settings in which each subject randomly 
received an envelope with a full-page black and white advertisement enclosed in a plastic cover 
and a questionnaire. Five dollars per section (3 five dollar prizes in large sections) were raffled 
to motivate student participation. Students who did not want to participate in the study were 
allowed to leave. Respondents were informed that the experimenter was working with an 
automobile manufacturer in developing a program targeted to college seniors. They were told 
that the program was a special financing program that would enable students to purchase a  car 
in their senior year, but this phase of the study was examining different ideas for advertisements 
that would be included in a direct mail program directed at target audiences such as 
themselves. They were instructed that the experimenter will ask them to remove the 
advertisement from the envelope and to examine it for a few minutes until they were instructed 
to replace it in the envelope. Respondents were also reminded that the ads were merely in the 
concept stage and to keep in mind that the final advertisements will be full-color, glossy 
advertisements such as those found in magazines. Furthermore, they were asked to examine
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only their ad, since other students may have a  different one. Monitoring the behavior of 
respondents by the author and a  graduate assistant revealed no problems with respondents 
looking at other respondents' ads.
Respondents examined the ads for 1 1 /2  minutes, which was determined in the pretest to 
be a  sufficient amount of time for the entire group to becom e familiar with the advertisement. 
After that time, respondents were instructed to put the ad s  back Into the envelope and to take 
out the questionnaire. Thus, the problem of looking back at the advertisement w as eliminated, 
which w as important for the memory protocol. (The questionnaire for the respondents that had 
a  picture in their advertisement is given in Appendix C, and the questionnaire given to 
respondents that were in the no picture condition is given in Appendix D.) Respondents were 
allowed to  complete the questionnaire at their own pace. The first page of the questionnaire 
consisted of the memory protocol. Next, the 23 imagery items followed. Attitude toward the 
advertisement, attitude toward the car, intentions, beliefs, style of processing (SOP and V/V 
Index), manipulation checks, and demographic variables were assessed  in that order.
Completion of the task by the entire group in each data collection was done within thirty 
minutes.
Manipulation Checks During Experimental Data Collection
Manipulation checks were also performed during the experimental data collection. As 
during the stimuli development stage, questions were included on the questionnaire to check for 
interactiveness of concrete pictures, concreteness of pictures, and presence or absence of 
instructions to imagine. Additionally, respondents were asked how familiar they were with the 
car advertised, how believable they thought the advertisement was, if they thought the car 
advertised was like one they have seen before, and if so, which one, and what they thought was 
the purpose of the study.
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Purpose o f the Study. The final question regarding the purpose of the study was screened 
prior to any data being entered because correct guessing of the purpose of the study (i.e., trying 
to manipulate imagery with pictures and words) would preclude that respondent from any data 
analysis. It was felt that if a  respondent was aware that the experiment was being conducted to 
manipulate and then measure imagery processing, demand effects would result. Six of the 
original 273 respondents correctly guessed the purpose and were thus discarded.
Picture Concreteness. Respondents that received advertisements with pictures (i.e., all 
except those in cells 4 and 8) were asked, "When you first looked at the picture in the ad, how 
easy was it to recognize it as a picture of a car?" (1 = extremely difficult to  7 = extremely easy). 
Responses to this question were predicted with the picture condition (i.e., concrete/interactive, 
concrete/noninteractive, and abstract) using the General Linear Models procedure in the 
Statistical Analysis System (SAS 1982) (F= 122.13, df=2, p<0.001). Bonferroni paired 
comparisons with alpha set at 0.05 indicated significant differences between the 
concrete/interactive picture and the abstract picture, the concrete/noninteractive picture and the 
abstract, but not between the concrete/interactive and the concrete/noninteractive pictures. No 
significant difference between the two concrete picture conditions (i.e., interactive and 
noninteractive) was expected and desired since they are both concrete pictures. The means for 
the concrete pictures (6.57 for interactive and 6.51 for noninteractive) were significantly higher 
than the mean for the abstract picture (3.87), which supports the concrete/abstract 
manipulation. The significantly higher means for the concrete pictures indicates that the 
concrete pictures were easier to identify as a picture of a car than was the abstract picture.
Picture Interactiveness. For the two concrete picture conditions, the interactive nature of 
the picture was examined. The manipulation check was concerned with whether or not 
respondents thought the car was in use (i.e., being driven). Respondents answered “probably 
moving" or "probably not moving" to the question, "Which of the following best describes the car 
in the ad?" Since this manipulation only concerns the concrete/interactive and
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concrete/noninteractive conditions, cross-tabulation of respondents' answers to this question 
and picture condition one and two (i.e., cells 1 and 5 and 2 and 6, respectively) was performed. 
Over 80% in the interactive picture condition (i.e., moving, cells 1 and 5) correctly responded 
that the car was "probably moving," and over 83% in the noninteractive picture condition (i.e., 
not moving, cells 2 and 6) correctly responded that the car was "probably not moving" (xz = 
52.55, d f= l, p =0.000). The significant x2 lends support for the contention that observed 
frequencies in responses were not simply due to chance, which indicates support for the 
successful manipulation of the interactive/noninteractive nature of the concrete pictures. 
Individual subjects in error were not dropped from further analyses for two reasons. First, the 
manipulation check was concerned with the overall impression of whether or not the picture was 
interactive in nature, which was supported. Second, respondents had to rely on recall of the 
advertisement when answering the manipulation check questions, which would be expected to 
result in some error. Thus, the fact that the observed frequencies are significantly better than 
chance indicates support for the effectiveness of the manipulation. This support, coupled with 
the manipulation checks performed during the stimuli development stage, indicates the 
successful manipulation of picture interactiveness.
Instructions to Imagine. To check the instructions to  imagine manipulation, respondents 
answered "yes," "no," or "not sure" to the question, “Did the ad tell you to imagine or picture 
anything in your mind?" Cross-tabulation of responses to this question and the instruction 
condition was performed. Over 90% who were in the instruction condition responded "yes," less 
than 2% responded "no," and less than 8% responded "not sure," and 62% who were in the no 
instruction condition responded "no," 17% responded "yes," and 21 % responded "not sure" (x2 = 
141, df=2, p = 0.000). Again, the significant x2 lends support for the contention that the 
observed frequencies in the responses were not simply due to chance, which indicates the 
successful manipulation of instructions to imagine. Subjects responding incorrectly to this
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question were not dropped from further analyses for the sam e reasons mentioned in the 
previous section.
Other Checks. Other factors, such as ad believability, familiarity with the car advertised, 
identification of the specific model of car pictured, and car use/ownership, were assessed. Ad 
believability was assessed  with the question, "How believable do you think the advertisement is?" 
The mean response was 4.61 with a  standard deviation equal to 1.29 (1 =not believable and all 
to 7 = extremely believable). Two respondents stated that the ad was "not believable at all" and 
were discarded from further data analysis. Using ANOVA, believability w as tested with cell 
assignments, and no significant differences by treatment group were evident (F7248 = 1.53, 
p=0.16). Familiarity with the fictitious car was checked with the question, "How familiar are you 
with the automobile model advertised?" The mean response was 2.71, SD=1.76, with 1 =not 
familiar at all and 7 = extremely familiar. ANOVA was used to test familiarity with the brand name 
with cell assignments, and no significant differences by treatment group were evident 
(F7 Z4B=0.69, p=0.68). Three subjects responded “extremely familiar" to this question, and upon 
inspection of their questionnaires, it was found that they also identified the car pictured as  a 
Toyota MR2, which eliminated them from further study.
Another question asked, "Did the car in the picture look like a particular model of 
automobile you’ve seen before?" Possible responses were "yes," "no," and "not sure." If yes, the 
respondents were asked to indicate which model to check for those that identified the car 
pictured a s  a  Toyota MR2. Even though the majority of the subjects responded "yes" to this 
question, only six correctly identified the car and were deleted from further study, which included 
the three that said they were extremely familiar with the car advertised above. While responses 
varied, the majority of respondents indicated a  Japanese import or a  model similar to  a  
Japanese import as a  model similar to the one in the advertisement. These responses were 
congruent with information revealed in the pretest in which the majority of the undergraduate
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college students sampled indicated a  Japanese import as the most likely car they would 
purchase.
Finally, as in the pretest, car use and ownership were assessed to ensure that the choice of 
the experimental product was appropriate for undergraduate college students. Similar to the 
pretest sample, 94% of this sample of undergraduate college students use a  car, and 65.8% of 
them own their own car, 28.6% indicated that their parents owned the car, and 5.6% of those 
that use a  car said it was owned by someone other than themselves or their parents. Thus, an 
automobile was a realistic product to use in an experiment with undergraduate college students 
because it appears that they have sufficient knowledge about and experience with the product to 
form mental imagery.
Measurement o f Moderating and Dependent Variables
In this section, properties of measures used to assess moderating and consequence 
variables are discussed. Because the development of the imagery processing scale was a major 
component of the dissertation research, the methodology and results of the imagery processing 
scale development are discussed in a separate section following this one. Variables such as 
style of processing, memory, beliefs, attitude toward the advertisement, attitude toward the car, 
and intentions, are discussed in this section, and properties of these measures are summarized 
in Table 3.2.
Style o f Processing. An individual’s style of processing was assessed using two scales. A 
20-item revision of Childers et al.’s (1985) Style of Processing Questionnaire (SOP) and Holbrook 
et al.’s (1984) 10-item Visualization/Verbalization Index (V/V Index) were used. The SOP 
Questionnaire has been widely used in marketing studies, but the V/V Index has not. As shown 
in Table 3.2, the SOP is much more reliable (a =0.72) than the V/V Index ( a =0.58). These two 
measures of style of processing were also used in the scale development of the imagery
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T a b le  3 . 2





SOP 20 0 .7 2
V/V Index 10 0 .5 8
Consequence Variables:
a b 8 0 .9 0
A ad 5 0 .8 9
Intentions 7 0 .9 5
Beliefs:
Specific 7 0 .7 2
Inferred 5 0.61
Memory:
Car-specific 2 judges 0 .9 6
Ad-specific 2 judges 0 .8 6
•Reliability w as a ssessed  through coefficient alpha, except for th e  memory variables, in which 
th e  correlation betw een the tw o  judges' scores is reported.
144
processing scale, and the reliabilities were similar (<*=0.71 for SOP and a=0.59 for V/V Index). 
Thus, only the SOP measure was used in further analysis.
Memory. Memory was assessed by having subjects write down everything they could 
remember about the advertisement and the car advertised. Each written protocol was analyzed 
by two independent judges (the author and an MBA graduate assistant) with respect to specific 
correct information recalled about the car advertised and Information recalled about the 
advertisement (e.g., "the picture was of a  car driving down a road"). To avoid bias, judges were 
not aware of which experimental condition a respondent was assigned. There were two recall 
measures: recall of car-specific information and recall of ad-specific information. There were 
seven specific pieces of information concerning the car that were measured, which represented 
the car-specific memory variable. Anything mentioned about the advertisement that was not car- 
specific information was coded as ad-specific memory. Since one might argue that the abstract 
picture condition contained three pictures because of the three different panels used, any 
mention of the picture in the ad was coded as one piece of ad-specific information for all 
conditions. Correlation between the two judge’s scores for the car-specific information was 0.96, 
and correlation between the two judge’s scores for ad-specific information was 0.86, which 
indicates adequate agreement between the two judges performing the task.
Beliefs. In the final experiment, the strength of brand attribute beliefs was measured 
through 12 Likert items of salient beliefs (1 = strongly disagree to 7= strongly agree). The salient 
beliefs included in the final questionnaire were determined from protocols collected during the 
pretest data collection discussed previously in which respondents were asked to describe the 
attributes they felt the car in the pretest advertisement possessed. From these protocols, 
specific salient brand attributes were gleaned as well as inferred brand attributes (e.g., sleek 
design) that were not expressly stated in the advertisement. Thus, two measures of beliefs were 
used: 7 items measuring specific car beliefs (i.e., 128 horsepower engine, bucket seats, sporty, 
poor suspension, 35 city/45 highway estimated mpg, available in a 4-door sedan, and
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aerodynamic; a =0.72) and 5 items measuring inferred car beliefs (i.e., sleek design, nice interior, 
weak engine, fuel efficient, and reliable; a =0.61). Both m easures were used in further analyses, 
but the low reliability of the inferred beliefs measure could be considered suspect. However, 
due to the exploratory nature of examining brand beliefs, the analyses were still performed.
Attitude Toward the Advertisement Attitude toward the ad w as m easured by a  5-item, 7- 
point semantic differential scale (boring/interesting, good /bad , unpleasant/pleasant, nice/awful, 
favorable/unfavorable), which is consistent with previous operationalizations of Aad (e.g., 
Holbrook and Batra 1987; Mitchell 1986). Coefficient alpha for the 5 items w as 0.89, and 
respondents’ scores on these items were summed to represent the Aad measure.
Attitude Toward the Brand. Attitude toward the brand (i.e., car) w as m easured by an 8- 
item, 7-point semantic differential scale (attractive/unattractive, desirable/undesirable, not for 
m e/for me, uninteresting/interesting, appropriate/inappropriate, unreasonable/reasonable, 
unappealing/appealing, a bad ca r/a  good car), which is consistent with previous 
operationalizations of AB (e.g., Mitchell 1986; Mittal 1990). Coefficient alpha for the 8 items was
0.90, and respondents’ scores on these items were summed to  represent the Ag measure.
Intentions. Intention was measured by summing subjects’ responses to  7 different 
questions, each on a  7-point extremely unlikely to extremely likely scale (Burns et al. 1991,
1992). The measure started with, "If you received a  brochure containing the advertisement you 
just saw, how likely is it that you would...: (1)...think about the offer? (2)...look into this plan?
(3)...call the 800 number? (4)...apply for this plan? (5)...consider buying this car? (6)...go to a 
dealer? (7)...buy this automobile?" Coefficient alpha for the 7 items was 0.95.
Imagery Processing Scale Development
As previously mentioned, the central concern of the dissertation research was the 
development of a scale to measure imagery processing. Development of the scale proceeded in 
accordance with guidelines set forth by Churchill (1979), which are illustrated in Figure 3.4.
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Churchill’s suggested procedure has been adopted in many marketing applications. The 
procedure involves defining the domain of the construct, generating a  sample of items from 
various sources, collecting data to purify the measure through reliability assessm ent and factor 
analysis, and finally, further collection of data to assess reliability and validity as  well as develop 
norms. Gerbing and Anderson {1988), building on Churchill’s paradigm, recommend the use of 
confirmatory factor analysis to assess unidimensionality of the scales. The paradigms suggested 
by these researchers were applied in the development of the imagery processing scale.
Development of the present scale began with a definition of the domain of each dimension 
as prescribed by Churchill (1979). Researchers familiar with mental imagery and experienced in 
the field were consulted regarding the proposed dimensions. Next, a  large pool of items was 
generated from the literature, a focus group, and inputs from other researchers. Prior to any 
data collection, items were evaluated for content validity using judging procedures consistent 
with other scale development researchers in marketing (e.g., Bearden, Netemeyer, and Teel 
1989; Shimp and Sharma 1987; Zaichkowsky 1985). Data were then collected from 145 
respondents who viewed an advertisement and answered a questionnaire. Items were 
evaluated, and a  second round of data was collected in a similar fashion from a new sample of 
111 respondents. Finally, the imagery processing scale was administered in the final sample of 
273 respondents participating in the final experiment, and the psychometric properties of the 
measures of the imagery processing dimensions were assessed again.
Scale Content
Before any data were collected, careful consideration was given to  content validity of scale 
items. First, experts (i.e., researchers that are familiar with mental imagery and have published 
in the field) were consulted concerning the domain of the proposed dimensions. Pam Ellen 
(Assistant Professor of Marketing, Georgia State University), Terry Childers (Professor of
Figure 3.4
CHURCHILL'S (1979) PARADIGM FOR SCALE DEVELOPMENT
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Marketing, University of Minnesota), and Linda Price (Associate Professor of Marketing,
University of Colorado) were consulted, and all agreed that the proposed dimensions were 
reasonable. Second, a  focus group was conducted to further explore whether mental imagery 
and the proposed dimensions of mental imagery were reasonable from a  typical consumer’s 
point of view. Participants indicated that mental imagery existed, and they were able to describe 
their mental imagery in terms of the proposed dimensions of quality, quantity, and elaboration.
An original pool of items, given in Table 3.3, was generated from the focus group, a 
literature review, and inputs from other researchers. Eiien and Bone’s (1991) items were 
included, but they were transformed to conform to the other items. Seven-point agree/disagree 
scales were used because the measure was tapping respondent-based responses rather than 
object-based responses (Green, Tull, and Albaum 1988). This resulted in 104 total items: 34 for 
the quality dimension, 30 for the quantity dimension, and 40 for the elaboration dimension.
Similar to Bearden et al. (1989) and Shimp and Sharma (1987), two LSU Department of 
Marketing faculty members and three LSU Marketing PhD students judged content validity of the 
items. Each judge was given an information sheet (given in Appendix E) concerning the 
proposed dimensions of imagery processing. They were also given verbal instructions to clarify 
any confusion. Each of the 104 items was printed on its own strip of paper and randomized so 
that the judge did not know what dimension the item was intended to represent. The judges 
were asked to place an item in a pile that represented the dimension they thought it belonged to 
or a "Not Applicable" pile. They were asked to first go through the items quickly and then go 
through each pile to reassign items if necessary. When finished with the task, each judge was 
asked to briefly explain the definition of each dimension (i.e., what they were using in their 
judging) to ensure they understood the dimensions. No problems were indicated as all judges 
were consistent and appeared to understand the proposed dimensions. To be retained, items 
had to receive consistent classifications by at least four of the five judges. A total of 77 items 
remained after this analysis: 29 for quality, 19 for quantity, and 29 for elaboration.
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T a b le  3 .3
ORIGINAL POOL OF SCALE ITEMS
QUALITY
1. I experienced very dim imagery.
2. I formed realistic imagery.
3. The imagery i experienced was crisp.
4. My imagery was very distinct.
5. Very dull images came to my mind.
6. I would describe the imagery I experienced as hazy.
7. I experienced very definite imagery.
8. I formed very specific imagery.
9. My imagery was explicit.
10. I imagined bizarre scenes.
11. My imagery was very full.
12. I formed graphic imagery.
13. I saw pictures in my head.
14. My imagery was fancy.
15. The imagery which occurred was brilliant.
16. The quality of my imagery was very deep.
17. I imagined extreme situations.
18. My imagery was ambiguous.
19. My imagery was poor.
20. I experienced subdued imagery.
21. I formed refined imagery.
22. Things were blurry in my mind.
23. My imagery was accurate.
24. The imagery which occurred was clear.
25. The imagery which occurred was fuzzy.
26. The imagery which occurred was detailed.
27. The imagery which occurred was weak.
28. The imagery which occurred was vivid.
29. The imagery which occurred was intense.
30. The imagery which occurred was lifelike.
31. The imagery which occurred was sharp.
32. The imagery which occurred was well-defined.
33. The imagery which occurred was vague.
34. The imagery which occurred was pale.
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Table 3.3 (continued) 
ORIGINAL POOL OF SCALE ITEMS
QUANTITY
1. Images cam e to mind to a very great extent.
2. I experienced lots of images.
3. All sorts of pictures, sounds, tastes, and /or smells cam e to my mind.
4. It was extremely difficult for me to create images.
5. Images were aroused very quickly.
6. I had no difficulty imagining the scene in my head.
7. I imagined several different scenarios.
8. I imagined all sorts of things.
9. I was not able to imagine much.
10. I imagined quite a  few things.
11. I thought of several things.
12. I thought of a lot of things that could go wrong with this product.
13. Nothing cam e to my mind.
14. I can count the number of images I experienced on one hand.
15. I can count the number of images I experienced on two hands.
16. I didn’t imagine much.
17. I imagined so many things that it’s hard to count them.
18. One image kept leading to another.
19. I really only experienced one image.
20. It was hard to imagine much from this ad.
21. I was am azed at how many images flashed into my head.
22. I imagined all sorts of unrelated things.
23. Just one scene cam e to my mind.
24. I probably imagined more from this ad than most people.
25. I imagined a considerable amount in my head.
26. The quantity of my imagery was large.
27. I imagined a  number of things.
28. Many images cam e to my mind.
29. I saw several distinguishable scenes in my mind.
30. Numerous images were aroused from the ad.
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T a b l e  3 .3  ( c o n t i n u e d )
ORIGINAL POOL OF SCALE ITEMS
ELABORATION
1. The ad reminded me of other times in my life.
2. The ad brought back memories of events that happened to me in the past.
3. My imagery w as very elaborate.
4. I imagined more than what was in the ad.
5. I formed mental images from the words in the ad.
6. I imagined what it would be like to  use the product advertised.
7. I remembered things from my life that related to the ad.
8. Some of the things I imagined were not in the ad.
9. I saw the picture in the ad in my mind.
10. In my mind, I saw more than Just the picture given.
11. I thought of how it would feel to use the product.
12. I imagined the smell of the product.
13. The picture in the ad was mirrored in my head.
14. I projected an image in my mind from the words in the ad.
15. I projected an image in my mind from the picture in the ad.
16. I projected an image in my head from other things that I know.
17. Things I imagined lacked factual reality.
18. Everything I imagined was based on something I already know.
19. The picture in the ad was reproduced in my head.
20. I fantasized about the product in the ad.
21. I used my imagination.
22. I imagined other people using the product.
23. Things I imagined were based on fantasy, not facts.
24. My images were extremely individual.
25. I let my imagination run wild.
26. I imagined improbable situations.
27. I let my mind wander.
28. I was daydreaming.
29. I imagined the texture of the product.
30. I imagined what the product tasted like.
31. I sensed a  feeling of motion.
32. I “heard" sounds in my head.
33. I felt like I was there.
34. Experiences from my life flashed into my head.
35. I thought of others I’ve seen using a product similar to the one advertised.
36. I could really see myself using a product similar to the one in the ad.
37. I would probably spend more time looking at this ad  than other ads.
38. This is the kind of ad that stays on my mind.
39. My imagery included members of my family.
40. My imagery included one or more of my friends.
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Similar to Bearden et al. (1989) and Zaichkowsky (1985), further assessm ent of content 
validity was conducted by giving four new judges (3 LSU Department of Marketing faculty 
members and 1 LSU Marketing PhD student) the information sheet concerning the dimensions 
and asking them to rate how representative an item was of the proposed dimension. The items 
were grouped according to the dimensions on a questionnaire (given In Appendix F), and the 
judges rated each item as "clearly representative," "somewhat representative," or "not 
representative" of the dimension. To be retained, items had to be judged as "clearly 
representative" by three judges and at least "somewhat representative" by the fourth judge. A 
total of 47 items remained after this analysis: 19 for quality, 11 for quantity, and 17 for 
elaboration.
Evaluating the Measures
Participants of the focus group were also asked to analyze 20 magazine advertisements for 
their imagery-eliciting ability. From the focus group discussion, three out of the 20 
advertisements appeared to be capable of eliciting mental imagery. One was a Mazda Miata ad, 
another was a Celestial Tea ad, and the third was an ad for a Minolta camera. Each 
advertisement was able to elicit mental imagery through different means; the car ad was 
nostalgic, the tea ad used pictures and words to stimulate imagery, and the camera ad used an 
impressive photograph. In addition to the focus group, faculty members were consulted 
concerning the appropriateness and usefulness of the three ads. Since chances of eliciting and 
measuring the three proposed dimensions were better if multiple stimuli were used instead of 
one, it was decided that all three ads would be used in the data collection stages of the scale 
development. The three ads (given in Appendix G) were then reproduced for use in both rounds 
of data collection.
Initial Administration. Data were collected in undergraduate classrooms at Louisiana State 
University during the 1991 Summer semester. To encourage respondents to participate in the
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study, one student in each class won $5.00 in a raffle. Students put their ID numbers on their 
questionnaires, and a winner was drawn at random. However, before awarding the prize, the 
questionnaire was inspected for completeness; otherwise, the student would not win the prize. 
Respondents were made aware of this prior to completing the questionnaire, which helped to 
encourage completeness when responding to the questionnaire.
To collect data, slides were made of each advertisement. Items were measured between- 
subjects. That is, each respondent viewed only one ad, not all three. Respondents viewed the 
ad for 1 1 /2  minutes and then responded to the questionnaire (given in Appendix H) containing 
the 47 imagery processing items. The ad was not projected while respondents completed the 
questionnaire. After collecting data in two classrooms where an ad was projected on the 
screen, it was evident that using a slide was inconvenient and unrealistic for respondents. Thus, 
color copies of the ads were used in further data collection. Eighteen respondents viewed the 
Mazda Miata ad from a slide, and twenty-three viewed the Celestial Tea ad from a  slide. For the 
remainder of the data collection, respondents viewed their own individual color copies of the 
advertisements for 1 1 /2  minutes, after which they put the ad back into an envelope and 
completed the questionnaire. To determine if the respondents viewing a slide could be pooled 
with those viewing copies of the ad, comparisons of the correlation matrices for the slide ad and 
the print ad for each product were performed using LISREL VI (Joreskog and Sorbom 1984). In 
all cases the chi-square was not significant, which indicates that there was no difference 
between the patterns of correlations for the two data sets. Thus, it was determined that all 
respondents could be used in this analysis, which brought the sample size to 145 respondents 
in the first round of data collection.
Item Reduction. Following Smith (1974), all 47 items were subjected to a  principal 
components factor analysis with varimax rotation without specifying the number of factors to 
retain. Eleven factors emerged with eigenvalues greater than one. Items with low (e.g., less 
than .4) and/or split loadings were deleted, and the analysis was repeated. Again, items not
1 5 4
exhibiting simple structure were deleted. Another factor analysis (restricting the solution to three 
factors) with varimax rotation also was performed. Although four factors had eigenvalues 
greater than one, examination of a scree plot supported keeping only three factors since it was 
level after the third factor. The eigenvalues were: 12.19 for the quality dimension, 2.74 for the 
quantity dimension, and 2.09 for the elaboration dimension. The eigenvalue of the fourth factor 
w as 1.11. At this point, several additional items failed to  exhibit simple structure on factors 
representing the three proposed dimensions of imagery processing and were deleted. The 
factor pattern Is given in Table 3.4. The procedure w as repeated using oblique rotation since 
the dimensions were considered to be independent but related dimensions and resulted in the 
retention of the sam e items.
Reliability. The reliability of the remaining items for each dimension was examined using 
coefficient alpha. Results are given in Table 3.4. Coefficient alpha estimates were 0.97, 0.88, 
and 0.75 for quality, quantity, and elaboration, respectively. While item-to-total correlations 
indicate that a  few items could be dropped to increase coefficient alphas, it was decided to 
retain these items for the second round of data collection.
Second Administration. The reliability and validity of the remaining 25 items were examined 
with a  new sample of 111 respondents, collected during the 1991 Summer sem ester at LSU. 
Again, each respondent viewed an advertisement (same advertisements that were used in the 
first administration) for 1 1/2 minutes, put the ad back into an envelope, and responded to  the 
questionnaire. The questionnaire (given in Appendix I) consisted of a  written protocol requesting 
for any imagery processing that may have occurred, the 25 imagery items, the 20-item revised 
SOP scale, and the 10-item V/V Index. The written protocol of imagery processing w as included 
to use as  a  test of convergent validity of the proposed imagery processing scale. The style of 
processing scales were included to use as  a  test of discriminant validity of the proposed imagery 
processing scale since style of processing and imagery processing should be related, but 
different constructs (Ellen and Bone 1991).
T a b le  3 .4
EXPLORATORY FACTOR ANALYSIS RESULTS: INITIAL ADMINISTRATION
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Dimension Item-Total
and Item Loading Correlation
Quality (a = 0.97)
1. The imagery which occurred was clear. .74 .74
2. My imagery was very distinct. .78 .79
3. The imagery which occurred was detailed. .72 .70
4. The imagery I experienced was crisp. .74 .80
5. I formed very specific imagery. .86 .89
6. The Imagery which occurred was weak.* .85 .84
7. I would describe the imagery I experienced as hazy*.82 .75
8. Nothing came to my mind.* .66 .66
9. I experienced very definite imagery. .85 .90
10. My imagery was explicit. .78 .82
11. The imagery which occurred was fuzzy.* .81 .73
12. The imagery which occurred was vague.* .83 .80
13. The imagery which occurred was vivid. .82 .87
14. The imagery which occurred was sharp. .82 .86
15. The imagery which occurred was well-defined. .78 .82
16. Things were blurry in my mind.* .78 .75
Quantity (a = 0.88)
17. I really only experienced one image* .89 .76
18. Just one scene came to my mind." .91 .73
19. I imagined a number of things. .70 .78
20. Many images came to my mind. .63 .70
Elaboration (a = 0.75)
21. I fantasized about the product in the ad. .68 .59
22. I imagined what it would be like to use
the product advertised. .71 .59
23. I remembered things from my life
that related to the ad. .45 .37
24. I imagined other people using the product. .65 .45
25. I imagined the feel of the product. .72 .63
"Denotes item is reversed scored.
1 5 6
First, a  confirmatory factor analysis (i.e., a three-factor correlated structure) was performed 
on the imagery processing scale using LISREL VI. Although item reliabilities ranged from .17 to 
.85, two items exhibited problems upon examination of normalized residuals (Costner and 
Schoenberg 1979). Item #18 in Table 3.4 (“Just one scene cam e to my mind") exhibited 
normalized residuals ranging from 2.15 to 3.15 with nine other items, and item #23 in Table 3.4 
(“I remembered things from my life that related to  the ad”) exhibited normalized residuals ranging 
from 2.07 to 2.56 with six other items. Hence, these two items were deleted.
A second confirmatory factor analysis was performed on the remaining 23 Items (see Table 
3.5). Although the overall chi-square statistic of 395.71 w as significant (df = 227, p<0.01), these 
results represent a significant improvement over the chi-square value of 686.55 (df = 230) 
obtained from a one-factor model (A x2 ~ 290.84, Adf = 3, p<0.001). Furthermore, the three 
factor model was better fitted than a series of two factor models, in which two dimensions of 
imagery processing were combined into one factor and the third dimension treated as  a single 
factor. Thus, three two-factor models were estimated (i.e., quality and quantity as a  nineteen 
item factor with elaboration as a single four item factor; quality and elaboration as a  twenty item 
factor with quantity as a single three item factor; and quantity and elaboration as  a  seven item 
factor and quality as a  single sixteen item factor). Chi-square values associated with these two 
factor models ranged from 527.52 to 563.11 (df=229), and the three factor model was 
significantly better than any of the two factor models. These results support modeling quality, 
quantity, and elaboration of imagery processing as separate dimensions.
Individual item f-values ranged from 4.49 to  12.61 (p<.01), offering support for the 
convergent validity of the items in each dimension (Anderson and Gerbing 1988). Coefficient 
alpha estimates were 0.97, 0.84, and 0.83 for quality, quantity, and elaboration, respectively. 
Similarly, LISREL estimates of construct reliability were 0.97, 0.85, and 0.84, respectively. Finally, 
coefficient beta estimates were 0.85, 0.60, and 0.41, respectively. Coefficient beta is used to 
indicate dimensionality within a set of items (John and Roedder 1981). The estimate for the first
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T a b le  3 .5








1. The imagery which occurred was clear. .86 .74
2. My imagery was very distinct. .75 .57
3. The imagery which occurred was detailed. .74 .51.
4. The imagery I experienced was crisp. .81 .65
5. I formed very specific imagery. .84 .70
6. The imagery which occurred was weak.b
7. I would describe the imagery
.89 .80
I experienced as hazy.b .74 .55
8. Nothing came to my mind.b .80 .63
9. I experienced very definite imagery. .89 .80
10. My imagery was explicit. .88 .77
11. The imagery which occurred was fuzzyb .84 .70
12. The imagery which occurred was vague.b .87 .75
13. The imagery which occurred was vivid. .87 .75
14. The imagery which occurred was sharp. .82 .68
15. The imagery which occurred was well-defined. .92 .84
16. Things were blurry in my mind.b .60 .35
Quantity .85“ .660
17. I really only experienced one image.b .64 .42
18. I imagined a number of things. .88 .77
19. Many images came to my mind. .89 .79
Elaboration .84“ .580
20. I fantasized about the product in the ad.
21. I imagined what it would be like to use
.81 .65
the product advertised. .89 .79
22. I imagined other people using the product. .43 .18
23. I imagined the feel of the product. .84 .70
“Denotes composite reliability. 
bDenotes item is reversed scored.
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two dimensions exceeds the suggested level of 0.50, but it is slightly below this level for the 
elaboration dimension items. Even though deleting Item #22 in Table 3.5 ("I imagined other 
people using the product") would result in a higher reliability, variance extracted, and coefficient 
beta, it was retained for the third round of data collection because it did not have unusual or 
high normalized residuals, and it was felt that four indicators would be better that three (Costner 
and Schoenberg 1979). If the item still exhibited problems in the final administration, it would be 
dropped before use in hypothesis testing.
Discriminant Validity. The more conservative variance extracted estimates were 0.67, 0.66, 
and 0.58, respectively, which are greater than the level of 0.50 suggested by Fornell and Larcker 
(1981). Variance extracted measures the amount of variance captured by the construct (i.e., 
dimension) in relation to the variance due to random measurement error. One test of 
discriminant validity involves comparison of the variance extracted estimates of the measures 
with the square of the parameter estimate between the measures, and Fornell and Larcker 
(1981) suggest evidence of discriminant validity if the variance extracted estimates are greater 
than the square of the correlation between the constructs. The variance extracted estimates of 
0.67, 0.66, and 0.58 all exceed the square of the correlations between the constructs (0Z21 =
.078; <S>\, = .314; ^z32 = .152). Finally, the phi coefficients were significantly less than 1 (i.e., the 
confidence interval, plus or minus two standard errors, did not contain a value of 1), which also 
offers support for the discriminant validity between the dimensions (Anderson and Gerbing 
1988).
Another method of addressing the discriminant validity of the proposed imagery processing 
scale involved correlating the proposed communication-evoked imagery processing scale with 
two scales that have been developed to measure an individual’s style of processing. The 
revised Style of Processing scale (SOP: Childers et al. 1985) and the Visualization/Verbalization 
index (V/V index: Holbrook et al. 1984) were correlated with respondents’ summed scores on 
the proposed dimensions of imagery processing in an attempt to show that the measure of
communication-evoked imagery is not simply duplicating measures of processing preference, 
which follows the analysis performed by Ellen and Bone (1991) in which an individual’s imagery 
ability was correlated with imagery processing. While the SOP scale exhibited acceptable 
reliability (a=0.71), the V/V Index did not (a=0.59). Furthermore, the SOP and V/V Index are 
purportedly measuring the same construct, style of processing, but the correlation between the 
two measures was 0.05. Hence, the V/V Index was eliminated from further analysis. As 
expected, the dimensions of imagery processing were positively correlated with the measures of 
processing style, but only slightly so. The correlational results are given In Table 3.6. With the 
exception of the correlation between the elaboration dimension and the SOP, the correlations 
among the imagery dimensions were stronger than the dimensions' correlations with the 
preference measure, which is similar to what Ellen and Bone (1991) found. Thus, support is 
given to the contention that the proposed imagery processing measure is tapping something 
different from one’s style of processing.
Convergent Validity. An investigation of convergent validity of proposed imagery 
processing dimensions was conducted with written protocols provided by each respondent. 
Respondents’ descriptions of imagery experienced while viewing the advertisement were content 
analyzed independently by three judges (i.e., the author, a University of Southern Mississippi 
Marketing faculty member, and a USM MBA graduate assistant). Judges were given a 
description of the proposed dimensions and were asked to rate the written protocol describing 
any imagery processing that may have occurred on a three point scale (low, average, or high) 
with respect to each dimension. There was also a "not applicable" category for blank or 
unusable responses, and eight of the descriptions did not contain enough information to be 
rated for imagery processing because they were not completed or they consisted of information 
that merely critiqued the advertisement. Interjudge reliability is given in Table 3.7. Exact 
agreement among judges was achieved across 73 percent of the quality dimension ratings, 87 






T a b le  3 .6
CORRELATIONS AMONG IMAGERY PROCESSING DIMENSIONS 
AND PROCESSING PREFERENCE: SCALE DEVELOPMENT STAGE






0.20 0.05 0.27 0.71'
(p=.0399) (p=.5951) (p=.0054)
aValues on the diagonals represent reliabilities.
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The index of reliability, lr, (Perreault and Leigh 1989) for the quality, quantity, and elaboration 
dimensions w as .767, .901, and .876, respectively, which indicates adequate interjudge reliability 
because the possible range of the index of reliability is between zero and one. Since there were 
no cases  where all three of the judge's ratings were completely disparate (i.e., one judge rating 
a  dimension low, another rating it average, and the third rating it high), disagreem ents were 
resolved by taking the rating that was given to a  respondent by two of the three judges.
Using the General Linear Model Procedure in SAS, judges' ratings were used to predict 
respondents’ summed scores on the three dimensions of imagery processing assessed  with the 
imagery processing scale (see Table 3.8). The first model revealed a  significant effect of the 
quality classification on the quality dimension (F298 = 5.17, p< .01) with the m eans ranging from 
68.7 for the "low1' classification and 86.0 for the "high” classification, and a Bonferroni paired 
comparison test revealed significant differences between the low and average m eans and the 
low and high m eans at the alpha=0.05 level. The second model displayed a marginally 
significant effect of the quantity classification on the quantity dimension (F2i100 = 2 -85* P <  06). 
Again, the m eans are in the expected order ranging from 11.1 for the “low” group and 14.4 for 
the "high" group, and a  Bonferroni paired comparison revealed a  significant difference between 
the low and high group at the atpha=0.1 level. The final model also revealed a  significant effect 
of the elaboration classification on the elaboration dimension (F298 = 4.50, p<.02). Similarly, the 
m eans were in the expected order ranging from 13.1 for the "low” group to 18.8 for the "high" 
group, and a  Bonferroni paired comparison revealed a  significant difference between the low 
and high group at the alpha=0.05 level. These results lend support for the consistency between 
judges' classification of all three dimensions based on open-ended respondent descriptions and 
self-report scale values of these dimensions.
Third Administration. The reliability and validity of the remaining 23 items were examined 
with the data obtained from the experimental sample of 251 respondents. Reliability,
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Table 3.7
RELIABILITY ESTIMATES OF JUDGED PROTOCOLS OF IMAGERY PROCESSING
Percentage I, estimate
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dimensionality, and validity were assessed through coefficient alpha and confirmatory factor 
analyses.
First, a  confirmatory factor analysis (i.e., a three-factor correlated structure) was performed 
on the imagery processing scale using LISREL VI. The item, “I imagined other people using the 
product," that was marginal in the first and second rounds of data collection had a  maximum 
likelihood loading of 0.09, which gave it a  reliability of 0.008, and a t-value of 1.24. Thus, this 
item w as dropped and the confirmatory factor analysis was repeated.
A second confirmatory factor analysis was performed on the remaining 22 items (see Table 
3.9). Although the overall chi-square statistic of 716.09 was significant {d f = 206, p < 0.01), these 
results represent a  significant improvement over the chi-square value of 992.58 (df = 209) 
obtained from a one-factor model (Ax2 = 276.49, Adf = 3, p<0.001). Similar to the previous 
administration of the scale, the three factor model was better fitted than a  series of two factor 
models. Chi-square values associated with all possible two factor models ranged from 826.42 to 
911.28 (df=208), and the three factor model was significantly better than any of the two factor 
models. Individual item f-values ranged from 8.19 to 17.77 (p < .01), offering support for the 
convergent validity of the items in each dimension (Anderson and Gerbing 1988). Coefficient 
alpha estimates were 0.96, 0.76, and 0.78 for quality, quantity, and elaboration, respectively. 
Similarly, LISREL estimates of composite reliability were 0.96, 0.76, and 0.78, respectively.
Finally, coefficient beta estimates were 0.82, 0.51, and 0.60, respectively. Coefficient beta is 
used to  indicate dimensionality within a set of items (John and Roedder 1981). The estimate for 
all three dimensions exceeded the suggested level of 0.50, indicating unidimensionatity of the 
constructs.
Discriminant Validity. The more conservative variance extracted estimates were 0.61, 0.53, 
and 0.54, respectively, which are greater than the level of 0.50 suggested by Fornell and Larcker 
(1981). Also, the variance extracted estimates all exceed the square of the correlations between 
the constructs, respectively ($221 = .130; $231 = .518; <j>222 = .325), which suggests evidence of
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Table 3.9
RESULTS OF CONFIRMATORY FACTOR ANALYSIS: FINAL EXPERIMENT
Dimension ML Variance
and Item Loading Reliability Extracted
Quality .96"
1. The imagery which occurred w as clear. .75 .56
2. My imagery was very distinct. .69 .48
3. The imagery which occurred was detailed. .81 .66
4. The imagery I experienced was crisp. .84 .71
5. I formed very specific imagery. .82 .67
6. The imagery which occurred was weak.b .81 .66
7. I would describe the imagery
i experienced as hazy.b .80 .64
8. Nothing cam e to  my mind.b .50 .25
9. i experienced very definite imagery. .89 .80
10. My imagery w as explicit. .84 .71
11. The imagery which occurred w as fuzzy.b .80 .64
12. The imagery which occurred w as vague.6 .79 .62
13. The imagery which occurred w as vivid. .75 .56
14. The imagery which occurred was sharp. .80 .64
15. The imagery which occurred was well-defined. .84 .71
16. Things were blurry in my mind.b .67 .45
Quantity .77*
17. 1 really only experienced one image.6 .58 .37
18. 1 imagined a  number of things. .83 .69
19. Many images cam e to  my mind. .74 .55
Elaboration .78"
20. 1 fantasized about the product in the ad. .73 .53
21. 1 imagined what it would be like to use
the product advertised. .71 .50
22. 1 imagined the feel of the product. .77 .59
"Denotes com posite reliability. 
bDenotes item is reversed scored.
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discriminant validity (Fornell and Larcker 1981). Finally, the phi coefficients were significantly 
less than 1 (i.e., the confidence interval, plus or minus two standard errors, did not contain a 
value of 1), which also offers support for the discriminant validity between the dimensions 
(Anderson and Gerbing 1988).
Another method of addressing the discriminant validity of the proposed imagery processing 
scale involved correlating the proposed communication-evoked imagery processing scale with 
two scales that have been developed to  measure an individual’s  style of processing. The 
revised Style of Processing scale (SOP: Childers et ai. 1985) was also collected in the third 
administration of the scale. Following Ellen and Bone (1991), the SOP was correlated with 
respondents’ summed scores on the proposed dimensions of imagery processing in an attempt 
to show that the measure of communication-evoked imagery is not simply duplicating measures 
of processing preference. As expected, the dimensions of imagery processing were positively 
correlated with the measures of processing style, but only slightly so. The correlational results 
are given in Table 3.10. The correlations among the imagery measures were stronger than the 
measures’ correlations with the preference measure. Thus, support is given to the contention 




CORRELATIONS AMONG IMAGERY PROCESSING DIMENSIONS 
AND PROCESSING PREFERENCE: FINAL EXPERIMENT STAGE




Elaboration 0.63 0.43 0.78s
(p=.0001) (p=.0001)
SOP 0.11 0.06 0.20 0.72s
(p=.0768) (p=.3842) (p = .0020)
“Values on the diagonals represent reliabilities.
CHAPTER FOUR 
HYPOTHESIS TESTS AND RESULTS
INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, results of tests  of hypotheses given in Chapter 3 are reported in the 
following order: (1) relationships between imagery-eliciting strategies and consequence 
variables and the moderating role of style of processing (Hypotheses 1a-8); (2) relationships 
between imagery-eliciting strategies and dimensions of imagery processing and the moderating 
role of style of processing (Hypotheses 9a-13); (3) relationships between dim ensions of imagery 
processing and consequence variables (Hypotheses 14a-16e); and (4) mediating effects of 
imagery processing on relationships between imagery-eliciting strategies and consequence 
variables (Hypothesis 17). Discussion of the results is given in Chapter Five of the dissertation.
Analyses followed moderator and mediational models given by Baron and Kenny (1986), 
which are illustrated in Figure 4.1. While a  general overview is given here, specifics regarding 
how hypotheses were tested are given within each section. According to Baron and Kenny 
(1986), if a  postulated m oderator is a  continuous variable, independent variables are 
multlchotomous (i.e., Case 3, p. 1175), and an expected linear relationship exists, then tests  for 
moderation are performed by adding the product of the m oderator and the multichotomous 
independent variables to a regression equation. A m oderator effect is indicated by a  significant 
product term. To test for mediation, the authors recom mend estimating three regression 
equations: (1) regressing mediators on independent variables (Path a); (2) regressing 
consequence variables on independent variables (Path c); and (3) regressing consequence 
variables on both the independent variables and on the mediator (Paths b  and c). To establish 
mediation, the following conditions must be met (p. 1177):
(1) the Independent variables must affect the mediator in the first equation;
1 6 7
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(2) the independent variables must be shown to affect the dependent variable in the
second equation; and
(3) the mediator must affect the dependent variable in the third equation.
if these conditions all hold in the predicted direction, then the effect of the independent
variables on the dependent variable must be less in the third equation than in the second.
The authors also point out that since multicollinearity may be a  problem In the third equation, 
absolute size of the coefficients be examined as well a s  their significance.
Analyses of variance were used to determine if independent variables influenced 
consequence variables and dimensions of imagery processing. Multiple regression was used to 
determine if dimensions of imagery processing influenced consequence variables. Finally, 
multiple regression of consequence variables with manipulated independent variables along with 
dimensions of imagery processing that were influenced by the Independent variables included as 
covariates was performed to test the mediational role of dimensions of imagery processing. A 
cutoff of p<0.05 was used to determine significance of tests. Although no hypotheses predicted 
an interaction effect between pictures and instructions to imagine, interactions were tested, and 
no significant interactions between pictures and instructions to imagine resulted for any variable 
tested. Thus, they are not reported.
IMAGERY-ELICITING STRATEGIES AND CONSEQUENCE VARIABLES
Hypotheses la-7e postulated effects of manipulated imagery-eliciting strategies on 
consequence variables of memory, beliefs, attitude toward the brand, attitude toward the 
advertisement, and intentions. These hypotheses were consistent with extant imagery studies in 
that they examined relationships between stimulus and response variables without any 
examination of imagery processing. While not all hypotheses were supported, many were, and 
they are consistent with previous imagery studies. Furthermore, the hypotheses examined 
expand the extant knowledge base of effects of different imagery-eliciting strategies by
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examining different picture conditions instead of simply pictures versus no pictures. Finally, the 
dissertation also examined the effect of including instructions to imagine within message stimuli.
Since beliefs, attitudes, and intentions are related constructs in a hierarchy of effects, an 
initial multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA option in the General Linear Model procedure in 
SAS) was conducted, and results are reported in Table 4.1. Correlations among specific beliefs, 
inferred beliefs, Ag, A^, and intentions ranged from 0.17 to 0.62, and ail were significant at the 
p<0.05 level. Memory was analyzed separately from other consequence variables as the 
relationship between memory and attitude is equivocal (Srull 1989} and beyond the scope of the 
dissertation. Furthermore, only car-specific memory and ad-specific memory were significantly 
correlated with car-specific beliefs and inferred beliefs, respectively. Correlations among the 
memory variables and the other dependent variables ranged from 0.01 to 0.29, and only the two 
exceptions noted above were significant. Because overall effects of pictures (Wilks' X = 0.84, 
F=3.58, p <0.0001) and instructions to imagine (Wilks’ X = 0.92, F=5.20, p<0.0005) were 
significant, separate analyses of variance were conducted. Individual models were estimated 
with the General Linear Model procedure in SAS with Bonferroni paired comparisons (alpha set 
to 0.1) when necessary. The General Linear Model procedure was used instead of the ANOVA 
procedure to account for differences in sample sizes when comparing different combinations of 
pictures. Means for effects of pictures and instructions to imagine on consequence variables 
discussed in this section and dimensions of imagery processing discussed in the next section 
are given in Table 4.2, but significant differences are reported in later sections and tables in this 
chapter.
Results are reported in order of consequence variables of memory, beliefs, attitude toward 
the brand, attitude toward the advertisement, and intentions, respectively. When analyzing 
effects of different picture conditions, three different models were estimated: (1) one in which 
cells 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, and 7 (i.e., pictures) and ceils 4 and 8 (i.e., no pictures) were collapsed to 
examine effects of pictures versus no pictures (Hypothesis 1a-1e), (2) one in which cells 1, 2, 5,
Table 4.1
EFFEC TS O F PICTURES AND INSTRUCTIONS T O  IMAGINE








Beliefs a b aad Intentions
Pictures .84 3.58* .57 .64 5.17* 4.78* 1.72
Instructions 
to Imagine .92 5.20* .16 4.01* 4.49* 20.21* 1.50
* p<.05
Table 4.2
MEANS FOR EFFECTS OF PICTURES AND INSTRUCTIONS TO IMAGINE 
ON MEMORY. BELIEFS. ATTITUDES, INTENTIONS,
AND DIMENSIONS OF IMAGERY PROCESSING
V ariab les
C oncrete /
In te ra c t iv e
P ic tu re s
C oncrete /
N o n in te rac tiv e Concrete A bstrac t
Treatm ents
No
P ic tu re
In s tru c t io n s  to  Imaqine 
P resen t Absent
Consequences:*
Memory:
Car 2 .57 2.22 2 .40 2 .36 2 .38 2.40 2 .37
Ad 2.01 1.79 1.91 2 .16 1.49 1.89 1.84
Bet ie f s :
S p ec if ic 42.46 42.23 42.35 41.56 41 .37 42.05 41.77
In fe rre d 27.86 27.10 27.49 26.93 27.09 27.77 26.72
43.25 42.06 42.67 39.64 38.46 41.87 39.83
A*o 24.60 22.95 23.81 21.16 22.25 24.24 21.25
In te n tio n s 26.03 23.08 24.58 26.57 26.56 26.34 24.76
Mental Im agery:'
Q uality 73.60 76.92 75.22 65.64 65.90 74.51 66.44
E lab o ra tio n 12.83 13.19 13.01 13.15 12.37 13.52 12.21
Q uantity 12.38 11.92 12.15 12.25 11.32 12.54 11.37




and 6 (i.e., concrete pictures), cells 3 and 7 (i.e., abstract pictures), and cells 4 and 7 (no 
pictures) were collapsed to examine effects of concrete versus abstract versus no pictures 
(testing no specified hypothesis, but used for understanding), and (3) paired comparisons of all 
four picture conditions were examined (Hypotheses 2a-7c).
Memory
As discussed in Chapter 3, memory was assessed through a written protocol in which 
respondents were asked to write down everything they could recall about the brand advertised 
and the advertisement itself. Two judges coded protocols by counting pieces of information 
recalled about the brand and pieces of information recalled about the advertisement. These 
values represent dependent variables of car-specific memory and ad-specific memory, 
respectively. Thus, memory was divided into two dependent measures.
Car-specific memory was predicted with pictures and instructions to imagine (Model 
F4250=0.47, p < 0.76). Main effects of pictures (F3250=0.62, p<0.60) and instructions to imagine 
(F1,25o = 0.01, p<0.91) were not significant. Similarly, ad-specific memory was predicted with 
pictures and instructions to imagine (Model F4250=2.68, p<0.03). The main effect of pictures 
was significant (F3 250 =3.53, p<0.02), but the main effect of instructions to  imagine was not 
(F-j.Z5o =0.11, p<0.74). Since Hypothesis 7a predicted that inctuding instructions to imagine 
within the advertisement would lead to greater recall of brand and ad information, this 
hypothesis was not supported. Hypotheses 1a and 2a-2c predicted a significant effect of 
pictures on memory of car-specific and ad-specific information, and there was a  significant 
picture main effect for ad-specific information recalled. Thus, further analysis of effects of 
different picture conditions was performed, and results are summarized in Table 4.3.
Pictures versus No Pictures (H1a). Hypothesis 1a stated, “As compared to not including a 
picture in an advertisement, including a picture will result in greater memory of ad information." 
Although this hypothesis was not supported for car-specific memory (F1250= 0 .0 0 , p <  0.97), it
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Table 4.3
E F F E C T S  O F  PIC T U R E  C O N D IT IO N S  O N  M EM O R Y
Picture condition compared n Mean8 F
Car-Specific Memory:
Model lb .00
Picture 188 2.39No Picture 63 2.38
Model 2C . 02
Concrete 127 2.40
Abstract 61 2.36
No Picture 63 2.38
Model 3d . 62
Concrete/Interactive 65 2. 57
Concrete/Noninteractive 62 2.22
Abstract 61 1.36
No Picture 63 2.38
Ad-Specific Memory:
Model lb 7 . 73e
Picture 188 1.99a
No Picture 63 1. 49a
Model 2C 4 .79e
Concrete 127 1.91
Abstract 61 2. 16a
No Picture 63 1. 49a
Model 3d 3 .53e
Concrete/Interactive 65 2 . 01
Concrete/Noninteractive 62 1.79
Abstract 61 2 . 16a
No Picture 63 1. 49a
“Means within each model marked with matching capital letter superscripts represent significant
contrasts (p<-05) as indicated by Bonferroni paired comparisons.
bModel 1 tested pictures (cells 1, 2, 3, 5, 6,and 7) versus no pictures (cells 4 and 8).
cMode! 2 tested concrete pictures (cells 1, 2, 5, and 6) versus abstract pictures (cells 3 and 7)
versus no pictures (cells 4 and 8).
dModel 3 tested concrete/interactive pictures (cells 1 and 5) versus concrete/noninteractive 




was supported for ad-specific memory (F-, 250=7.73, p < 0.006), with mean number of ad-specific 
responses equal to 1.99 in the picture condition and 1.49 in the no picture condition. Thus, 
including pictures in the advertisement resulted in greater recall of ad-specific information but 
not car-specific information when compared to not including pictures in the advertisement.
These results indicate partial support for Hypothesis 1a.
Comparisons o f Picture Conditions (H2a-2c). Hypothesis 2 predicted effects of different 
picture conditions on memory of ad and brand information:
H2: Greater memory for ad information will result when an advertisement contains:
a. a concrete/interactive picture versus a concrete/non interactive picture
b. a concrete/interactive picture versus an abstract picture
c. a concrete/noninteractive picture versus an abstract picture
The test of Hypothesis 2 involved contrasts of different picture conditions for car-specific and ad-
specific memory. Thus, concrete/interactive picture conditions were compared to 
concrete/noninteractive pictures and abstract pictures, respectively, and concrete/noninteractive 
pictures were compared to abstract pictures. Again, only the dependent variable of ad-specific 
memory was examined further because the main effect of pictures was insignificant for car- 
specific memory. For ad-specific memory, Bonferroni paired comparisons revealed no 
significant differences at the p<0.05 level between concrete/interactive pictures (M=2.01) and 
concrete/noninteractive pictures (M=1.79), between concrete/interactive pictures and abstract 
pictures (M=2.16), or between concrete/noninteractive pictures and abstract pictures. Thus, 
Hypothesis 2 was not supported. Abstract pictures, however, did result in greater ad-specific 
memory than no pictures (M = 1.49).
Although Hypotheses 2a-2c were tested and not supported, further analysis was performed 
to understand what levels of pictures were significantly different to cause the significant picture 
main effect on ad-specific memory. As can be seen from Table 4.3, when pictures were broken 
down into concrete (i.e., interactive and noninteractive combined), abstract, and no picture 
conditions, abstract pictures (M=2.16) resulted in greater recall of ad-specific information than
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no pictures (M = 1.49). However, there was neither a significant difference between abstract and 
concrete pictures nor between concrete and no pictures for ad-specific memory.
Instructions to Imagine (H7a). Hypothesis 7a stated, “As compared to not including 
instructions to imagine in an advertisement, including them will result in greater memory of ad 
information." Since there was no significant main effect for Instructions to imagine for either car- 
specific memory or ad-specific memory, Hypothesis 7a was not supported.
Beliefs
As discussed in Chapter 3, two types of beliefs were measured and analyzed: specific 
beliefs and inferred beliefs. Specific beliefs were tested with pictures and instructions to imagine 
(Model F4249=0.47, p < 0.76). Main effects of pictures (F3249=0.57, p<0.64) and instructions to 
imagine (F, 249=0.16, p<0.69) were not significant. Similarly, inferred beliefs were tested with 
pictures and instructions to imagine (Model F4250 = 1.50, p<0.20). While the main effect of 
pictures was not significant (F3 250=0.64, p < 0.59), the main effect of instructions to imagine was 
significant (F1i250=4.01, p  <0.046). Since the main effect of pictures was not significant for either 
specific or inferred beliefs, further analysis was not necessary. However, for completeness, the 
analyses were performed and results summarized in Table 4.4.
Pictures versus No Pictures (H1b). Hypothesis 1b stated, "As compared to not including a 
picture in an advertisement, including a picture will result in stronger brand beliefs." Since there 
was no main effect of pictures on either specific or inferred beliefs, Hypothesis 1b was not 
supported.
Comparisons of Picture Conditions (H3a-3c). Hypothesis 3 predicted effects of different 
picture conditions on brand beliefs:
H3: Stronger brand beliefs will result when an advertisement contains:
a. a concrete/interactive picture versus a  concrete/noninteractive picture
b. a concrete/interactive picture versus an abstract picture
c. a concrete/noninteractive picture versus an abstract picture
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Table 4.4
E F F E C T S  O F  PIC T U R E  C O N D IT IO N S  O N  B E L IE FS


























No Picture 63 27.09
Model 3CConcrete/Interactive 65 27.86
.64
Concrete/Noninteractive 62 27. 10
Abstract 61 26.93
No Picture 63 27.09
“Model 1 tested pictures (cells 1, 2, 3, 5, 6,and 7) versus
no pictures (cells 4 and 8).
bModel 2 tested concrete pictures (cells l, 2, 5, and 6) 
versus abstract pictures (cells 3 and 7) versus no pictures 
(cells 4 and 8).‘Model 3 tested concrete/interactive pictures (cells 1 and 
5) versus concrete/noninteractive pictures (cells 2 and 6) 
versus abstract pictures (cells 3 and 7) versus no pictures 
(cells 4 and 8).
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As with the test of Hypothesis 2, the test of Hypothesis 3 involved contrasts of different picture 
conditions for brand beliefs. Thus, concrete/interactive pictures were compared to 
concrete/noninteractive pictures and abstract pictures, respectively, and concrete/noninteractive 
pictures were compared to  abstract pictures. For specific beliefs, Bonferroni paired 
comparisons revealed no significant differences at the p<0.05 level between concrete/interactive 
pictures (M=42.46) and concrete/noninteractive pictures (M=42.23), between 
concrete/interactive pictures and abstract pictures (M=41.56), or between 
concrete/noninteractive pictures and abstract pictures. Similarly, for inferred beliefs, no 
significant differences emerged between concrete/interactive pictures (M=27.86) and 
concrete/noninteractive pictures (M=27.10), between concrete/interactive pictures and abstract 
pictures (M=26.93), or between concrete/noninteractive pictures and abstract pictures. Results 
of the contrasts were not unexpected due to the insignificant picture main effect. Thus, 
Hypothesis 3 was not supported.
Instructions to Imagine (H7b). Hypothesis 7b stated, "As compared to not including 
instructions to imagine in an advertisement, including them will result in stronger brand beliefs." 
Since there was a  significant main effect for instructions to imagine for inferred beliefs 
( M i n s t r u c t i o n 5=  27.77 and Mnolnstructions= 26.72, p <0.046), Hypothesis 7b was supported.
Attitude Toward the Brand
Attitude toward the brand (AB) was tested with pictures and instructions to imagine (Model 
F4,249=4.99. p<0.001). Main effects of pictures (F3 249 = 5.17, p<0.002) and instructions to 
imagine (F^>249=4.49, p<0.04) were significant. Hypotheses 1c and 4a-4c predicted a significant 
effect of pictures on Ae, and there was a significant picture main effect for AB. Thus, further 
analyses of the effects of different picture conditions were performed, and results are 
summarized in Table 4.5.
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Table 4.5
E F F E C T S  O F  PIC TU R E C O N D IT IO N S O N  Ae
Picture condition compared n Mean8 F
Model lb 8.02®
Picture 187 41. 68*No Picture 63 38. 46a
Model 2C 7 . 26e
Concrete 126 42.67ab
Abstract 61 39.64a
No Picture 63 38.46 B
Model 3d 5.17eConcrete/Interactive 64 43.2 5ab
Concrete/Noninteractive 62 42.06 c
Abstract 61 39.64 B
No Picture 63 38.4 6ac
aMeans within each model marked with matching capital letter 
superscripts represent significant contrasts (p<.05) as 
indicated by Bonferroni paired comparisons.
‘’Model 1 tested pictures (cells 1, 2, 3, 5, 6,and 7) versus 
no pictures (cells 4 and 8).
cModel 2 tested concrete pictures (cells 1, 2 , 5, and 6) 
versus abstract pictures (cells 3 and 7) versus no pictures
4 cells 4 and 8).lodel 3 tested concrete/interactive pictures (cells 1 and 5) versus concrete/noninteractive pictures (cells 2 and 6) 
versus abstract pictures (cells 3 and 7) versus no pictures 
(cells 4 and 8). 
ep<. 0 5
1 8 0
Pictures versus No Pictures (H1c). Hypothesis 1 c stated, "As compared to not including a 
picture in an advertisement, including a  picture will result in more positive brand attitudes.” This 
hypothesis was supported (F1249=8.02, pcO.005), with the mean Ag equal to 41.68 In the picture 
condition and 38.46 in the no picture condition. Thus, Hypothesis 1c was supported.
Comparisons o f Picture Conditions (H4a-4c). Hypothesis 4 predicted effects of different 
picture conditions on A^
H4: More positive brand attitudes will result when an advertisement contains:
a. a concrete/interactive picture versus a concrete/noninteractive picture
b. a  concrete/interactive picture versus an abstract picture
c. a  concrete/noninteractive picture versus an abstract picture
Bonferroni paired comparisons revealed no significant differences at the p<0.05 level between 
concrete/interactive pictures (M=43.25) and concrete/noninteractive pictures (M =42.06) or 
between concrete/noninteractive pictures and abstract pictures (M=39.64), but a  significant 
difference was found between concrete/interactive pictures and abstract pictures. Although not 
specifically hypothesized, concrete/interactive pictures resulted in a significantly greater AB than 
no pictures (M=38.46). Thus, Hypothesis 4a and 4c were not supported, but Hypothesis 4b was 
supported.
Further analysis was performed to  analyze effects of concrete, abstract, and no pictures on 
Ae. As can be seen from Table 4.5, when pictures were broken down into concrete (i.e.,
interactive and noninteractive combined), abstract, and no picture conditions (Model 2 in Table
4.5), concrete pictures (M=42.67) resulted in a  more positive AB than both abstract pictures 
(M=39.64) and no pictures (M=38.46).
instructions to Imagine (H7c). Hypothesis 7c stated, "As compared to not including 
instructions to  imagine in an advertisement, including them will result in more positive brand 
attitudes." Because the mean Aa score in the instructions condition (M=41.87) w as significantly 
different than (p<0.04) in the no instruction condition (M=39.83), Hypothesis 7c was supported.
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Attitude Toward the Advertisement
Attitude toward the advertisement (Aad) was tested with pictures and instructions to  imagine 
(Model F424g=8.74, p<0.0001). Main effects of pictures (F3249=4.78, p<0.003) and instructions 
to  imagine (F1249 = 20.21, p <  0.0001) were significant. Hypotheses Id  and 5a-5c predicted a  
significant effect of pictures on Aad, and there was a significant picture main effect for Aad. Thus, 
further analysis of effects of different levels of pictures w as performed, and results are 
summarized in Table 4.6.
Pictures versus No Pictures (H1d). Hypothesis id  stated, "As com pared to  not including a 
picture in an advertisement, including a picture will result in more positive attitudes toward the 
advertisement." No significant difference between the two conditions was evident (F1249 =0.74, 
p<0.39), with the mean Aad equal to 22.95 in the picture condition and 22.25 in the no picture 
condition. Thus, Hypothesis 1d was not supported.
Comparisons of Picture Conditions (H5a-5c). Hypothesis 5 predicted effects of different 
picture conditions on Aad:
H5: More positive attitudes toward the advertisement will result when an advertisement
contains:
a. a concrete/interactive picture versus a concrete/noninteractive picture
b. a  concrete/interactive picture versus an abstract picture
c. a  concrete/noninteractive picture versus an abstract picture
Bonferroni paired comparisons revealed no significant differences at the p<0.05 level between 
concrete/interactive pictures (M=24.64) and concrete/noninteractive pictures (M=22.95) or 
between concrete/noninteractive pictures and abstract pictures (M=21.16). However, there was 
a significant difference between concrete/interactive pictures and abstract pictures. Thus, 
Hypotheses 5a and 5c were not supported, but 5b was supported. Furthermore, 
concrete/interactive pictures resulted in a more positive Aa0 than no pictures.
Further analysis was performed to analyze effects of concrete, abstract, and no pictures on 
Aad. As can be seen from Table 4.6, when pictures were broken down into concrete (i.e., 
interactive and noninteractive combined), abstract, and no picture conditions, concrete pictures
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Table 4.6
E F F E C T S  O F  PIC TU R E C O N D IT IO N S O N
Picture condition compared n Mean8 F
Model lb .74
Picture 187 22.95









Concrete/Noninteractive 62 22 .95
Abstract 61 21.16*
No Picture 63 22.25 B
aMeans within each model marked with matching capital letter 
superscripts represent significant contrasts (p<.05) as 
indicated by Bonferroni paired comparisons.
bModel 1 tested pictures (cells 1, 2, 3 , 5, 6,and 7) versus 
no pictures (cells 4 and 8).
cModel 2 tested concrete pictures (cells 1 , 2, 5, and 6) 
versus abstract pictures (cells 3 and 7) versus no pictures 
(cells 4 and 8).“Model 3 tested concrete/interactive pictures (cells 1 and 
5) versus concrete/noninteractive pictures (cells 2 and 6) 
versus abstract pictures (cells 3 and 7) versus no pictures 
(cells 4 and 8). 
ep<. 05
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(M=23.81) resulted in a  more positive Aad than abstract pictures (M=21.16) but not for the no 
picture condition (M=22.25).
Instructions to Imagine (H7d). Hypothesis 76 stated, "As compared to  not including 
instructions to imagine in an advertisement, including them will result in more positive attitudes 
toward the advertisement." The mean Aad score in the instructions condition (M=24.24) was 
significantly different than (p<0.0001) in the no Instruction condition (M=21.25). Thus, 
Hypothesis 7d was supported.
Intentions
Intentions were tested with pictures and instructions to  imagine (Model F4 2A9 = 1.67, 
p<0.16). Main effects of pictures (F3249 = 1.72, p<0.16) and instructions to imagine (F1249 = 1.50, 
p < 0.22) were not significant. Since the main effect of pictures was not significant for intentions, 
further analyses was not necessary. However, for completeness, the analyses were performed 
and the results summarized in Table 4.7.
Pictures versus No Pictures (H1e). Hypothesis 1e stated, "As compared to  not including a 
picture in an advertisement, including one will result in greater behavioral intentions."
Since there was no main effect of pictures on intentions, Hypothesis 1e was not supported.
Comparisons of Picture Conditions (H6a-6c). Hypothesis 6 predicted the effects of different 
levels of pictures on intentions:
H5: Greater behavioral intentions will result when an advertisement contains:
a. a  concrete/interactive picture versus a  concrete/noninteractive picture
b. a  concrete/interactive picture versus an abstract picture
c. a  concrete/noninteractive picture versus an abstract picture
Bonferroni paired comparisons revealed no significant differences at the p<0.05 level between 
concrete/interactive pictures (M=26.03) and concrete/noninteractive pictures (M=22.08), 
between concrete/interactive pictures and abstract pictures (M=26.57), or between
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Table 4.7
E F F E C T S  O F  P IC T U R E  C O N D IT IO N S  O N  IN T E N T IO N S
Picture condition compared n Mean F
Model la .82
Picture 187 26.56
No Picture 63 25.23
Model 2b 1.22
Concrete 126 24 . 58
Abstract 61 26.57
No Picture 63 26.56
Model 3C 1.72
Concrete/Interactive 64 26. 03
Concrete/Noninteractive 62 22 . 08
Abstract 61 26.57
No Picture 63 26.56
aModel 1 tested pictures (cells 1, 2, 3, 5, 6,and 7) versus 
no pictures (cells 4 and 8).
'’Model 2 tested concrete pictures (cells l, 2, 5, and 6) 
versus abstract pictures (cells 3 and 7) versus no pictures 
(cells 4 and 8).
cModel 3 tested concrete/interactive pictures (cells 1 and 
5) versus concrete/noninteractive pictures (cells 2 and 6) 
versus abstract pictures (cells 3 and 7) versus no pictures 
(cells 4 and 8).
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concrete/noninteractive pictures and abstract pictures, which was not unexpected due to the 
insignificant picture main effect. Thus, Hypothesis 5 was not supported.
Instructions to Imagine (H7e). Hypothesis 7e stated, "As compared to not including 
instructions to  imagine in an advertisement, including them will result in greater behavioral 
intentions." Since there was not a  significant main effect for instructions to imagine on intentions 
( ^ i n s t r u c t i o n ^ 26.34 and Mnolnsmjctlons= 24.76, p<0.16), Hypothesis 7e was not supported.
Moderating Role of Style o f Processing (H8)
Hypothesis 8 stated that an individual’s style of processing would moderate relationships 
between imagery-eliciting strategies and consequence variables:
H8: Relationships given in Hypotheses 1a through 7e will be stronger as individuals
prefer a  visual style of processing.
Style of processing’s moderating role between manipulated imagery-eliciting strategies and
consequence variables was assessed  by re-analyzing Hypotheses 1a-7e with style of processing
included. According to Baron and Kenny (1986), a significant interaction between
multichotomous independent variables and continuous moderating variables indicates a
moderating relationship. Analyses were performed for each consequence variable, and results
are reported in Table 4.8. As can be seen from Table 4.8, no significant interactions between
pictures and style of processing and between instructions to imagine and style of processing
emerged for any consequence variable. However, style of processing exhibited a  significant
main effect on Aad.
Further analyses were performed in which the 20-item SOP scale was broken down into its 
10-item visual and 10-item verbal components. Each subscale was dichotomized into high and 
low based on a median split. The above analyses were performed again with two style of 
processing variables: visual (high and low) and verbal (high and low). A significant interaction 
between an independent variable and the proposed moderator would indicate a moderating
Table 4.8
TEST S FOR MODERATING ROLE O F  STYLE O F  PR O C ESSIN G
ON RELATIONSHIPS BETW EEN IMAGERY-EUCITING STRATEGIES













Picture .63 3 .36a .75 1.02 5.46a 4.94a 1.83
Instructions .11 .84 .02 2.51 4.38a 18.58a 1.65
SOPb 2.83 .01 1.94 2.94 1.44 6.29a 3.11
SOP*Picture 1.03 1. 67 .56 .33 .09 .97 .49





relationship. Similar to  the previous analyses in which style of processing w as analyzed as a  
continuous variable, no significant interactions emerged. Thus, when style of processing was 
analyzed a s  a  continuous variable or as  two categorical variables, Hypothesis 8 w as not 
supported.
Summary
In this section, effects of manipulated imagery-eliciting strategies of different picture 
conditions and instructions to  imagine on consequence variables of memory, beliefs, attitude 
toward the brand, attitude toward the advertisement, and intentions were examined. While not 
all hypotheses tested were supported, several were, especially for AB and Aad. It was found that 
pictures and instructions to imagine included in a print advertisement did significantly affect AB 
and Aad. Including pictures in an advertisement resulted in greater ad-specific memory than not 
including pictures, but further analysis revealed only abstract pictures to  be better than no 
pictures. For A0, including a  picture resulted in more positive attitudes than not including a 
picture in an advertisement. When analyzed further, it was found that concrete pictures resulted 
in a  more positive AB than abstract and no pictures, respectively. However, when concrete 
pictures were separated into concrete/interactive and concrete/noninteractive pictures, both 
concrete/interactive pictures and concrete/noninteractive were significantly greater than no 
pictures, which is consistent with the result that concrete pictures (i.e., interactive and 
noninteractive combined) resulted in a more positive AB than no pictures. Abstract pictures 
resulted in the lowest Aad ratings, but these were only significantly lower than 
concrete/interactive pictures. Including instructions to  imagine in an advertisement resulted in 
greater inferred beliefs, and more positive attitudes (i.e., Ae and Aad). With respect to  
relationships between imagery-eliciting strategies and consequence variables, a moderating roie 
of style of processing was not supported, but style of processing did exhibit a  significant main 
effect on Aad.
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IM A G E R Y -E L IC IT IN G  S T R A T E G IE S  A N D  IM A G ER Y  P R O C E S S IN G
Hypotheses 9a-12c postulated effects of manipulated imagery-eliciting strategies on quality, 
elaboration, and quantity dimensions of imagery processing. While not all hypotheses were 
supported, several were, and they expand the extant knowledge base concerning relationships 
between imagery-eliciting strategies and imagery processing.
Since quality, quantity, and elaboration are related dimensions of imagery processing, an 
initial multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA option in the General Linear Model procedure in 
SAS) was conducted, and results are reported in Table 4.9. Since overall effects of pictures 
(Wilks’ X = 0.92, F=2.44, p<0.01) and instructions to imagine (Wilks’ X = 0.96, F=3.69, p<0.01) 
were significant, separate analyses of variance were conducted. Individual models were 
estimated with the General Linear Model procedure in SAS with Bonferroni paired comparisons 
when necessary. The General Linear Model procedure was used instead of the ANOVA 
procedure to account for differences in sample sizes when comparing different combinations of 
pictures. Means for the effects of pictures and instructions to imagine on dimensions of imagery 
processing were given in Table 4.2.
Results are reported in order of quality, elaboration, and quantity dimensions of imagery 
processing, respectively. Similar to analyses conducted in the previous section, when analyzing 
effects of different picture conditions, three different models were estimated: (1) one in which 
cells 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, and 7 (i.e., pictures) and ceils 4 and 8 (i.e., no pictures) were collapsed to 
examine effects of pictures versus no pictures (Hypothesis 9a-9c), (2) one in which cells 1, 2, 5, 
and 6 (i.e., concrete pictures), cells 3 and 7 (i.e., abstract pictures), and cells 4 and 7 (no 
pictures) were collapsed to examine effects of concrete versus abstract versus no pictures 




EFFECTS OF PICTURES AND INSTRUCTIONS TO IMAGINE 
ON QUALITY, QUANTITY, AND ELABORATION
MANOVA  ANOVA F-Values________
Sources Wilks’ X F-Value Quality Quantity Elaboration
Pictures 0.92 2.44“ 4.56* 0.80 0.47
Instructions




Quality was tested with pictures and instructions to imagine {Model F4250=5.77, p<0.0002). 
Main effects of pictures (F3250=4.56, p < 0.004) and instructions to imagine (F1250=9.39, 
p  <0.002) were significant. Hypotheses 9a, 10a, and 11a predicted a significant effect of pictures 
on quality, and there was a significant picture main effect for quality. Thus, further analysis of 
effects of different picture conditions was performed, and results are summarized in Table 4.10.
Pictures versus No Pictures (H9a). Hypothesis 9a stated, "As compared to not including a 
picture in an advertisement, including one will result in higher quality of imagery processing."
This hypothesis was supported (F1 249 =3.93, p<0.048), with the mean quality score equal to 
72.11 in the picture condition and 65.90 in the no picture condition. Since including pictures in 
the advertisement resulted in higher quality imagery processing when compared to not including 
pictures in the advertisement, Hypothesis 9a was supported.
Comparisons of Picture Conditions (HlOa and H11a). Hypotheses 10 and 11 predicted 
effects of different picture conditions on dimensions of imagery processing. Hypothesis 10 
concerned concrete and abstract pictures, and Hypothesis 11 concerned concrete/interactive 
pictures and concrete/noninteractive pictures.
Hypothesis 10a stated, "As compared to including an abstract picture in an advertisement, 
including a concrete picture will result in higher quality of imagery processing." Bonferroni 
paired comparisons revealed a significant difference between concrete pictures (M=75.22) and 
abstract pictures (M = 65.64) on quality of imagery processing. Thus, Hypothesis 10a was 
supported.
Hypothesis 11a stated, "As compared to including a concrete/noninteractive picture in an 
advertisement, including a concrete/interactive picture will result in higher quality of imagery 
processing." Bonferroni paired comparisons did not reveal a  significant difference between 
concrete/interactive pictures (M=73.60) and concrete/noninteractive pictures (M=76.92). Thus, 
Hypothesis 11a was not supported.
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Table 4.10
E F F E C T S  O F  PIC T U R E  C O N D IT IO N S
O N  QUALITY O F  IM AGERY P R O C E S S IN G
Picture condition compared n Mean8 F
Model lb 3 .93e
Picture 188 72.11




No Picture 63 65.90 B
Model 3d 4 . 56e
Concrete/Interactive 65 73.60
Concrete/Noninteractive 62 76. 92ab
Abstract 61 65.64a
No Picture 63 65.90 B
0Means within each model marked with matching capital letter 
superscripts represent significant contrasts (p<.05) as 
indicated by Bonferroni paired comparisons.
‘’Model 1 tested pictures (cells 1, 2, 3, 5, 6,and 7) versus 
no pictures (cells 4 and 8).
cModel 2 tested concrete pictures (cells 1, 2, 5, and 6) 
versus abstract pictures (cells 3 and 7) versus no pictures
4 cells 4 and 8).lodel 3 tested concrete/interactive pictures (cells l and 5) versus concrete/noninteractive pictures (cells 2 and 6) 
versus abstract pictures (cells 3 and 7) versus no pictures 
(cells 4 and 8). 
ep<. 05
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Instructions to Imagine (H12a). Hypothesis 12a stated, "As compared to not including 
instructions to imagine in an advertisement, including them will result in higher quality of imagery 
processing." The mean quality score in the instructions condition (M=74.51) was significantly 
different than (p<0.002) in the no instruction condition (M=66.44). Thus, Hypothesis 12a was 
supported.
Elaboration
Elaboration was tested with pictures and instructions to imagine (Model F4250 = 1.62, 
p<0.17). While the main effect of pictures (F3 j 50= 0 .47, p<0.70) was not significant, the main 
effect of instructions to imagine was (Fn 2S0=5.19, p<0.02). Since the main effect of pictures was 
not significant for elaboration, further analysis was not necessary. However, for completeness, 
the analyses were performed, and results are summarized in Table 4.11.
Pictures versus No Pictures (H9b). Hypothesis 9b stated, "As compared to not including a 
picture in an advertisement, including one will result in less elaboration of imagery processing." 
Since there was no main effect for pictures on elaboration of imagery processing when 
comparing pictures (M = 13.05) to no pictures (M = 12.36), Hypothesis 9b was not supported.
Comparisons of Picture Conditions (H10b and HUb). Hypothesis 10b stated, "As 
compared to including an abstract picture in an advertisement, including a concrete picture will 
result in less elaboration of imagery processing." Bonferroni paired comparisons revealed no 
significant differences between concrete pictures (M = 13.01) and abstract pictures (M=12.36), 
which would be expected because of the overall insignificant picture main effect. Thus, 
Hypothesis 10b was not supported. Hypothesis 11b stated, "As compared to including an 
concrete/noninteractive picture in an advertisement, including a concrete/interactive picture will 
result in less elaboration of imagery processing." Again, no significant difference between 
concrete/interactive pictures (M = 12.83) and concrete/noninteractive pictures (M = 13.19) was 
evident. Thus, Hypothesis 11 b was not supported.
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Table 4.11
E F F E C T S  O F  P IC T U R E  C O N D IT IO N S
O N  E L A B O R A T IO N  O F  IM A G ER Y  P R O C E S S IN G
Picture condition compared n Mean F
Model 1* 1.04
Picture 188 13.05No Picture 63 12. 36
Model 2b .54
Concrete 127 13.01
Abstract 61 13. 15
No Picture 63 12 . 36
Model 3C .47
Concrete/Interactive 65 12.83
Concrete/Noninteractive 62 13. 19
Abstract 61 13 . 15
No Picture 63 12.36
'Model 1 tested pictures (cells 1, 2 i 3 » 5 f 6,and 7) versusno pictures (cells 4 and 8).
hModel 2 tested concrete pictures (cells 1, 2, 5, and 6)
versus abstract pictures (cells 3 and 7) versus no pictures 
(cells 4 and 8).'Model 3 tested concrete/interactive pictures (cells 1 and 
5) versus concrete/noninteractive pictures (cells 2 and 6) 
versus abstract pictures (cells 3 and 7) versus no pictures 
(cells 4 and 8).
1 9 4
Instructions to imagine (Hl2b). Hypothesis 12b stated, "As compared to not including 
instructions to imagine in an advertisement, including them will result In greater elaboration of 
imagery processing." The mean elaboration score In the instructions condition (M=13.52) was 
significantly different than (p<0.02) in the no instruction condition (M=12.21). Thus, Hypothesis 
12b was supported.
Quantity
Quantity was tested with pictures and instructions to imagine (Model F4249 = 1.75, p<0.14). 
While the main effect of pictures (F324g=0.80, p<0.50) was not significant, the main effect of 
instructions to imagine was (F1i249 =4.70, p<0.03). Since the main effect of pictures was not 
significant for quantity, further analysis was not necessary. However, for completeness, analyses 
were performed, and results are summarized in Table 4.12.
Pictures versus No Pictures (H9c). Hypothesis 9c stated, "As compared to not including a 
picture in an advertisement, including one will result in greater quantity of imagery processing." 
There was no significant difference between pictures (M = 12.18) and no pictures (M = 11.32).
Thus, Hypothesis 9c was not supported.
Comparisons of Picture Conditions (H10c and H11c). Hypothesis 10c stated, “As 
compared to including an abstract picture in an advertisement, including a concrete picture will 
result in a smaller quantity of imagery processing." Since there was no significant main effect for 
pictures on quantity, Hypothesis 10c was not supported. Hypothesis 11c stated, "As compared 
to including a concrete/noninteractive picture in an advertisement, including a 
concrete/interactive picture will result in a greater quantity of imagery processing." Hypothesis 
11c was not supported due to an insignificant main effect of pictures on quantity of imagery 
processing.
instructions to Imagine {H12c). Hypothesis 12c stated, “As compared to not including 
instructions to imagine in an advertisement, including them will result in greater quantity of
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Table 4.12
E F F E C T S  O F  P IC TU R E C O N D IT IO N S
O N  QUANTITY O F  IM AGERY P R O C E S S IN G
Picture condition compared n Mean F
Model 1* 1.91
Picture 187 12.18









No Picture 63 11. 32
‘Model 1 tested pictures (cells 1, 2 / 3 / 5 t 6,and 7) versus
no pictures (cells 4 and 8).
hModel 2 tested concrete pictures (cells 1, 2, 5, and 6)
versus abstract pictures (cells 3 and 7) versus no pictures 
(cells 4 and 8).
cModel 3 tested concrete/interactive pictures (cells 1 and 
5) versus concrete/noninteractive pictures (cells 2 and 6) 
versus abstract pictures (cells 3 and 7) versus no pictures 
(cells 4 and 8).
1 9 6
imagery processing." The mean quantity score in the instructions condition (M = 12.54) was 
significantly different than (p<0.03) in the no instruction condition (M = 11.37). Thus, Hypothesis 
12c was supported.
Moderating Role of Style o f Processing (H13)
Hypothesis 13 stated that an individual's style of processing would m oderate relationships 
between imagery-eliciting strategies and dimensions of imagery processing:
H13: Relationships given in Hypotheses 9a through 12c will be stronger as  individuals
prefer a  visual style of processing.
Style of processing’s  moderating role between manipulated imagery-eliciting strategies and
dimensions of imagery processing w as assessed  by re-analyzing H ypotheses 9a-12c with style
of processing included. According to Baron and Kenny (1986), a  significant interaction between
multichotomous independent variables and continuous moderating variables indicates a
moderating relationship. Analyses were performed for each dimension of imagery processing,
and results are reported in Table 4.13. As can be seen from Table 4.13, no significant
interactions between pictures and style of processing and between instructions to imagine and
style of processing em erged for any dimension of imagery processing, but style of processing
did exhibit a significant main effect on elaboration of imagery processing.
Further analyses were performed in which the 20-item SOP scale was broken down into its 
10-item visual and 10-item verbal components. Each subscale was dichotomized into high and 
low based on a median split. The above analyses were performed again with two style of 
processing variables: visual (high and low) and verbal (high and low). A significant interaction 
between an independent variable and the proposed m oderator would indicate a  moderating 
relationship. Similar to the previous analyses in which style of processing w as analyzed a s  a 
continuous variable, no significant interactions emerged. Thus, when style of processing w as
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Table 4.13
TESTS FOR MODERATING ROLE OF STYLE OF PROCESSING 
ON RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN IMAGERY-ELICITING STRATEGIES 
AND DIMENSIONS OF IMAGERY PROCESSING
F-Values
Source Quality Elaboration Quantity
Picture aOVO• .54 .69
Instructions ISOCM« 4.22° 3.55
SOPb 2.21 9. 58b . 63
SOP*Picture . 16 1.25 . 19




analyzed a s  a  continuous variable or as two categorical variables, Hypothesis 13 was not 
supported.
Summary
In this section, effects of manipulated imagery-eliciting strategies of different picture 
conditions and instructions to imagine on imagery processing dimensions of quality, elaboration, 
and quantity w ere examined. While not all hypotheses tested were supported, several were, 
especially for quality. It was found that pictures and instructions to imagine included in a  print 
advertisement did significantly affect quality of imagery processing. Including pictures in an 
advertisement, specifically concrete pictures, tended to result in higher quality imagery when 
com pared to abstract and no pictures. Including instructions to imagine within m essage stimuli 
also resulted in higher quality imagery, greater quantity of imagery, and greater elaboration of 
imagery than not including instructions to  imagine. The moderating role of style of processing 
w as not supported.
IMAGERY PROCESSING AND CONSEQUENCE VARIABLES
Hypotheses 14a-16e predicted relationships between dimensions of imagery processing 
and consequence variables of memory, beliefs, AB, Aad, and intentions. Each hypothesis 
predicted that relationships between dimensions of imagery processing and consequence 
variables would be positive. Each consequence variable was regressed on the three dimensions 
of imagery processing (i.e., quality, quantity, and elaboration). Therefore, seven separate 
multiple regressions were performed, and results are summarized in Table 4.14. Results are 
reported in order of consequence variables of memory, beliefs, Ae, Aad, and intentions, 
respectively.
Models were estimated with the regression procedure in SAS. Since the three dimensions 
of imagery processing are separate, but related constructs, diagnostics were performed to
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Table 4.14
EFFECTS OF DIMENSIONS OF IMAGERY PROCESSING 
ON MEMORY, BELIEFS, ATTITUDES, AND INTENTIONS
Cons equence 
Variable



















































ensure no problems with multicollinearity among the three dimensions. Neter, Wasserman, and 
Kutner (1985) recommend assessing variance inflation factors (VIF) as one formal method of 
detecting multicollinearity. These factors measure how much the variances of estimated 
regression coefficients are inflated compared to when Independent variables are not linearly 
related. The VIF of an independent variable is equal to one when that Independent variable is 
not linearly related to other independent variables. The authors recommend, "examining the 
largest VIF among the independent variables as an indicator of the severity of multicollinearity, 
and a VIF in excess of 10 is often taken as an indicator that multicollinearity may be unduly 
influencing the least squares estimates" (p. 392). Variance inflation factors were estimated for 
independent variables of quality, quantity, and elaboration, and they were 1.65, 1.22, and 1.82, 
respectively. Thus, the VIF's are within acceptable levels recommended by Neter et al. (1985), 
and multicollinearity was not considered a problem. Furthermore, rigorous evaluation of 
dimensionality that was performed during the scale development stage of the dimensions 
mitigated multicollinearity.
Memory
Car-specific memory and ad-specific memory were regressed on the three dimensions of 
imagery processing, respectively. For car-specific memory, the overall model was not significant 
(Model F3 248 = 1.37, p < 0.25). Similarly, the overall model was not significant for ad-specific 
memory (Model F3248 = 1.74, p<0.16). Results are summarized in Table 4.14.
Quality (H14a). Hypothesis 14a stated, "Quality of imagery processing is positively related 
to memory of ad information." For either car-specific memory or ad-specific memory, 
standardized regression coefficients for quality were not significant (£=0.10, p<0.20 and £=0.15, 
p<0.06, respectively). Thus, Hypothesis 14a was not supported.
Elaboration (H15a). Hypothesis 15a stated, “Elaboration of imagery processing is positively 
related to memory of ad information." For either car-specific or ad-specific memory,
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standardized regression coefficients for elaboration were not significant (0=-O.O4, p<0.68 and 
0=-O.14, p < 0 .1 0 0 0 , respectively). Thus, Hypothesis 15a was not supported.
Quantity (H16a). Hypothesis 16a stated, "Quality of imagery processing is positively related 
to  memory of ad information." For either car-specific or ad-specific memory, standardized 
regression coefficients were not significant (0=0.08, p<0.26 and 0=0.08, p<0.26, respectively). 
Thus, Hypothesis 16a was not supported.
Beliefs
Specific beliefs and inferred beliefs were regressed on the three dimensions of imagery 
processing, respectively. For specific beliefs, the overall model was significant (Model 
F3 2 4a =9.53, p < 0 .0 0 0 1 ). Similarly, the overall model was significant for inferred beliefs (Model 
F3 248 = 1 2 .6 8 , p  <0.0001). Results are summarized in Table 4.14.
Quality (Hl4b). Hypothesis 14b stated, "Quality of imagery processing is positively related 
to brand beliefs." For both specific and inferred beliefs, standardized regression coefficients for 
quality were significant and positive (0=0.35, p<0.0001 and 0=0.30, p<0.0001, respectively), 
indicating a  positive relationship between quality of imagery processing and both specific and 
inferred beliefs. Thus, Hypothesis 14b was supported.
Elaboration (H1Sb). Hypothesis 15b stated, "Elaboration of imagery processing is positively 
related to brand beliefs." For either specific or inferred beliefs, standardized regression 
coefficients for elaboration were not significant (0=-O.O6, p<0.48 and 0=0.12, p<0.14, 
respectively). Thus, Hypothesis 15b was not supported.
Quantity (H16b). Hypothesis 16b stated, "Quantity of imagery processing is positively 
related to brand beliefs." For either specific or inferred beliefs, standardized regression 
coefficients were not significant (0=0.03, p<0.63 and 0=-O.O4, p < 0.56, respectively). Thus, 
Hypothesis 16b was not supported.
2 0 2
Attitude Toward the Brand
Aq w as regressed on the three dimensions of imagery processing. The overall model was 
significant (Model F324e=48.19, p < 0 .0 0 0 1 ) with an R2 of .37, and results are summarized in 
Table 4.14.
Quality (H14c). Hypothesis 14c stated, "Quality of imagery processing is positively related 
to brand attitudes." The standardized regression coefficient for quality was significant and 
positive (/3=0.30, p<0.0001), indicating a positive relationship between quality of imagery 
processing and A0. Thus, Hypothesis 14c was supported.
Elaboration (H15c). Hypothesis 15c stated. “Elaboration of imagery processing is positively 
related to brand attitudes." The standardized regression coefficient for elaboration was 
significant and positive (/5=0.39, p<0.0001), indicating a  positive relationship between 
elaboration of imagery processing and AB. Thus, Hypothesis 15c was supported.
Quantity (H16c). Hypothesis 16c stated, “Quantity of imagery processing is positively 
related to brand attitudes." The standardized regression coefficient was not significant 05=-0 .0 2 , 
p < 0.68). Thus, Hypothesis 16c was not supported.
Attitude Toward the Advertisement
Aad was regressed on the three dimensions of imagery processing. The overall model was 
significant (Model F3 248 =39.40, p<0.0001) with an R2 of 0.33, and results are summarized in 
Table 4.14.
Quality (Hl4d). Hypothesis I4d stated, "Quality of imagery processing is positively related 
to attitude toward the advertisement." The standardized regression coefficient for quality was 
significant and positive (/?=0.42, p<0.0001), indicating a positive relationship between quality of 
imagery processing and Aad. Thus, Hypothesis I4d was supported.
Elaboration (H15d). Hypothesis 15d stated, “Elaboration of imagery processing is positively 
related to attitude toward the advertisement." The standardized regression coefficient for
2 0 3
elaboration was significant and positive (/9=0.20, p < 0 .0 1 ), indicating a positive relationship 
between quality of imagery processing and Aad. Thus, Hypothesis 15d was supported.
Quantity (Hl6d). Hypothesis 16d stated, "Quantity of imagery processing is positively 
related to  attitude toward the advertisement." The standardized regression coefficient was not 
significant 03=0.02, p < 0.76). Thus, Hypothesis 16d was not supported.
Intentions
Intentions were regressed on the three dimensions of imagery processing. The overall 
model was significant (Model F3 24e= 26.00, p < 0.0001) with an R2 equal to 0.24, and results are 
summarized in Table 4.14.
Quality (Hl4e). Hypothesis 14e stated, "Quality of imagery processing is positively related 
to  behavioral intentions." The standardized regression coefficient for quality was not significant 
03=0.03, p < 0.67). Thus, Hypothesis 14e was not supported.
Elaboration (H15e). Hypothesis 15e stated, "Elaboration of imagery processing is positively 
related behavioral intentions." The standardized regression coefficient for elaboration was 
significant and positive 05=0.46, p<0.0001), indicating a  positive relationship between 
elaboration of imagery processing and intentions. Thus, Hypothesis 15e was supported.
Quantity (H16e). Hypothesis 16e stated, "Quantity of imagery processing is positively 
related to behavioral intentions." The standardized regression coefficient was not significant 
03=0.02, p < 0.76). Thus, Hypothesis 16e was not supported.
Summary
In this section, effects of quality, elaboration, and quantity of imagery processing on 
memory, beliefs, AB, Aad, and intentions were examined. While not all hypotheses tested were 
supported, several were, especially for quality of imagery processing on beliefs and attitudes and 
elaboration of imagery processing on attitudes and intentions. The significant relationships were
2 0 4
all positive. Only quantity of imagery processing did not have any effect on consequence 
variables, and thus was not considered in the next set of analyses in which the mediating role of 
imagery processing dimensions between imagery-eliciting strategies and consequence variables 
was assessed.
MEDIATING ROLE OF IMAGERY PROCESSING
According to Baron and Kenny (1986), a variable can only be considered a mediating 
variable if that variable as well as independent variables significantly influence a dependent 
variable, and the independent variables must significantly influence the mediating variable (i.e., 
paths a, b, and c In Figure 4.1 must be significant). If these relationships hold, then dependent 
variables are regressed on independent variables with mediating variables included as 
covariates. If previously significant Independent variables become insignificant and mediating 
variables are significant, then the covariate is acting as a mediating variable. If independent 
variables are still significant but not as significant as previously, a reduced parameter estimate 
indicates partial mediation by the covariate (Baron and Kenny 1986).
Hypothesis 17 stated, "Relationships given in Hypotheses 1 a through 7e are mediated by 
the dimensions of imagery processing in the directions specified in Hypotheses 14a through 16e, 
respectively." Since paths a, b, and c in Figure 4.1 must all be significant before a test for 
mediation can be performed, not every independent variable, consequence variable, or imagery 
processing dimension was included in a test for mediation. Thus, Table 4.15 highlights the 
variables that could be included in tests for mediation. Only variables that were significantly 
influenced by a manipulated independent variable(s) and dimension(s) of imagery processing 
could be tested. Furthermore, to be included, a dimension must have been influenced by an 
independent variable, also. The mediating effect of imagery processing is discussed in order of 
consequence variables of memory, beliefs, AB, Aad, and intentions.
VARIABLES EXHIBITING SIGNIFICANT MAIN EFFECTS ON 
CONSEQUENCE VARIABLES AND DIMENSIONS OF IMAGERY PROCESSING
Consequence V ariab les__________________________________________________  Dimensions o f
Independent
V ariab les
C a r-s p e c if ic
Memory
A d-specif ic  
Memory
S p e c if ic
B e lie fs
In fe rre d
B e lie fs A. A In te n tio n s
Imaoerv P rocessing  
Q u a lity  E lab o ra tio n  Q uan tity
P ic tu re s No Yes No No Yes Yes No Yes No Ho
In s tru c t io n s  
to  Imagine No No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Q u a lity No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No
E lab o ra tio n No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Q uan tity No No No No No No No
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Furthermore, since there were no significant differences found between concrete/interactive 
pictures and concrete/noninteractive pictures, these picture conditions were collapsed into 
"concrete" pictures, and since there were no significant differences between abstract and no 
picture conditions for the consequence variables examined in this section, these were collapsed 
into an "other" category. The regression analyses were performed with a (1 /0) dummy variable 
representing picture conditions examined in the specific test and a  (1 / 0 ) dummy variable 
representing the instructions to  imagine variable. The dimension(s) of imagery processing 
included in the analyses w as a continuous variable, thus, no special treatment was required 
when performing the regression analysis.
With respect to  path a  (i.e., effects of pictures and instructions to imagine on dimensions of 
imagery processing), both manipulated imagery-eliciting strategies significantly influenced quality 
of imagery processing, but only instructions to imagine significantly influenced all three 
dimensions of imagery processing. Since the tests  for mediation used regression analysis and 
pictures were analyzed differently from previous analyses, effects of manipulated imagery- 
eliciting strategies were analyzed with regression analysis to obtain standardized beta 
coefficients. For quality of imagery processing, standardized beta coefficients for both pictures 
and instructions to  imagine were significant (/3=0.22, p<0.001 and /3=0.17, p<0.01, 
respectively). For elaboration of imagery processing, the beta coefficient for instructions to 
imagine was significant 05=0.13, p<0.04) but not for pictures (/?=0.04, p<0.57). Quantity of 
imagery processing was significantly influenced by instructions to imagine 03=0.1 S, p<0.05) but 
not pictures 03=0.04, p<0.60). These results are consistent with earlier analyses and 
conclusions in which main effects of pictures were significant for quality of imagery processing 
but not the other two dimensions and main effects of instructions to  imagine were significant for 
all three dimensions.
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Quantity of imagery processing did not significantly influence any consequence variable, 
which means path b in Figure 4.1 for this dimensions was not significant. Therefore, only quality 
and elaboration dimensions of imagery processing were included in mediation tests given below.
Memory
As can be seen from Table 4.15, no variable influenced car-specific memory. Thus, no 
tests of mediating effects of quality, quantity, or elaboration dimensions of imagery processing 
were performed for car-specific memory.
Although pictures affected ad-specific memory, no dimension of imagery processing 
affected ad-specific memory. Thus, no tests of mediating effects of quality, elaboration, or 
quantity of imagery processing were performed with respect to the relationship between 
imagery-eliciting strategies and ad-specific memory.
Beliefs
As can be seen from Table 4.15, only quality of imagery processing influenced specific 
beliefs. Since no manipulated independent variable influenced specific beliefs, no tests of 
mediating effects of quality, quantity, or elaboration dimensions of imagery processing were 
performed.
Inferred beliefs were significantly influenced by instructions to imagine and quality of 
imagery processing. Since instructions to imagine significantly influenced quality of imagery 
processing, a  test for the mediating effect of quality was performed, and results are reported in 
Table 4.16. Initially, inferred beliefs were regressed on dummy-coded instructions to imagine 
(Model F-, 243=4.27, p<0.04). The standardized regression coefficient for instructions to imagine 
was significant (/3=0.13, p<0.04). When inferred beliefs were regressed on instructions to 
imagine and quality of imagery processing (Model F2249 = 18.43, p<0.0001), the standardized 
regression coefficient for instructions to imagine was no longer significant (/?=0.07, p<0.28), but
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Table 4.16
TEST FOR MEDIATING ROLE OF QUALITY OF IMAGERY PROCESSING 







Model 1* . 02 4 . 27c
Instructions . 13 .0398
Model 2b . 13 18.43°
Instructions .07 .2775
Quality .34 .0001
‘Model 1 examined the effect of the independent variable 
without the mediator.




the standardized regression coefficient for quality was significant 09=0.34, p < 0.0001). Quality of 
imagery processing did mediate the relationship between instructions to imagine and inferred 
beliefs since quality was significant, and a previously significant instructions to imagine effect 
became insignificant. Thus, Hypothesis 17 was supported with respect to quality of imagery 
processing’s mediating role on the relationship between instructions to imagine and inferred 
beliefs.
Attitude Toward the Brand
As can be seen from Table 4.15, pictures, instructions to imagine, quality, and elaboration 
influenced Ae. Since both pictures and instructions to imagine significantly influenced quality of 
imagery processing, a test for the mediating effect of quality was performed, and results are 
reported in Table 4.17. Elaboration of imagery processing was not included in this analysis 
because only instructions to imagine significantly influenced elaboration, which would preclude 
this variable from being included in a test for mediation between both independent variables and 
Ab. initially, AB was regressed on dummy-coded picture conditions and instructions to imagine 
(Model F2 2 4 9 =9.23, p <0.0001). Pictures were coded one for concrete (i.e., interactive and 
noninteractive combined) and zero for other (i.e., abstract and no picture combined) because 
only concrete pictures were significantly different than abstract and no pictures, and there was 
no significant difference between concrete/interactive and concrete/noninteractive pictures for 
quality of imagery processing. The same was true for Aad. Standardized regression coefficients 
for pictures and instructions to imagine were significant (£=0.23, p<0.0002 and £=0.13, p< 0 .04, 
respectively). When Ae was regressed on pictures, instructions to imagine, and quality of 
imagery processing (Model F3 249 = 34.89, p <0 .0 0 0 1 ), the standardized regression coefficient for 
pictures remained significant (£=0.12, p<0.03), but the standardized regression coefficient for 
instructions to imagine was not significant (/9=0.04, p < 0.52). The standardized regression 
coefficient for quality was significant (£=0.50, p< 0 .0 0 0 1 ). Quality of imagery processing did
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Table 4.17
TEST FOR MEDIATING ROLE OF QUALITY OF IMAGERY PROCESSING ON 






Model 1* . 06 9 .23e
Pictures .23 .0002
Instructions .13 .0359




■Model 1 examined the effect of the independent variable 
without the mediator.




mediate relationships between pictures and instructions to imagine with Aq since quality was 
significant, and previously significant manipulated independent variables did becom e insignificant 
or at least less significant. Thus, Hypothesis 17 was supported with respect to quality of 
imagery processing’s mediating role on relationships between imagery-eliciting strategies and Ag.
Since instructions to imagine did influence elaboration of imagery processing, and 
elaboration influenced AB, another test for mediation was performed for quality and elaboration 
between the instructions to imagine relationship and AB, and results are reported in Table 4.18. 
Initially, AB was regressed on dummy-coded instructions to imagine (Model F1 Z4g=4.23, p<0.04). 
The standardized regression coefficient for instructions to imagine w as significant 09=0.13, 
p<0 .04). When AB was regressed on instructions to imagine along with quality and elaboration 
of imagery processing (Model F3 Z4g = 48.33, p < 0 .0 0 0 1 ), the standardized regression coefficient 
for instructions to imagine was no longer significant (/9=0.02, p<0.71), and the standardized 
regression coefficients for quality and elaboration were significant (/9=0.29, p < 0.0001 and 
0=0.38, p < 0.0001, respectively). Quality and elaboration of imagery processing did mediate the 
relationship between instructions to imagine and AB since quality and elaboration were 
significant, and the previously significant instructions to imagine effect becam e insignificant.
Thus, Hypothesis 17 was supported with respect to quality and elaboration of imagery 
processing's mediating role on the relationship between instructions to imagine and A0.
Attitude Toward the Advertisement
As can be seen from Table 4.15, pictures, instructions to imagine, quality, and elaboration 
influenced Aad. Since both pictures and instructions to imagine significantly influenced quality of 
imagery processing, a  test for the mediating effect of quality was performed, and results are 
reported in Table 4.19. Elaboration of imagery processing was not included in this analysis 
because only instructions to imagine significantly influenced elaboration, which would preclude it 
from being included in a  test for mediation between both independent variables and Aad.
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Table 4.18
T E S T  FO R  MEDIATING RO LE O F  QUALITY AND ELABORATION
O F  IMAGERY P R O C E S S IN G  O N  RELA TIO N SH IP






Model la .01 4 .23c
Instructions . 13 .0408
Model 2b .36 48 . 33cInstructions . 02 .7097Quality . 29 . 0001Elaboration . 38 .0001
aModel 1 examined the effect of the independent variable 
without the mediator.




TEST FOR MEDIATING ROLE OF QUALITY OF IMAGERY PROCESSING 
BETWEEN PICTURES/INSTRUCTIONS TO IMAGINE AND Aad
Standardized Significance
Source Beta Level R2 F
Model la • o 15.21°Pictures . 19 .0018Instructions .27 .0001
Model 2b .33 41.52°
Pictures . 08 . 1335
Instructions . 18 . 0009
Quality . 50 .0001
aModel 1 examined the effect of the independent variable 
without the mediator.




Initially, Aad was regressed on dummy-coded picture conditions and instructions to imagine 
(Model F2,249 = 15.21, p <0.0001). Pictures were coded one for concrete (i.e., interactive and 
noninteractive combined) and zero for other (i.e., abstract and no picture combined) because 
only concrete pictures were significantly different than abstract and no pictures, and there was 
no significant difference between abstract and no pictures for quality of imagery processing. 
Similarly, for Aad, there was no significant difference between concrete/interactive and 
concrete/noninteractive pictures, but concrete/interactive pictures were significantly different 
that abstract and no pictures. Thus, concrete pictures were pooled in this analysis.
Standardized regression coefficients for pictures and instructions to imagine were significant 
09=0.19, p < 0.002 and £=0.27, p < 0.0001, respectively). When Aao was regressed on pictures, 
instructions to imagine, and quality of imagery processing (Model F3249  =41.52, p<0.0001), the 
standardized regression coefficient for pictures became insignificant (£=0.08, p<0.13), but the 
standardized regression coefficient for instructions to imagine was still significant (£=0.18, 
p < 0.0009). However, the effect of instructions to imagine became less significant, and the 
regression coefficient did decrease. The standardized regression coefficient for quality was 
significant (£=0.50, p<0.0001). Quality of imagery processing partially mediated relationships 
between pictures and instructions to imagine with Aad since quality was significant, and 
previously significant manipulated independent variables did become insignificant or at least less 
significant. Thus, Hypothesis 17 was supported with respect to quality of imagery processing’s 
mediating role on relationships between imagery-eliciting strategies and Aad.
Since instructions to  imagine did influence elaboration of imagery processing, and 
elaboration influenced Aad, another test for mediation was performed for quality and elaboration 
between the instructions to imagine relationship and Aad, and results are reported in Table 4.20. 
Initially, AADwas regressed on dummy-coded instructions to imagine (Model F1249  = 19.71, 
p<0.0001). The standardized regression coefficient for instructions to imagine was significant 
(£=0.27, p<0.0001). When Aad was regressed on instructions to imagine along with quality and
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Table 4.20
T E S T  F O R  M ED IA TING  R O L E  O F  QUALITY A N D  EL A B O R A T IO N
O F  IM A GERY  P R O C E S S IN G  O N  R E L A T IO N S H IP




Model 1* .07 19.71c
Instructions .27 .0001
Model 2b .34 44.59°
Instructions .17 .0014
Quality .40 .0001
Elaboration .19 . 0040
‘Model 1 examined the effect of the independent variable 
without the mediator.




elaboration of imagery processing (Model F3 2 4 9 =44.59, p < 0 .0 0 0 1 ), the standardized regression 
coefficient for instructions to imagine was still significant 05=0.17, p<0.00l), and the 
standardized regression coefficients for quality and elaboration were significant 09=0.40, 
p<0.0001 and 9=0.19, p<0.004, respectively). Quality and elaboration of imagery processing 
partially mediated the relationship between instructions to imagine and Aad since quality and 
elaboration were significant, and the previously significant instructions to imagine effect became 
less significant. Thus, Hypothesis 17 was supported with respect to quality and elaboration of 
imagery processing's mediating role on the relationship between instructions to imagine and Aad.
Although not hypothesized in the dissertation research, style of processing did exhibit a 
significant main effect on Aad (9=0.26, p<0.0001) and elaboration of imagery processing 
(9=0.19, p<0.003). Thus, a mediating test for elaboration between instructions to imagine with 
style of processing and Aad was performed. Instructions to imagine were included in this test 
because this imagery-eliciting strategy significantly influenced both Aad and elaboration of 
imagery processing, also. Results are reported in Table 4.21, and it can be seen that 
elaboration of imagery processing partially mediated the effect of instructions to imagine on Aad, 
but it completely mediated the previously significant effect of style of processing on Aa0.
Intentions
As can be seen from Table 4.15, only elaboration of imagery processing influenced 
intentions. Since no manipulated independent variable influenced intentions, tests of mediating 
effects of quality, quantity, or elaboration dimensions of imagery processing were not performed.
Summary
In this section, tests for mediating effects of quality and elaboration of imagery processing 
on relationships between imagery-eliciting strategies and consequence variables were 
performed, which tested Hypothesis 17. Only quality and elaboration of imagery processing
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Table 4.21
T E S T  F O R  MEDIATING RO LE O F  ELABORATION O F  IMAGERY P R O C E S S IN G
O N  RELA TIO N SH IPS BETW EEN
IN STR U C TIO N S T O  IM A GIN E/STY LE O F  P R O C E S S IN G  AND A ^
Source StandardizedBeta SignificanceLevel R2 F
Model l* .09 13 . 04d
Instructions .26 .0001
SOPb .17 .0058




■Model 1 examined the effect of the independent variable 
without the mediator. 
bSOP=Style of Processing




were included because quantity of imagery processing did not influence any consequence 
variable, which precluded that dimension from being tested as  a mediating variable.
In all cases in which a  dimension(s) of imagery processing was tested for hypothesized 
mediational effects, the results support a  mediating role for imagery processing because the 
significant effects of imagery-eliciting strategies either diminished in significance or became 
insignificant when imagery processing, specifically quality and elaboration of imagery 
processing, was included in the analysis. Furthermore, the dimension(s) of imagery processing 
was a  significant variable in the tests. Thus, Hypothesis 17 was supported due to complete, or 
at least partial, mediation on the part of quality and elaboration of imagery processing on 
relationships between imagery-eliciting strategies and consequence variables of inferred beliefs, 
Ab, and Aao.
SUMMARY
In this chapter, hypotheses put forth in Chapter 3 were tested. While not all were 
supported, several were, and a summary is given in Table 4.22. The manipulated imagery- 
eliciting strategies did influence several consequence variables. The independent variables of 
pictures did significantly influence ad-specific memory, but not in the hypothesized direction. AB 
and Aad were also significantly influenced by pictures in the hypothesized direction, but concrete 
pictures prevailed over other picture conditions. Instructions to imagine impacted inferred 
beliefs, Ab, and Aad in the hypothesized direction. The only consequence variables not being 
influenced by either imagery-eliciting strategy were car-specific memory and Intentions.
Imagery manipulations also influenced dimensions of imagery processing, especially quality. 
While not all hypotheses concerning the relationship between picture conditions and dimensions 
of imagery processing were supported, it was generally found that concrete pictures generated 
higher quality of imagery processing. In contrast, the hypothesized relationships between 
instructions to imagine and all three dimensions of imagery processing were supported. That is,
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Table 4.22 
SUMMARY OF HYPOTHESES TESTED
Dependent
Hypothesis Variable Results
1a-e. Pictures > No pictures* a. Car-specific memory Not supported
Ad-specific memory Supported
b. Specific beliefs Not supported
Inferred beliefs Not supported
c. Ag Supported
d. Not supported
e. Intentions Not supported
2 a. Interactive > Noninteractive Car-specific memory Not supported
Ad-specific memory Not supported
2 b. Interactive > Abstract Car-specific memory Not supported
Ad-specific memory Not supported
2 c. Noninteractive > Abstract Car-specific memory Not supported
Ad-specific memory Not supported
3a. Interactive > Noninteractive Specific beliefs Not supported
Inferred beliefs Not supported
3b. Interactive > Abstract Specific beliefs Not supported
Inferred beliefs Not supported
3c. Noninteractive > Abstract Specific beliefs Not supported
Inferred beliefs Not supported
4a. Interactive > Noninteractive Aa Not supported
4b. Interactive > Abstract Ag Supported
4c. Noninteractive > Abstract Ag Not supported
5a. Interactive > Noninteractive Aao Not supported
5b. Interactive > Abstract Aao Supported
5c. Noninteractive > Abstract Aad Not supported
6 a. Interactive > Noninteractive Intentions Not supported
6 b. Interactive > Abstract Intentions Not supported
6C. Noninteractive > Abstract Intentions Not supported
7a-e. Instructions > No instructions a. Car-specific memory Not supported
Ad-specific memory Not supported




e. Intentions Not supported
8. Style of processing moderates 1a-7e Those in la-7e Not supported
Table 4.22 (continued) 





9a. Pictures > No pictures Quality Supported
9b. Pictures < No pictures Elaboration Not supported
9c. Pictures > No pictures Quantity Not supported
1 0 a. Concrete > Abstract Quality Supported
1 0 b. Concrete < Abstract Elaboration Not supported
1 0 c. Concrete < Abstract Quantity Not supported
1 1 a. Interactive > Noninteractive Quality Not supported
1 1 b. Interactive < Noninteractive Elaboration Not supported
1 1 c. Interactive > Noninteractive Quantity Not supported
1 2 a. Instructions > No instructions Quality Supported
1 2 b. instructions > No instructions Elaboration Supported
1 2 c. Instructions > No instructions Quantity Supported
13. Style of Processing moderates 9a-12c Those in 9a-12c Not supported
14. Quality positively related to: a. Car-specific memory Not supported
Ad-specific memory Not supported




e. intentions Not supported
15. Elaboration positively related to: a. Car-specific memory Not supported
Ad-specific memory Not supported
b. Specific beliefs Not supported




16. Quantity positively related to: a. Car-specific memory 
Ad-specific memory












17. Imagery processing mediates 1a-7e Those in 1a-7e Partially supported
*> means the condition on the greater than side will result in greater, stronger, or more positive effect in 
the dependent variable.
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including instructions to imagine in an advertisement resulted in higher quality, greater 
elaboration, and greater quantity of imagery processing. The hypothesized moderating role of 
style of processing on relationships between imagery-eliciting strategies and consequence 
variables and between imagery-eliciting strategies and dimensions of imagery processing was 
not supported.
With the exception of quantity of imagery processing, dimensions of imagery processing 
influenced several consequence variables. Quality of imagery processing w as positively related 
to  specific beliefs, inferred beliefs, AB, and Aao, while elaboration of imagery processing was 
positively related to A0, Aad, and intentions. Thus, several of the hypotheses predicting a  
positive relationship between dimensions of imagery processing and consequence variables 
were supported.
Finally, the mediating role of imagery processing was examined. Tests for mediation were 
limited by the conditions set forth by Baron and Kenny (1986). Thus, tests for mediation of an 
imagery processing dimension required an imagery-eliciting strategy to significantly influence the 
consequence variable as well as the dimension(s) of imagery processing. Furthermore, the 
dimension(s) of imagery processing had to significantly influence the consequence variable.
Thus, quality of imagery processing’s mediating role was examined between the relationships of 
pictures and instructions to imagine on A0 and Aad, respectively. Since instructions to  imagine 
and elaboration influenced inferred beliefs, a  test for mediation was performed. Finally, because 
instructions to imagine, quality, and elaboration all influenced AB and Aad, separate tests for 
mediation w ere performed. In all tests for mediation, the mediating role, either partial or 




As stated in Chapter One, the dissertation research set out to examine four general 
research questions. First, the question of whether or not imagery processing could be 
measured was addressed. While this issue cannot be resolved with one dissertation, ft was 
assumed that mental imagery does exist and can be measured. Support for this assumption is 
provided by the psychometric properties of the scale developed in the dissertation research to 
measure imagery processing in concert with the support toward nomological validity of the 
construct that was provided by applying the scale in the experiment.
Second, the dissertation research examined antecedents to mental imagery, namely, the 
imagery-eliciting strategies of pictures and instructions to imagine, and their effects on 
consequence variables of memory, beliefs, attitudes, and intentions. While both imagery-eliciting 
strategies have been studied in the past, the dissertation research expands extant knowledge 
concerning these two strategies. Specifically, the dissertation research examined effects of a 
range of pictures instead of simple pictures versus words. Also, it was shown that including 
instructions to imagine within a message stimulus was more effective than not including 
instructions to imagine within a message stimulus for several consequence variables studied. 
This is something that has not been previously supported in the imagery literature, for the 
majority of studies manipulating instructions to imagine have done so externally to message 
stimuli, which is not very applicable in an advertising context.
With respect to consequence variables, pictures included in a print advertisement 
enhanced brand attitudes; more specifically, concrete pictures resulted in greater brand attitudes 
than either abstract or no pictures. More positive attitudes toward the advertisement were 
evident from concrete pictures as opposed to abstract pictures. Thus, for enhancing attitudes,
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concrete pictures were more effective than abstract pictures, instructions to  imagine enhanced 
inferred beliefs and attitudes. While hypothesized in previous studies (e.g., Wright and Rip 
1980), the dissertation research is the only study that has successfully found this effect in a  print 
advertising context. One possible explanation could be the way the instructions were em bedded 
in the copy (i.e, different phrasing instead of “Imagine yourself). The instructions to imagine 
statem ents appealed to  different senses, not only visual. However, another reason could be due 
to  dem and effects, but if this is true, it would be expected that all dependent variables would be 
influenced, which they were not. However, future research could examine the sam e 
manipulation without measuring imagery processing, which might provide insight into whether or 
not dem and effects occurred. Future research could also examine the effect of including 
instructions to  imagine in other media, for example broadcast.
Third, the dissertation research set out to examine the moderating role of processing 
preference on relationships between imagery-eliciting strategies and consequence variables and 
between imagery-eliciting strategies and dimensions of imagery processing. While this 
hypothesis w as not supported in the dissertation research, possible explanations are discussed 
in this chapter, and further research is still necessary in this area.
Fourth, the last research question addressed by the dissertation research concerned the 
mediating role of imagery processing on relationships found between imagery-eliciting strategies 
and consequence variables. Coupled with the scale developed to m easure dimensions of 
imagery processing, the dissertation research has made a  contribution to the extant knowledge 
base of imagery processing. Concrete pictures positively influenced quality of imagery 
processing, and instructions to  imagine influenced all three dimensions of imagery processing. 
When the mediating role of imagery processing, specifically elaboration and quality, w as 
examined, relationships between imagery-eliciting strategies and consequence variables were 
completely or partially explained by those dimensions. Thus, the dissertation research has
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opened up the "black box," which provides further understanding of the effects of imagery- 
eliciting strategies in a  print advertising context.
In short, the dissertation research addressed these four research questions in a 
methodologically sound manner. The scale that was developed to measure imagery processing 
began with a  definition of the domain of the construct followed by qualitative research to 
generate and content-validate items. Then, the items were evaluated and refined through 
quantitative research in which scale items were administered to three different samples. The 
result is a  psychometrically sound measure to assess quality, quantity, and elaboration of 
imagery processing. However, this attempt is only a  beginning of research in this area, not an 
ending. Finally, the experiment that was conducted was carried out by adhering to good 
experimental design, which strengthens conclusions that can be drawn from the results.
In this chapter, discussion and implications of the research questions examined in the 
dissertation are provided. First, measurement of dimensions of imagery processing is 
addressed. Second, findings from the experiment that was performed are discussed. Finally, 
managerial implications and directions for future research are provided.
MEASUREMENT OF IMAGERY PROCESSING
As discussed in Chapter One, the question of whether or not mental imagery could be 
measured was open to two criticisms. First, and most extreme, it could be argued that no 
mental process can be measured adequately with verbal responses because individuals are 
unable to report what they know or how they think (Nisbett and Wilson 1977). Second, it could 
be argued that verbal scales are inappropriate for measuring nonverbal phenomena (Holbrook at 
al. 1984; Maclnnis and Price 1987; Sheehan et al. 1983). Even though these are plausible 
criticisms, and one dissertation cannot resolve these issues, the attempt in this dissertation does 
shed som e light on these controversies. The dissertation research did exhibit evidence toward
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nomological validity with a much improved measure of the imagery processing construct, which 
advances understanding in this area.
Measurement of Mental Processes
The criticism concerning measurement of mental processes with verbal (i.e., written) 
responses can be attacked. If verbal responses are not used, there are only two alternatives:
(1) not measure the mental process at all, but rather, rely on restrictive manipulations to Infer 
that a  mental process could have been the only mechanism and (2) use alternative measures of 
the mental process. An example of using restrictive manipulations to infer a mental process is 
Kisielius and Sternthal (1984). The authors manipulated the time respondents were allowed to 
view a message stimulus. They hypothesized that greater cognitive elaboration was the mental 
process that caused respondents to exhibit less favorable judgements in one condition 
compared to another condition. When they restricted the time respondents could view the 
m essage stimulus, the differential effects between the two conditions disappeared, thus leading 
the authors to conclude that cognitive elaboration was lower due to the viewing time restriction. 
While there is nothing wrong with this approach, it would be beneficial to attempt to measure the 
explanatory construct, also. Thus, even greater understanding of the underlying process may 
result.
In contrast to not measuring a  mental process at all, the second alternative is to use 
measures other than verbal reports, such as physiological measures. As discussed in Chapter 
Two, physiological responses, such as brain wave patterns, have been used as Indicators of 
imagery processing (Maclnnis and Price 1987). Since imagery processing is a mental process, 
these techniques may provide a  superior assessm ent of imagery processing. However, these 
m easures are inferential, highly obtrusive, and require technical sophistication. Moreover, there 
is no guarantee that these types of measures are assessing mental imagery.
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Thus, the options available are to not attempt to measure imagery processing, which still 
leaves open the possibility of other explanations, measure physiological responses, which also 
still leaves open the possibility of other explanations, or use a  verbal response measure, which 
also still leaves open the possibility of other explanations. However, in the latter option, rigorous 
assessm ent of construct validity, in which reliability, convergent validity, discriminant validity, and 
nomological validity are assessed  could lessen the possibility of other explanations while 
opening the "black box" to  provide some explanation. Finally, a  verbal response measure of 
imagery processing that could be applied in other situations in which communication-evoked 
imagery processing is considered an explanatory variable would be of interest to researchers 
examining this construct, for it not only provides further support for construct validity, it provides 
explanation.
Results of the scale development process and the application of the scale developed also 
weaken the criticism against measuring a mental process with verbal responses. First, the scale 
development procedure involved a definition of the domain of the construct, followed by 
rigorous assessm ent of content validity, reliability, convergent validity, discriminant validity, and 
finally, nomological validity. While construct validity is a never ending process (Peter 1981), 
support toward construct validity of mental imagery dimensions was found in the dissertation 
research. That is, development of the scale used in the dissertation involved qualitative research 
in which a  focus group was used to help define the domain of imagery processing dimensions, 
judging procedures in which content validity of dimensions and items proposed to a ssess  those 
dimensions was assessed, and quantitative analyses in which proposed items were administered 
to three different samples to evaluate and refine scale items with respect to  reliability and 
dimensionality. In sum, psychometrically sound scales were used to measure quality, quantity, 
and elaboration dimensions of imagery processing in the final test assessing nomological validity 
of the construct. Given that dimensions of imagery processing, particularly quality and 
elaboration, exhibited partial or complete mediational effects on relationships between imagery-
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eliciting  s t r a te g ie s  a n d  c o n s e q u e n c e  v a r ia b le s , s u p p o r t  to w a rd  n o m o lo g ica l valid ity  of th e  m e n ta l
im a g e ry  c o n s tru c t  w a s  p re s e n t.  If n o  m e d ia tin g  e ffec t w a s  ev id en t, th e n  it c o u ld  b e  c o n s id e re d
in a p p ro p r ia te  to  m e a s u re  d im e n s io n s  o f im a g e ry  p ro c e s s in g .
Future research should involve further application of the measure developed to assess 
dimensions of imagery processing. Results from application of the scale In the dissertation 
research indicate quality as the strongest dimension of imagery processing, but elaboration was 
affected by instructions to imagine and did exhibit a mediating role with respect to inferred 
beliefs, Ab, and Aad. Quantity of imagery processing appeared to be the weakest dimension 
within the context of the dissertation experiment, for only instructions to imagine influenced this 
dimension. Moreover, quantity of imagery processing did not significantly influence any 
consequence variable. Quantity may be the most difficult to stimulate, but it may have profound 
effects on consequence variables. In this application of the scale, nomological validity of this 
dimension is questionable and requires further research. If further assessment of this dimension 
does not result in support for nomological validity, then it should not be considered an important 
dimension of imagery processing. An experiment that compares all three dimensions may 
provide further insight.
Measurement of Nonverbal Process With Verbal Responses
The second criticism that can be lodged against measuring a nonverbal process, such as 
mental imagery, with verbal responses can be attacked, also. Holbrook et al. (1984), Maclnnis 
and Price (1987), and Sheehan et al. (1983) point out that verbal scales may be inappropriate for 
measuring nonverbal phenomena because an individual must translate a  nonverbal process into 
a  verbal response. As an example of an attempt to overcome this, Holbrook et al. (1984) 
combined verbal and nonverbal reference points in a scale to measure processing style (i.e., the 
V/V Index). Each item contained a stimulus (a word or picture) and an anchor (a word or 
picture), and subjects were asked to place a check closer to the anchor that was more strongly
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associated with the stimulus. Thus, one could argue that a  scale assessing mental imagery 
would need to  incorporate visual instead verbal responses. There are two problems, however. 
First, mental imagery is not only visual, but rather, it can involve all senses. Thus, arguing that 
visual responses are necessary to assess imagery processing Is incomplete considering the 
domain of the construct. Second, Holbrook et al. incorporated visual responses in their scale, 
which was administered on three different occasions in the dissertation research. The V/V Index 
exhibited poor reliability in all three administrations (i.e., a < .60), and several respondents had a  
difficult time responding to the scale because it was confusing. Even though instructions were 
provided, some respondents did not understand what they were supposed to do with the items. 
Thus, if this experience is generalizable, trying to use nonverbal responses to assess  mental 
imagery may not be reasonable, especially when considering how to measure all senses, not 
just visual. The use of a verbal report is the most reasonable alternative, and the scale 
developed in the dissertation research provides a good starting point.
IMAGERY-ELICITING STRATEGIES AND CONSEQUENCES
In this section, effects of manipulated imagery-eliciting strategies of different picture 
conditions and instructions to imagine on consequence variables are discussed. Also discussed 
are the moderating role of style of processing and the mediating role of dimensions of imagery 
processing, and possible explanations and directions for future research are provided.
Memory
No manipulated imagery-eliciting strategy influenced car-specific memory, but ad-specific 
memory was influenced by abstract pictures. Specifically, abstract pictures resulted in greater 
memory of ad-specific memory, which is contrary to what was hypothesized, which was based 
on Paivio’s (1986) dual code theory. However, reasonable explanations exist for: (1) no effect of
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imagery-eliciting strategies on recall of car-specific information and (2) abstract pictures 
significantly affecting recall of ad-speciflc information but not car-specific information.
Insignificant differences between the manipulated conditions and car-specific memory could 
have been due to the experimental procedure that was employed. First, respondents viewed 
only one advertisement, which reduces interference from other stimuli. Second, respondents 
viewed the advertisement, placed it back into an envelope, and immediately responded to the 
memory protocol on the first page of the questionnaire. The protocol w as assessed  immediately 
because the measure of beliefs was placed later in the questionnaire, and specific attribute 
information was included in these items. Thus, to eliminate respondents using belief items to 
respond to  the memory protocol, the two measures were placed in the order of memory 
assessm ent first and beliefs-strength assessm ent considerably further back in the questionnaire. 
As a result, Information concerning the car advertised was relatively salient in the minds of all 
respondents, which could have been the reason for insignificant differences between groups on 
this variable; indeed, most information written in the protocols was car-specific information rather 
than ad-specific information, and means in all conditions were between 2.22 and 2.57 items 
correctly recalled about the car advertised (maximum possible score for car-specific information 
was 7). Since there is no way of knowing whether or not there truly were no differences with 
respect to imagery-eliciting strategies and car-specific memory or the results being an artifact of 
the experimental procedure, future research would be necessary to  investigate this further. An 
improvement for future research would be to investigate a  portfolio of advertisements and ask 
respondents to respond to the questionnaire for only the target advertisement (e.g., Unnava and 
Burnkrant 1991) and /o r administer an interference task between exposure to the stimulus and 
measurement of memory to clear short term memory.
Abstract pictures, however, did result in greater ad-specific memory, which w as contrary to 
what w as hypothesized. The hypothesis was based on Paivio’s  dual code theory (1986), and 
several empirical results support pictures resulting in greater memory than no pictures (see
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Table 2.7). However, few have studied concrete versus abstract versus no pictures (e.g., Palvio 
and Csapo 1969). Thus, hypotheses tested in the dissertation research were based on 
established theory, but there are other explanations. First, since no effects were found for car- 
specific memory, possibly due to  the experimental procedure, this effect could somehow be 
spurious and a  result of the experimental procedure, also. For example, respondents knew the 
researcher was interested in "copytesting" different advertisements, which may have made them 
concentrate more on the advertisement than the product advertised. On the other hand, this 
may be a  nonspurious effect that requires further testing because this result can be explained 
with Kisielius and Sternthal’s (1984, 1986) Availability-Valence (AV) Hypothesis, also. They argue 
that greater cognitive elaboration of information results in that information being more available 
for recall. The abstract picture was illustrated as three different panels in which it was obvious 
that the picture was of a car, but it was not obvious what the car actually looked like. 
Consequently, respondents given an abstract picture may have had to spend more cognitive 
effort piecing together an image of a  car than those given a  concrete picture, which implies 
greater elaboration on their part. Thus, when asked everything they could remember from the 
advertisement, respondents in the abstract picture condition may have had more picture-related 
information available than those in other picture conditions, which may have been the reason for 
more ad-specific memory being reported in the abstract picture condition; indeed, respondents 
in this condition tended to write something about the picture (e.g., “there were three pieces of a 
car pictured"), whereas those in the concrete picture condition tended not to write anything 
about the picture in the advertisement. This could be due to the fact that the concrete picture 
condition w as typical of car advertisements, but the abstract picture condition was not. Thus, it 
would be interesting in future research to examine this further with more appropriate 
experimental procedures with respect to this consequence variable. Furthermore, to determine if 
greater elaboration is the explanatory construct, varying the time respondents are allowed to 
view a  stimulus may provide further insight. Thus, while not supporting hypotheses given in the
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dissertation research, the empirical results provide interesting avenues for future research as  
very few researchers have examined the range of pictures as  the present study.
Beliefs
Effects of manipulated imagery-eliciting strategies on brand attribute beliefs, specific and 
inferred, were examined. For specific beliefs, there were no significant differences with respect 
to  manipulated imagery-eliciting strategies of pictures and instructions to  imagine. However, 
while not significant, differences in m eans were in the direction hypothesized. For inferred 
beliefs, however, it was found that, when com pared to not including instructions to  imagine, 
including them within the m essage stimulus resulted in stronger inferred beliefs. Specific belief 
items related directly to brand attribute information from the advertisement, but inferred belief 
items were implied by specific information regarding the brand. Thus, stronger inferred brand 
beliefs may result from greater cognitive elaboration. Since instructions to  imagine provide a  
command to elaborate on information presented in the stimulus, stronger inferred brand beliefs 
could have resulted. This is consistent with Kisielius and Sternthal's (1984, 1986) AV Hypothesis, 
in which they contend that instructions to imagine would result in greater cognitive elaboration, 
which may then influence attitudes. Applying the AV Hypothesis to inferred beliefs, stronger 
inferred beliefs may have resulted in the instructions to imagine condition because the cognitive 
elaboration that took place was favorable, thus resulting in stronger inferred beliefs due to the 
positive valence of the cognitive elaboration. While there was no way of knowing for sure if 
respondents given instructions to imagine in m essage stimuli actually experienced positiveiy- 
valenced cognitive elaboration, these respondents did report greater elaboration of imagery 
processing, and all elaboration items were phrased in positive terms. Thus, while the AV 
Hypothesis offers a  viable explanation, further research in which the actual valence of cognitive 
elaboration is assessed  (or manipulated) instead of inferred would be necessary to  resolve this 
issue.
231
The AV Hypothesis also offers explanation concerning insignificant differences among 
conditions for specific beliefs. Since specific beliefs related to unvarying specific brand attribute 
information provided in the m essage stimulus, no cognitive elaboration was necessary. If no 
differences in cognitive elaboration took place, it is reasonable that there would be no 
differences regarding strengths of specific beliefs. Thus, no differences with respect to  
relationships between imagery-eliciting strategies and specific beliefs could have been due to  no 
differences in cognitive elaboration. However, future research would be necessary to resolve 
this issue because instructions to imagine did influence elaboration of imagery processing but 
not specific beliefs, and elaboration of imagery processing was not significantly related to 
specific beliefs.
Picture manipulations influenced neither specific- nor inferred-beliefs. Again, this can 
possibly be explained with cognitive elaboration. Even though pictures can elicit cognitive 
elaboration, pictures may be subtie compared to instructions to imagine; indeed, instructions to 
imagine command the viewer to do  something, whereas pictures do not. This could also explain 
why pictures influenced quality of imagery processing, but not elaboration or quantity, and 
instructions to imagine influenced all three dimensions of imagery processing.
Attitude Toward the Brand
A0 was significantly influenced by pictures and instructions to imagine. Although not all 
hypotheses concerning effects of different picture conditions on Ae were supported, it was found 
that pictures, specifically concrete pictures, were more effective in eliciting more positive 
attitudes toward the brand than either abstract or no pictures. These results are consistent with 
Kisielius and Sternthai’s  AV Hypothesis because it was assumed that pictures encourage 
cognitive elaboration. Whether that cognitive elaboration is more positive or less positive than 
the advocacy would determine whether or not judgements were favorable or unfavorable. For 
pictures, it was hypothesized that the most favorable cognitive elaboration would occur for the
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concrete/interactive picture condition, followed by the concrete/noninteractive, abstract, and no 
picture conditions, respectively. The dissertation results support this hypothesis, for the 
concrete/interactive picture condition resulted in the most positive Ag, followed by the other 
three picture conditions in the hypothesized order. However, only significant differences 
occurred between concrete and abstract pictures and concrete and no pictures, but this is 
consistent with the AV Hypothesis. These results provide implications for advertising 
practitioners, also. It is a widely held belief that including pictures in an advertisement results in 
greater brand attitudes (Rossiter 1978), but the dissertation research examined different picture 
conditions. It was found that including a concrete picture was more effective with respect to AB 
than including an abstract picture or having no picture.
When compared to not including instructions to imagine in a message stimulus, including 
them resulted in more positive brand attitudes. This result is also consistent with Kisielius and 
Sternthal’s AV Hypothesis because instructions are considered to elicit cognitive elaboration. 
Since it was assumed that the cognitive elaboration that took place was positively-valenced, a 
more positive Ae resulted in the instructions to imagine condition.
A topic for future research would be to manipulate or measure the valence of the cognitive 
elaboration that took place to further test the AV Hypothesis. Since empirical results tend to 
support that positive cognitive elaboration occurred, the dissertation research provides a  basis 
for future research. Until this is done, one can only speculate that positively-valenced cognitive 
elaboration occurred in the concrete picture condition and the instructions to imagine condition, 
respectively. However, because instructions to imagine did result in greater elaboration of 
imagery processing and elaboration items were phrased in a  positive manner, some support for 
the assumption of positively-valenced cognitive elaboration was provided.
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Attitude Toward the Advertisement
AAD was significantly influenced by pictures and instructions to  imagine. Although not all 
hypotheses concerning effects of different picture conditions on Aad were supported, it was 
found that pictures, specifically concrete pictures, were more effective in eliciting more positive 
attitudes toward the advertisement than were abstract pictures. These results, coupled with the 
finding that abstract pictures resulted in greater ad-speclfic memory, provide support for the AV 
Hypothesis. Since greater memory of ad-specific information occurred in the abstract picture 
condition, it can be assumed that respondents in this condition experienced greater cognitive 
elaboration, which, if negatively-valenced, would result in a  less positive Aad. Also, some time 
was necessary to solve the abstract puzzle, so there was less time for cognitive elaboration. It 
is reasonable to assum e that the cognitive elaboration that occurred in respondents placed in 
the abstract picture condition was less positive than for respondents given a  concrete picture 
because of the idiosyncratic nature of the elaboration. Concrete pictures are consistent with 
respondents’ established cognitive networks, but abstract pictures are not (Kisielius and 
Sternthal 1986). Thus, a cognitive network'had to be generated in the abstract picture condition, 
which required more idiosyncratic elaboration when compared to a cognitive network that 
already exists. Thus, according to Kisielius and Sternthal (1986), less positive attitudes result in 
abstract conditions when compared to vivid (i.e., concrete) conditions.
When compared to not including instructions to imagine in a  message stimulus, including 
them did result in more positive attitudes toward the advertisement. Again, these findings are 
consistent with the AV Hypothesis because it is reasonable to assum e that instructions to 
imagine elicit positively-valenced cognitive elaboration from respondents. Future research, 
however, is necessary to verify this assumption.
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Intentions
Manipulated Imagery-eliciting strategies of pictures and instructions to  imagine did not 
significantly influence behavioral intentions. While it w as hypothesized that pictures and 
instructions to imagine would favorably influence intentions, there are reasonable explanations. 
First, although the choice of automobiles as  an experimental product was reasonable from the 
standpoint that undergraduate students possess sufficient knowledge structures to  be able to 
imagine the product and the product was not purely functional in nature, actual purchase of an 
automobile may be too far in the future for them to be able to respond to intentions measures. 
Even though it w as found that the majority of undergraduates sampled in the pretest expected 
to purchase a  car within the next two years, this time gap between intentions and actual 
purchase may be too long to adequately examine intentions. Furthermore, expecting a  single 
advertisement to move intentions for a  large durable good that is probably a first time purchase 
for the sample is a long shot. The second explanation for the insignificant results with respect to 
intentions concerns the artificial nature of the experiment. While a fictitious brand name (i.e.,
'The 1993 Concept") was used to prevent bias from prior attitudes, this could have resulted in 
respondents being unwilling to "commit" to any behavioral intentions. Informal interviews with a 
few respondents that participated in the study indicated that this could have been the reason.
Not only was the brand name fictitious and unfamiliar to respondents, but there was no mention 
of the automobile manufacturer in the advertisement. Consequently, if the experimental 
advertisements had included the car name as "Honda Concept" or T oyota Concept," there 
might have been som e differences in intentions. However, since Honda and Toyota are well- 
known automobile manufacturers, prior attitudes could have biased results. Also, som e 
respondents felt that since 1993 model cars have not been introduced to the market yet, it was 
difficult to report intentions to examine the automobile further.
A final explanation for the insignificant effects of imagery-eliciting strategies on intentions 
could be the self-related ness of the imagery that took place. Since imagery processing was
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measured, it can be assum ed that mental imagery actually took place. However, as discussed 
in Chapter Three, care was taken to try to elicit imagery without references to the self, especially 
with respect to instructions to imagine. Anderson (1983) asked som e respondents to draw 
themselves or another person performing a  behavior and assessed attitudes and behavioral 
intentions. While mental imagery (i.e., drawing a  cartoon) enhanced attitudes in the imagery 
condition, it was found that intentions were not greater within all mental imagery conditions. 
Specifically, it was found that only those that drew themselves performing the behavior reported 
greater behavioral intentions. Thus, the author concluded that while imagery may enhance 
attitudes, only self-related imagery enhances behavioral intentions. While mental imagery may 
have occurred in the dissertation study, it may not have been self-related. If so, results from this 
study are consistent with Anderson (1983).
Moderating Role o f Style o f Processing
The moderating role of an individual’s style of processing was not supported. This 
hypothesis was not firmly based in theory, but it was assum ed that a  presentation format that 
was congruent with an individual's processing preference would result in stronger effects of 
imagery-eliciting strategies (e.g., Holbrook et al. 1984). This hypothesis may not have been 
supported for two reasons.
First, perhaps style of processing is not an important moderator between imagery-eliciting 
strategies and consequence variables or dimensions of Imagery processing. Lack of a 
significant moderating role of style of processing has been reported in other studies examining 
this variable as a moderating variable (e.g., Burns et al. 1992). Thus, other possible moderators, 
such as opportunity to imagine or motivation to imagine, could provide insight into situational 
and individual difference variables that may be important.
Second, the fact that an individual’s style of processing was assessed during a  study in 
which imagery-eliciting strategies were manipulated may have influenced this measure. There is
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no way of knowing if there was a contamination effect from the imagery processing items on the 
styie of processing items. Future research could examine if there Is an effect, and implications 
may be to assess individual difference variables separately from the actual experiment. Since 
the dissertation research did not assess this individual difference variable separately from the 
final experiment, there is no way of knowing if style of processing is not an important 
moderating variable or if context of the study influenced responses to this measure.
Mediating Role of Imagery Processing
The last, and possibly most important, implication of the dissertation research is the 
mediating rote of dimensions of imagery processing because not only did this provide support 
toward nomological validity of the measures developed, it also provided explanation regarding 
the effects of imagery-eliciting strategies on consequence variables. The mediating role of an 
imagery-processing dimension (s) was assessed for relationships that were significant between 
imagery-eliciting strategies and consequence variables, in all cases in which the mediating role 
of an imagery processing dimension(s) was assessed, partial or complete mediation was found.
When quality of imagery processing was included as a covariate with the previously 
significant relationship between instructions to imagine and inferred beliefs, a mediating role of 
quality was supported because the standardized beta coefficient for instructions to imagine 
became insignificant and the quality coefficient was significant. Thus, quality of imagery 
processing completely mediated the relationship between instructions to imagine and inferred 
beliefs.
Pictures, instructions to imagine, quality of imagery processing, and elaboration of imagery 
processing all influenced AB and Aad. Again, quality and elaboration exhibited complete 
mediation for instructions to imagine and partial mediation for pictures with respect to AB. For 
Aad, when examining pictures, instructions to imagine and quality of imagery processing, quality 
of imagery processing exhibited complete mediation with respect to pictures but only partial
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mediation with respect to instructions to imagine. However, when the mediating role of quality 
and elaboration was examined with respect to the relationship between instructions to imagine 
and Aad, complete mediation was indicated, providing further support for the AV Hypothesis 
explanation given earlier. Since mental imagery is a form of cognitive elaboration, measuring 
elaboration of imagery processing gives some insight into the extent and valence of cognitive 
elaboration that had taken place. Furthermore, since the elaboration of imagery processing 
completely mediated the previously significant effect of instructions to imagine on Aad, more 
support is given for the assumption that instructions to imagine elicit greater cognitive 
elaboration.
An interesting serendipitous finding was that style of processing significantly influenced Aad 
and elaboration of imagery processing. When a test for mediation was performed, it was found 
that elaboration of imagery processing completely mediated the previously significant positive 
main effect of style of processing. A conclusion that can be drawn from this finding is that visual 
processors elaborated on the advertisement irrespective of the type of advertisement given.
A final implication that can be derived from the mediational tests of dimensions of imagery 
processing is that, in the majority of cases, a dimension(s) of imagery processing completely 
mediated the effects of instructions to imagine but not the effects of pictures. Thus, it appears 
that while imagery processing does mediate relationships, respondents have to be told to 
imagine. While pictures did influence quality of imagery processing, instructions to imagine 
influenced quality, quantity, and elaboration of imagery processing. Consequently, if an 
advertiser wants to elicit mental imagery, it is important to note that the audience should be told 
to imagine. The dissertation research also illustrated that instructions to imagine can be 
embedded within a written message effectively, which has alluded researchers until now (e.g., 
Wright and Rip 1980).
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MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS
Even though the major thrust of the dissertation research was concerned with measuring 
and predicting the mental process of imagery processing, the results hold several managerial 
implications. However, limitations concerning generalizability (e.g., sample, task setting, and 
experimental procedures) mitigate managerial implications. The first implication pertains to 
nonverbal elements of print m essage design. It was found that including pictures in a  print 
advertisement was generally more effective in positively influencing attitudes than not including 
pictures. However, concrete pictures were more effective than abstract pictures, possibly 
because abstract pictures require respondents to allocate a greater proportion of their limited 
processing capacity to piecing together a picture in their mind. A concrete picture is congruent 
with established memory networks, which may have allowed respondents given this type of 
picture to  allocate a  greater proportion of their limited processing capacity to other elements of 
the message. Furthermore, by giving the complete image to the audience, less idiosyncratic 
information was used in processing the advertisement, which may have resulted in more positive 
cognitive elaboration. Thus, more positive attitudes resulted, in sum, then, it was found that 
imagery processing does influence communication effects, and imagery processing can be 
stimulated with nonverbal elements of the advertisement. While imagery processing is desirable, 
it is recommended to provide the image for the audience instead of making them have to work 
to form one.
The second managerial implication pertains to verbal elements of a  m essage. It was found 
in the dissertation research that imagery processing can also be stimulated by instructions to 
imagine included within m essage stimuli. By instructing respondents to  form mental imagery, 
attitudes were favorably influenced. This may have been due to the fact that the m essage told 
the audience what to do, which resulted in positive cognitive elaboration. Thus, if an  advertiser 
wants to stimulate cognitive activity, specifically mental imagery, it's best to  instruct the 
audience.
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DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
There are several directions for future research from the dissertation research. One 
research agenda pertains to the scale developed to measure imagery processing. First, the 
scale developed is only a beginning, not an ending. Further application and refinement of the 
scale is necessary to provide further support toward construct validity. The purpose of the scale 
is to measure communication-evoked imagery processing. While it was developed and applied 
in a print advertising context, it should be applied and refined in other communication contexts. 
For example, while the scale is useful in advertising research and should be applied in other 
media, it could also be useful in communication contexts such as personal selling. It would be 
interesting to examine whether or not eliciting mental imagery in a personal selling situation is 
effective, and using the scale developed in the dissertation research could provide 
understanding about any mental imagery that may have taken place. Thus, advertising is only 
one communication context marketers are interested in. Since eliciting mental imagery appears 
to be effective with respect to attitudes, the scale could be used in other areas of 
communication.
Another avenue of research with respect to the scale developed would be to further analyze 
the dimensions of imagery processing. While three dimensions of imagery were proposed and 
measured, there may be more dimensions, such as self-relatedness of mental imagery. To 
further analyze the domain of the dimensions, an experiment could be devised that compares 
the three dimensions, and examination of different manipulations that affect one dimension vis-a- 
vis the others would advance understanding of this construct as well as the imagery-eliciting 
manipulations. Finally, while the scale attempts to measure communication-evoked mental 
imagery processing, which is nonverbal cognitive processing, measurement of verbal cognitive 
processing, such as arguments and counterarguments, would provide a  greater understanding 
of the domain of the construct as well as provide further evidence of discriminant validity. This
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may provide further understanding of the mediating role of imagery processing, especially in the 
cases where only partial mediation was evident.
Another research agenda pertains to imagery-eliciting strategies. The dissertation research 
examined two strategies: pictures and instructions to imagine. Concreteness of wording was 
not manipulated due to the overwhelming evidence in support of concrete over abstract words. 
None of these studies, however, have attempted to measure and understand the mediating role 
of imagery processing. Thus, while it is clear that concrete words are more effective, especially 
for memory, it is not clear why. Measurement of dimensions of imagery processing would 
provide further understanding. Finally, while a range of pictures was examined in the 
dissertation research, other picture configurations could be examined.
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The LSU department of Marketing is working with an automobile company 
on a purchase plan designed especially for college students. Your class has been 
selected to help us evaluate an advertisement which is being developed to 
announce this plan in Fall 1991.
This plan is especially designed for college students in their Senior year. The 
manufacturer will mail q, brochure to the student containing information on the 
automobile and the special purchase plan. To qualify, all students have to do is 
call a toll free number in the brochure, and they will be sent an application form to 
send back with copies of their latest transcript and college ID. Once approved, all 
that is required for purchase is a minimal down payment and a special 48-month 
financing arrangement. The first payment will not be due until 3 months after 
graduation, and the deferment is good as long as the student is enrolled full-time.
Please read the advertisement contained on the following page. This is one 
of the ads being pre-tested to be used in the brochure, it is important that you 
respond to the questions after the advertisement as accurately and as completely 
as possible. We are interested in your overall evaluation of the ad and the car, not 
the specifics of the advertising copy. Therefore, please read the ad as naturally as 
you would an ad found in a magazine or a brochure you would receive in the mail.
JU ST  PICTURE YOURSELF
BEHIND THE WHEEL OF THE 1 9 9 2  CONCEPT 
A  CAR THAT FITS YOUR IMAGE
(Illustration)
You could be driving to work or 
meeting clients looking mature, 
professional, and confident. Qualities 
that you possess and Concept helps to 
express.
But there are times when we all 
leave our business suits in our closets 
and act carefree. The 1992 Concept 
would be a perfect machine in those 
situations too - because the Concept is 
just as much fun to drive as it is to be 
seen in.
Position yourself in the Concept's 
contoured sport bucket seat and just
fire the engine up. The 128 
horsepower engine quivers. On the 
road the sporty,'aerodynamic 
design cuts through the wind like 
no other car in its class.
And then, with its performance- 
engineered suspension, you could 
be gliding across the rolling plains 
or attacking curves and climbing up 
hills across the country in your 
1992 Concept. Whistling along 
alone or sharing the bright sunshine 
with that special friend.
TAKE A FEW MOMENTS, CLOSE YOUR EYES, AND... 
IMAGINE YOURSELF IN THESE SITUATIONS IN YOUR 1 9 9 2  CONCEPT
ISN 'T  IT  EXCITING?
Call us at 1-800-CONCEPT 
Available In 4-door sedans or 2-door coups 28 city/32 highway estimated mpg
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Please respond to the following questions and statements without looking back to the advertisement. There are 
no ’right* or ’wrong’ answers, so please just answer as honestly and accurately as you can.
1. What type of car do you think the ad described? (please circle one)
a. 2-door coupe
b. sports car
c. 4-door mid-size sedan




it. 4-wheel drive vehicle
i. van
j- other (Diease soecifv: )
k. no idea
Do you have access to a car to drive? ____ yes ____ no
If yes, who owns it? ____ you
 your parents
 someone else (specify:___________________ )





e. 5 or more years
4. Realistically, what car would you purchase next?




The ad instructed me to picture myself
behind the wheel of the car. 1 2 3 4
Agraa
5
6 . Cars are for transportation only. 1 2 3 4 5
7. Cars can be used to express one's image to others. 1 2 3 4 5
8 . The ad told me to close my eyes for a few moments. 1 2 3 4 5
9. 1 pictured myself driving this car. 1 2 3 4 5
10. Cars can be fun. 1 2 3 4 5
11. 1 don't care what my car looks like. 1 2 3 4 5
12. The ideal car is the least expensive one. 1 2 3 4 5
13. The ad told me to picture others driving this car. 1 2 3 4 5







b. reacts 1 2  3
c. engine 1 2 3
d. Imagine 1 2 3
e. sunshine 1 2 3
f. air 1 2 3
g. whistling 1 2 3
h. riding 1 2 3
i. fun 1 2 3








b. Beretta 1 2 3 4 5
c. Bonneville 1 2 3 4 5
d. Capri 1 2 3 4 5
e. Concept 1 2 3 4 5
f. Corrado 1 2 3 4 5
g. Eclipse 1 2 3 4 5
h. Finch 1 2 3 4 5
i. Integra 1 2 3 4 5
j. Jato 1 2 3 4  5
k. Mustang 1 2 3 4 5
I. Radiant 1 2 3 4  5
m. Scoupe 1 2 3 4  5
n. Stylus 1 2 3 4 5
o. Talon 1 2 3 4 5
p. Taurus 1 2 3 4 5
How believable do you think the advertisement is? (circle number corresponding to your response) 
Not
baliavabfe Vary
a t all beliavebla
1 2 3 4  5
Please describe a picture that would be appropriate for the wording of the advertisement you just read.
Please list the features that you feel the car described in the ad possessed. Some examples include a 
turbocharged engine, fuel efficiency, safety features, etc.
The picture should include (please circle one):
a. a man
b. a woman
c. both a man and a woman
d. a family
e. a group of friends
f. no people
2 5 7
20. The last set of items concern your involvement or interest In the product class of automobiles. 













































ADVERTISEMENTS USED IN FINAL EXPERIMENT
2 5 8
THE 1993 CONCEPT
Imagine the Concept In your mind.
A car that fits your image. One that's fun to 
drive and to  be seen in.
im agine it...
The Concept has contoured sport bucket seats. 
Hear it...
The engine fires up and the 128 horsepower 
engine quivers.
Picture it...
The sporty, aerodynamic design cuts through 
the wind like no other car in its class.
Feet R...
The performance-engineered suspension glides 
across the rolling planes or attacks curves and 
climbs hills.
Available in 2-door coup* and a -door aad an.
24 dty/30 highway aanmaiad mpg.
C al 1-aoo-CONCEFTIor a  brochure and locabon ol your n*are*t dealer.
2 6 0
THE 1993 CONCEPT
Imagine the Concept In your mind...
A car that fits your image. One that's fun to 
drive and to be  seen in.
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A car that fits your image. One that's fun to 
drive and to  be seen In.
Im agine it...
The Concept has contoured sport bucket seats. 
H ear It...
The engine fires up and the 128 horsepower 
engine quivers.
Picture It...
The sporty, aerodynamic design cuts through 
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(The finished ad will have a picture here.)
THE 1993 CONCEPT
Imagine the Concept in your mind...
A car that fits your image. One that's fun to 
drive and to be seen in.
Imagine ft...
The Concept has contoured sport bucket seats. 
Hear ft...
The engine fires up and the 128 horsepower 
engine quivers.
Picture it...
The sporty, aerodynamic design cuts through 
the wind like no other car in its class.
Feel it...
The performance-engineered suspension glides 
across the rolling planes or attacks curves and 
climbs hills.
Available In 2-door coupe and 4-door sedan.
24 city/30 highway estim ated  m pg.
Call 1-800-CONCEPT (or a  brochure and  location of your nearest dealer.
THE 1993 CONCEPT
A car that fits your image. One that's fun to  The sporty, aerodynamic design cuts through
drive and to  be seen in. the wind like no other car in its class.
The Concept has contoured sport bucket seats.
The performance-engineered suspension glides 
across the roiling planes or attacks curves and 
The engine fires up and the 126 horsepower climbs hills,
engine quivers.
Available In 2-door coupe and 4 -door eed in .
24 eity/30 highway esomaled mpg.
Ca4  i-600-CONCEPTIor a  brochure and loeabon o l your naaraat dealer.
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THE 1993
A car that fits your image. One that's fun to 
drive and to be seen in.
The Concept has contoured sport bucket seats.
The engine fires up and the 126 horsepower 
engine quivers.
CONCEPT
The sporty, aerodynamic design cuts through 
the wind like no other car in its class.
The performance-engineered suspension glides 
across the rolling planes or attacks curves and 
climbs hills.
Available in 2-door coups and 4-door sedan.
24 city/30 highway estim ated mpg.
Call 1-80O-CONCEPT for a  brochure and location ot your nearest dealer.
APPENDIX C
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR EXPERIMENTAL SUBJECTS IN A PICTURE CONDITION
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Please write down everything and anything you can remember about the 
advertisement you just saw. Include any information that you can remember about the 
car advertised and the advertisement itself. There are no right or wrong answers, so 
anything you write will be of interest to the researcher. If you can’t remember 
anything, please write "can’t remember anything."
What was the name of the car advertised?
269
The following items concern any imagery (I.e., visualizations or pictures you saw in 
your head, sounds you may have heard in your head, anything you imagined, etc...) 
you may have experienced while viewing the advertisement. Respond to these items 
by circling the number that best represents how strongly you agree or disagree with 
the statement All of the items concern what was going .through your head while 
Mewing the advertisement.
Example: *The imagery which occurred was pale.'
If you formed images from the ad, but they weren’t very dear in your mind, you would 
drde 7 (strongly agree), if things were very dear and lifelike, you would drcie 1 
(strongly disagree). Cirde one of the responses in between 1 and 7 if you agree or 
disagree, but not very strongly.
I  I  I
Is
1. The Imagery which occurred was clear. 1 2 3 5 6 7
z My imagery was very distinct 1 2 3 5 6 7
3. 1 fantasized about the product In the ad. 1 2 3 5 6 7
4. The Imagery 1 experienced was detailed. 1 2 3 5 6 7
S. The imagery 1 experienced was crisp. 1 2 3 5 6 7
6. 1 formed very specific imagery. 1 2 3 5 6 7
7. The Imagery which occurred was weak. 1 2 3 5 6 7
8. 1 would describe the imagery 1 
experienced as hazy. 1 2 3 5 6 7
9. 1 Imagined what It would be like to 
use the product advertised. 1 2 3 5 6 7
10. Nothing came to my mind. 1 2 3 5 6 7
11. 1 experienced very definite imagery. 1 2 3 5 6 7
1Z My imagery was explicit 1 2 ' 3 5 6 7
13. The imagery which occurred was fuzzy. 1 2 3 5 6 7
14. The Imagery which occurred was vague. i 2 3 4 5 6 7
IS. 1 really only experienced one Image. 1 2 3 ' 4 5 6 7
1& The imagery which occurred was vMd. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
17. 1 imagined other people using the product i 2 3 4 5 6 7
IS. The imagery which occurred was sharp. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
19. 1 imagined a  number of things. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
20. 1 Imagined the feel of the product 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
21. The imagery which occurred was well-defined. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
22. Things were blurry In my mind. 1 2 3 4 5 0 7
23. Many Images cam e to  my mind. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
The next set of questions concerns your reaction to the advertisement. Please rate 
your reaction to just the advertisement (not the automobile) using the rating scales 
below.
Example:
The advertisement was... (circle a number corresponding to your opinion)
rwiK) Vmy Him  la—tM Wry faflramtf]
Neat 1 2  3 4 5 6 7 Messy
If you thought the advertisement was neat, but not extremely so, you might 
circle 2 to Indicate your opinion. If you thought the advertisement was 
extremely messy, you would circle 7 to Indicate that opinion.
The advertisement was... (circle a number corresponding to your opinion for each 
set of items)
Wry Imwm MM ln»r.h* Wry ft— W
1. Boring 1 2  3 4 5 6 7 Interesting
2. Good 1 2  3 4 5 6 7 Bad
3. Unpleasant 1 2  3 4 5 6 7 Pleasant
4. Nice 1 2  3 4 5 6 7 Awful
5. Favorable 1 2  3 4 5 6 7  Unfavorable
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The next se t of questions concerns your reactions to the automobile based  only on 
the information contained in the advertisement. These items refer to your opinion 
about the car, not th e  advertisem ent
I th ink th e  au to m o b ile  Is... (circle a  number corresponding to your opinion for each
ft— w-y Naunri 1 Vary n—
1. Attractive 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unattractive
2. Desirable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Undesirable
3. Not for m e 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 For m e
4. Uninteresting 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Interesting
5. Appropriate 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Inappropriate
6. Unreasonable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Reasonable
7. Unappealing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 ' Appealing
8. A bad car 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 A good car
The next set of questions concerns how likely you are to do something based  on the 
advertisement you just saw.
If you received  a b ro ch u re  containing th e  advertisem en t you ju s t saw , how  likely 




Urtujr NuM ULtfy v«nr
1. ...think abou t this offer? 1 2 3 4 5 6
2. ...look into this plan? 1 2 3 4  5 6
3. ...call the 800 num ber? 1 2 3 4 5 6
4. ...apply for this plan? 1 2 3 4 5 ' 6
5. ...consider buying this car? 1 2 3 4 5 6
6. ...go to a  dealer? 1 2 3 4 5 6




The following se t of questions concerns what attributes you believe the  ca r advertised possessed . 
For each attribute, circle th e  response representing how strongly you ag ree  o r disagree tha t the car 
p o sse ssed  that attribute. W e are interested in w hat attributes you b e liev e  th e  car advertised 
possessed , so  there a re  no right or wrong answ ers.
T h e  c a r  ad v ertised ...
I
f
11 i I 11 t
1. ...h as a  sleek design. 2 3 4 5 6
2. ...has a  128 horsepow er engine. 2 3 4 5 6
3. ...has bucket sea ts . 2 3 4 5 6
4. ...is sporty. 2 3 4 5 6
5. ...has poor suspension . 2 3 4 5 6
6. ...gets 35 city/45 highway 
estimate mpg. 2 3 4 5 6
7. ...is available in a  4-door sedan. 2 3 4 5 6
8. ...has a  nice interior. 2 3 4 5 6
9. ...is aerodynamic. 2 3 4 5 6
10. ...has a  weak engine. 2 3 4 5 6
11. ...is fuel efficient. 2 3 4 5 6




The aim of this exercise Is to  determine th e  style or m anner you use when carrying ou t different mental tasks. Your 
n sp o n s e s  to  the  statem ents should reflect the m anner In which you typiceOr engage in each  of the tasks mentioned. There 
are  no right o r wrong answ ers, w e only ask  that you provide honest and accurate answers. P lease respond to each 
atatem ent by circling one  of the  five possible responses.
Example: 1  seldom  read books.* If th is w as your typical behavior, even though you might read one book a  year, you 
w o d d  circle 5 (Strongly Agree). f  /
1. I enjoy w ork tha t requires th e  use  of words.
2. I like to  picture future even ts o r situations in my mind.
3. I can  never seem  to  find the  right w ord when I need 1L
4. I do  a  lot of reading.
5. There a re  som e special tim es In my life that I like to  relive 
by mentally *plcturing* Just how  everything looked.
a  I think I often u se  w ords In th e  wrong way.
7. Before I perform an  activity, I often d o s e  
m y eyes and  picture doing It.
6. I enjoy learning new  words.
B. I think of writing a s  one of my hobbles.
10. When listening to  som eone describing their experiences,
I try to  mentally picture w hat w as happening.
11. When I think of som eone I know, I often ‘picture*
In my mind what they look Ilka.
1 2 .1 find It helps to  think In term s of mental 
pictures w hen doing m any things.
13. I often think of synonym s for words.
14. When I have forgotten som ething I frequently try to  form 
a  mental “picture* to  rem em ber I t
1 5 .1 have difficulty using new  words.
1 6 .1 enjoy using mental pictures to  help m e solve problems.
1 7 .1 prefer activities that don 't require a  lot of reading.
IB. I spend very little tim e attempting to  increase my vocabula ry.
1 8 .1 seldom  picture past events In my mind.
20. My thinking often c onsists  of mental ‘pictures' o r Images.
























































In this ecard se , consider the numbered sdmiius (■ word or a  picture). Place an *5C In the apace doaer to the anchor (a 
word or a picture) more strongly associated with that sttmdus.
(1 ) W O R K  _____  f t  (6)
F A C T O R Y  W O M AN
t
(7) M O N E Y
COINS
(3 ) H O M E
T R A C T O RHOUSE
(9) MOTHER
BABY
(5 ) NAVY (10)
S H I P  J L i .  TRA IN____;: :  : 
2 7 5
Please indicate your response to the following questions by circling your response or 
by placing an "X" in the appropriate blank.




1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2. How familiar are you with the automobile model advertised?
Not
familiar Extremely
a t all familiar
1 2 3 4 5 6 7




4. When you first looked at the picture in the ad, how easy w as it to  recognize it
a s  a  picture of a  car?
Extremely Not so  Extremely
difficult Easy Easy easy
1 2 3  4 5 6 7
5. Which of the following best describes the car in the ad?
 probably moving  probably not moving
6. Did the car in the picture look like a  particular model of automobile you’ve seen  
before?
 yes (which model?__________________ )  no not sure
Please respond  to  th e  following for classification purposes by placing an *X“ In the 
appropriate blank or by filling In the correct response.
1. You are:______ ____ Male
 Female
2. How old a re  you?  years old




 G raduate student
4. You are: ____ Right-handed
 Left-handed
5. Do you have a  ca r to  use?   Yes  No
6. If you answ ered  “yes" to  number 5, who ow ns the car?
 You
 Your parents
 S om eone  else (please specify:_____________________________)
Finally, p lease write dow n w hat you think is the  p u rpose  of this study.
APPENDIX D
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR EXPERIMENTAL SUBJECTS IN A NO PICTURE CONDITION
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2 7 8
Please write down everything and anything you can remember about the 
advertisement you just saw. Include any information that you can remember about the 
car advertised and the advertisement Itself. There are no right or wrong answers, so 
anything you write will be of interest to the researcher. If you can’t remember 
anything, please write 'can't remember anything.”
What was the name of the car advertised?
2 7 9
The following items concern any imagery (i.e., visualizations or pictures you saw in 
your head, sounds you may have heard in your head, anything you imagined, etc...) 
you may have experienced while viewing the advertisement. Respond to these items 
by circling the number that best represents how strongly you agree or disagree with 
the statement All of the Items concern what was going through your head while 
'Viewing the advertisement.
Example: "The imagery which occurred was pale.”
If you formed images from the ad, but they weren't very dear in your mind, you would 
circle 7 (strongly agree). If things were very dear and lifelike, you would circle 1 
(strongly disagree). Cirde one of the responses in between 1 and 7 if you agree or 
disagree, but not very strongly.
1. The imagery which occurred was dear. 1 2 3 5 6 7
2. My imagery was very distinct 1 2 3 5 6 7
3. I fantasized about the product In the ad. 1 2 3 5 6 7
4. The Imagery I experienced was detailed. 1 2 3 S 6 7
5. The Imagery 1 experienced was crisp. 1 2 3 5 6 7
6. 1 formed very specific Imagery. 1 2 3 5 6 7
7. The Imagery which occurred was weak. 1 2 3 5 6 7
8. 1 would describe the Imagery 1 
experienced as hazy. 1 2 3 5 6 7
9. 1 Imagined what It would be like to 
use the product advertised. 1 2 3 5 6 7
10. Nothing came to my mind. 1 2 3 5 6 7
11. 1 experienced very definite imagery. 1 2 3 5 6 7
12. My Imagery was explicit 1 2 3 5 6 7
13. The Imagery which occurred was fuzzy. 1 2 3 5 6 7
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14. The Imagery which occurred w as vague. 2 3 5 6 7
IS. 1 realty onty experienced one  Image. 2 3 ‘ 5 6 7
16. The imagery which occurred w as vMd. 2 3 5 6 7
17. 1 imagined other people using th e  p ro d u c t 2 3 S 6 7
18. The Imagery which occurred w as sharp* 2 3 5 6 7
1B. 1 imagined a  num ber of things. 2 3 5 6 7
20. 1 imagined the feei of the p roduc t 2 3 5 6 7
21. The Imagery which occurred w as well-defined. 2 3 5 6 7
22. Things w ere blurry In my mind. 2 3 S 6 7
23. Many Images cam e to  my mind. 2 3 S 6 7
The next set of questions concerns your reaction to the advertisement. Please rate 
your reaction to just the advertisement (not the automobile) using the rating scales 
below.
Example:
The advertisement was... (circle a num ber corresponding to  your opinion)
Neat 6 Messy
If you thought the advertisement was neat, but not extremely so , you might 
circle 2 to Indicate your opinion. If you thought the advertisement was 
extremely m essy, you would circle 7 to Indicate that opinion.





























The next set of questions concerns your reactions to the automobile based only on 
the information contained in the advertisement. These items refer to your opinion 
about the car, not the advertisement
I think the automobile Is... (circle a number corresponding to your opinion for each 
set of items) ■in hi «*nr HUM Mr; A*«Miy
1. Attractive 1 2 3 4 5 6  7 Unattractive
2. Desirable 1 2 3 4 5 6  7 Undesirable
3. Not for me 1 2 3 4 5 6  7 For me
4. Uninteresting 1 2 3 4 5 6  7 Interesting
5. Appropriate 1 2 3 4 5 6  7 Inappropriate
6. Unreasonable 1 2 3 4 5 6  7 Reasonable
7. Unappealing 1 2 3 4 5 6  7 Appealing
8. A bad car 1 2 3 4 5 6  7 A good car
The next set of questions concerns how likely you are to do something based on the 
advertisement you just saw.
If you received a brochure containing the advertisement you Just saw, how likely 
ls.lt that you would...
MryUnUy IMMfy
SoMiMUr*J*y taM  *u2*h-
V»y
1. ...think about this offer? 1 2 3 4  5 6 7
2. ...look into this plan? 1 2 3 4  5 6 7
3. ...call the BOO number? 1 2 3 4  5 6 7
4. ...apply for this plan? 1 2 3 4  5  ' 6 7
5. ...consider buying this car? 1 2 3 4  5 6 7
6. ...go to a dealer? 1 2 3 4  5 6 7
7. ...buy this automobile? 1 2 3 4  5 6 7
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The following set of questions concerns what attributes you believe the car advertised possessed. 
For each attribute, circle the response representing how strongly you agree or disagree that the car 
possessed that attribute. We are interested in what attributes you believe the car advertised 
possessed, so there are no right or wrong answers.
I
The car advertised...
1. ...has a sleek design.
2. -.has a 128 horsepower engine.
3. ...has bucket seats.
4. ...is sporty.
5. —has poor suspension.
6. —gets 35 city/45 highway
estimate mpg.
7. —is available in a 4-door sedan.
8. ...has a nice interior.
9. —is aerodynamic.
10. ...has a weak engine.

































































T he aim  of this exercise Is to  determ ine th e  stylo o r m anner you  u se  w hen carrying ou t different mental tasks. Your 
resp o n ses to  th e  sta tem ents should reflect th e  m anner In which you typfeaOy engage In each  of th e  task s m entioned. There 
a re  no right o r w rong answ ers, w e  only a sk  that you provide honest an d  accura te  answ ers. P lease respond to  each  
statem ent try circling one  of th e  five possib le  responses.
Example: *1 seldom  read  books.” If this w as your typical behavior, even though  you might read  o n e  book a  year, you 
would circle 5 (Strongly Agree). /  /  /
1. I en joy w ork th a t requires th e  u se  of w ords.
2. I Uke to picture future events or situations In m y mind.
а . I c a n  never seem  to  find th e  right w ord w hen I need  tL
4. I d o  a  lot of reading.
5. There a re  so m e  special tim es in m y life th a t I like to  relive 
by mentally "picturing’ Just how everything looked.
б. I think I often u se  w ords In th e  w rong way.
7. Before I perform an  activity. I often d o s e  
m y eyes an d  picture doing h.
& I enjoy learning new  w ords.
8. I think of writing a s  o n e  of m y hobbles.
10. W hen listening to  som eone describ ing their experiences,
I try  to  mentally picture w hat w as happening.
11. W hen I think of som eone I know, I often "picture"
In m y mind w hat they  look like.
12. I find It he lps to  think In term s of m ental 
p ictures w hen doing m any things.
13. I often think of synonym s for w ords,
14. W hen I have forgotten som ething I frequently try to  form 
a m ental "picture" to  rem em ber tt.
1 6 .1 have dHHcdty using new  w ords.
1 6 .1 enjoy using m ental pictures to  help  m e solve problems.
1 7 .1 prefer activities tha t d o n 't require a  kit o f reading.
18. I sp en d  very Uttle tim e attem pting to  increase my vocabulary.
1 0 .1 se ldom  picture p as t even ts in m y mind.
20. My thinking oftsn  consists  of m ental "pictures* o r im ages.
























































In this exercise, consider the numbered sdmiius (s word or ■ picture). Piece an *X* In the space closer to the anchor (a 
word or a picture) more strongly associated wfch that stimulus.
(1) WORK |  (6)









SHIP :  : :
. (10)^ C
TRAIN : : :
Please indicate your response to the following questions by circling your response 
by placing an "X" in the appropriate blank.




1 2 3 4 5 6 7




1 2 3 4 5 6 7




4. Please describe a picture that you think would be appropriate for this 
advertisement.
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Please respond to the following for classification purposes by placing an "X" In the 
appropriate blank o r  by filling In the correct response.
1. You are: ____ Male
 Female
2. How old are you?  years old





4. You are:  Right-handed
 Left-handed
5. Do you have a  car to use?  Yes  No
6. If you answered y e s ’ to number 5, who owns the car?
 You
 Your parents
 Som eone else (please specify:___________________________ )
Finally, please write down what you think is the purpose of this study.
APPENDIX E
INFORMATION SHEET GIVEN TO JUDGES IN SCALE DEVELOPMENT STAGE
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PROPOSED DIMENSIONS OF IMAGERY PROCESSING
QUALITY
Representing the clarity and vividness of the mental Image an Individual forms, 
regardless of the number of images or the content or elaboration of that imagery.
Describes how 'good* the Imagery was in terms of details.
Example Item: The Image was dear.'
QUANTITY
Representing the number of different Images generated.
Describes how many different scenarios/situations were imagined.
Example Item: *1 Imagined a lot.*
ELABORATION
Representing the activation of stored Information In the production of Images beyond 
what is provided by the stimulus.
Describes how 'deep* images were (i.e., did they simply image what was provided In the 
ad, or did they bring in other experiences?) Also includes forming mental images from 
the wording In the ad.
Also indudes the use of one's Imagination or fantasy in the formation of images. 
Example item: *1 remembered several things from my life that related to the ad.'
APPENDIX F
QUESTIONNAIRE GIVEN TO JUDGES RATING 
THE REPRESENTATIVENESS OF AN ITEM 
ON A PROPOSED DIMENSION
289
290
PROPOSED DIMENSIONS OF IMAGERY PROCESSING
QUALITY
Representing the clarity and vividness of the mental image an Individual forms, 
regardless of the number of images or the content or elaboration of that 
Imagery.
Describes how 'good" the imagery was in terms of details.
Example item: "The image was clear."
QUANTITY
Representing the number of different images generated.
Describes how many different scenarios/situations were imagined. 
Example hem: "I imagined a lot."
ELABORATION
Representing the activation of stored information In the production of images 
beyond what is provided by the stimulus.
Describes how "deep" images were (i.e., did they simply image what was 
provided in the ad, or did they bring in other experiences?) Also Includes 
forming mental Images from the wording in the ad.
Also includes the use of one’s imagination or fantasy in the formation of 
images.
Example hem: "I remembered several things from my life that related to the
ad."
Based on the descriptions of the proposed dimensions, the following hems ware judged to be 
representative of a specific dimension. For each hem, judge whether that hem is dearly 
representative, somewhat representative, or not representative of the dimension h is proposed to 
represent by pladng an "X* In the appropriate column. Do not feel you have to vary your 
responses, it's fine if you respond that most of them are deariy or somewhat representative of the 




D I M  MPKSENTATIVE IBMESENTATIVE
1. I experienced very dim Imagery.__________________ _____
2. I formed realistic Imagery._______________________ _____
3. The imagery I experienced was crisp. _____ _____
4. My imagery was very distinct____________________ _____
5. Very dull images came to my mind. _____ _____
6. I would describe the imagery I
experienced as hazy. _____ _____
7. I experienced very definite Imagery. _____ _____
8. I formed very specific Imagery. _____ _____
9. My imagery was explicit _____ _____
10.1 formed graphic imagery. _____ _____
11. My imagery was fancy. ____  _____
12. The imagery which occurred was brilliant ____  _____
13. My imagery was ambiguous. ____  _____
14. My imagery was poor. _____ _____
15. Things were blurry in my mind._____________ _____ _____
16. My imagery was accurate._________________ _____ _____
17. The imagery which occurred was dear. _____ _____
18. The imagery which occurred was fuzzy._______ _____ _____
19. The imagery which occurred was detailed. _____ _____
20. The imagery which occurred was weak. _____ _____






IT B U  MPREKNTATTVE REPRESENTATIVE
22. The Imagery which occurred was Intense. _____  _____
23. The imagery which occurred was lifelike.______ _____ _____
24. The imagery which occurred was sharp. _____ _____
25. The imagery which occurred was well-defined. _____ _____
26. The imagery which occurred was vague. _____ _____
27. The imagery which occurred was pale. _____  _____
28 .1 saw the picture In the ad in my mind. _____ _____
29. The picture in the ad was






ITEM* SBftEMNTATTVE WP H E M KTATTVE REPRESENTATIVE
1. I experienced lots of Images.________________ _____  _____  _____
2. I Imagined several different scenarios. _____  _____  _____
3. I imagined quite a few things. _____  _____  _____
4. I thought of several things. _____  _____  _____
5. Nothing came to my mind. _____  _____  _____
6. I can count the number of images i
experienced on one hand.     *__________
7. I can count the number of images I
experienced on two hands. _____  _____  _____
8. I didn't imagine much. _____  _____  _____
9. I Imagined so many things that
It’s hard to count them. _____  _____  _____
10.1 reaify only experienced one image.__________ _____  _____  _____
11.1 was amazed at how many images
flashed into my head. _____  _____ _____
12. Just one scene came to my mind.____________ _____  _____  _____
13.1 probably imagined more from
this ad than most people. _____  _____  _____
14.1 imagined a considerable amount In my head. _____  _____  _____
15. The quantity of my imagery was large.________ _____  _____  _____
16.1 imagined a number of things.____________________  _____  _____
17. Marry images came to my mind.____________ _____  _____  _____
18.1 saw several distinguishable scenes in my mind. ____________  _____




(TIM S IBHECENTATIVE fCPfKSENTATIVE
1. The ad reminded me of other times In my life. _____ _____
2. The ad brought back memories of events
that happened to me in the past__________________  _____
3. I Imagined more than what was In the ad. _____  _____
4. I imagined what it would be like to use
the product advertised. _____  _____
5. I remembered things from my life
that related to the ad. _____  _____
6. Some of the things I imagined
were not in the ad. _____  _____
7. In my mind, I saw more than just
the picture given. _____  _____
B. I thought of how it would feel
to use the product _____  _____
9. I imagined the smell of the product _____  _____
10. I projected an image in my head
from other things that I know. _____  _____
11. Things I imagined lacked factual reality._____________  _____
12. Everything I imagined was based on
something I already know.__________________ _____  _____
13.1 fantasized about the product in the ad. _____  _____
14.1 imagined other people using the product _____  _____
15. Things I imagined were based
on fantasy, not facts.____________________________  _____
16.1 let my imagination run wild.________________ _____  _____




















I imagined the texture of the product_______ _____  _____
t imagined what the product tasted like. _____  _____
I sensed a feeling of motion.______________ _____  _____
I ’heard* sounds In my head. _____  _____
Experiences from my life flashed
Into my head. _____  _____
I thought of others I've seen using a
product similar to the one advertised. ______ ______
I could really see myself using a product
similar to the one In the ad. _____  _____
My Imagery included members of my family. _____  _____
My imagery included one or
more of my friends. _____  _____
I Imagined bizarre scenes. _____  _____
I imagined extreme situations. _____  _____




ADVERTISEMENTS USED IN SCALE DEVELOPMENT
2 9 6
H a v en 't  W e M e t  So m e w h e r e  Before?
It may have been thirty yean ago, or 
just yesterday. A little two-seater caught your eye, and 
you've never been quite the same. Memories like this 
created the Mazda Miata. A product of both dreams 
and advanced technology, its the perfect reason to 
pursue your love of the classic sports car.
Slip into the cockpit and you're greeted by snug, 
supportive seats and traditional round analog gauges. 
Twist the key and the 1.6-liter DOHC engine answers 
with a throaty growl—a note tuned to perfection by 
testing more than 100 exhaust pitches.
As you snap through the gears with the short- 
throw shifter, the front-engine/rear-drive 
layout and four-wheel double-wish- 
bone suspension combine to deliver 
razor-sharp handling. There’s little 
doubt that the Miata b  a purists dream.
Yet this is one dream car that's also 
thoroughly down to earth. It's been named 
the most trouble-free sports car in America*
mazoa
It  Ju s t  Feels R ig h t .*
Even the most jaded automotive critics have fallen 
head over heels. "Automobile of the Year" proclaimed 
Automobile Magazine. While Rood & Track judged the 
Miata to be one of the five best cars in the world. Kind 
of makes it hard to resist, doesn't it?
So stop torturing yourself. Look up your Mazda 
Dealer, and take the Miata fora spin. You might just fall in 
love with a roadster. For the fust time, or all over again.
36-MONTH/5QOOO-MILE WARRANTY 
No-deductible," bumper- co-bumper" protection. See your 
dealer for limited warranty details. For information on
any new Mazda car or 
truck, call toll-free, 
I P  1-800-345-3799.
Mazda Mtata
day that S C r e e c h d SIt had been the kind o f mttmm U «  
to a  halt for a  slow moving night so I p  a d  J  e d  10
the stove and poured a big cup, ^ ' - iu  minty sweetness witA a
m u  as I curled my feet under the covers and slowly sipped the hot, honeyed
-  -*•
my face a n  d  ^  r  a  fj p  e  ^  a T o «  , J i k e  a sweet dream that 
* d m e
p u l l e d  m  ^  into the p  j f | o W y  Id  I f I O  W y  softness o f the 
sleepy time night which was so very quiet save the soft lootAinj m z z z z  Z Z Z*1 
« z z Z Z  Z Z Z Z z m r U P  m p  f l i p  of  my  ALARM C L O C K ?  I
2 9 9
O N L Y  FRO M  THE M IN D  OF M IN O LTA  ' ' v  v  ^  '\"*V ‘ V  /
APPENDIX H
Q U E S T IO N N A IR E  U S E D  IN F IR S T  R O U N D  O F  DATA C O L L E C T IO N
IN S C A L E  D E V E L O P M E N T
3 0 0
301
The following Kama concern any imagery you may hava experienced wtde viewing the ad. Respond to these Kerns by 
circling the number that bee represents how strongly you agree or disagree wfth the statement. A t o f tho ftom t 
ooncom softer sras going through your hood whto ofowing tho od.
Example: The Imagery which occurred was pale*
If you formed Images from the ad, but they weren't vary dear In your mind, you would circle 7 (strongly agree). If things 
were very dear and lifelike, you wotid circle 1 (Strongly disagree). Circle one of the responses In between 1 and 7 If 
you agree or disagree, but not very strongly.
/  / / / / 1 /
1. 1 formed realistic Imagery. 1 2 3 8 6 7
2. 1 experienced lots of Images. 1 2 3 6 6 7
3. The Imagery which occurred was dear. 1 2 3 5 6 7
4. My Imagery was very distinct 1 2 3 5 6 7
5. The ad reminded me of other times In my life. 1 2 3 S 6 7
6, 1 fantasized about the product In the ad. 1 2 3 5 6 7
7. The Imagery which occurred was detafled. 1 2 3 5 6 7
8. My Imagery was ambiguous. 1 2 3 5 6 7
8. 1 didn't Imagine much. 1 2 3 5 6 7
10. In my mind, I saw more than |ust the picture given. 1 2 3 5 6 7
11. I thought of how K would feel to use the product 1 2 3 5 6 7
12. The Imagery I experienced was crisp. 1 2 3 5 6 7
13. I formed very specific Imagery. 1 2 3 5 6 7
14. The Imagery which occurred was weak. 1 2 3 5 6 7
15. 1 imagined quKe a few things. 1 2 3 5 6 7
16. I wodd describe the imagery
1 experienced as hazy. 1 2 3 5 6 7
17. 1 imagined what K would be like to
use the product advertised. 1 2 3 5 6 7
IB. 1 thought of several things. 1 2 3 5 6 7
IB. 1 formed graphic Imagery. 1 2 3 5 6 7
20. Nothing came to my mind. 1 2 3 5 6 7
21. The ad brought back memories of events
that happened to me In the past 1 2 3 5 . 6 7
22. I experienced very definite imagery.
23. My Imagery was explicit.
24. The Imagery which occurred was fuzzy.
25. I Imagined so many things that It's 
hard to ccuntthem.
26. I remembered things from my 
He that related to the ad.
27. The imagery which occurred was vague.
28. I really only experienced one Image.
29. I Imagined the smell of the product
30. The Imagery which occurred was vMd.
31. Just one scene came to my mind.
32. I Imagined other people using the product
33. I pro|ected an Image in my head from 
other things that I know.
34. The Imagery which occurred was sharp.
35. I Imagined a number of things.
36. I imagined the feel of the product
37. My Imagery included one or mors of my friends.
38. The imagery which occurred was well-defined.
39. I sensed a feeling of motion.
40. The imagery which occurred was lifelike.
41.1 cotid really see myself using a product 
almlar to the one In the ad.
42. Things were blurry in my mind.
43. Many images came to my mind.
44. Experiences from my life flashed Into my head.
45. I knagined what the product tasted like.
46. I saw several distinguishable scenes in my mind.
47. I “hearer sounds in my head.
3 0 2
/ *  / /  /  / /
1 2 3 5 6  7
1 2 3 6 6  7
1 2 3 5 6  7
1 2 3 5 6  7
1 2 3 5 6  7
1 2 3 5 6  7
1 2 3 5 6  7
1 2 3 5 6  7
1 2 3 5 6  7
1 2 3 5 6  7
1 2 3 5 6  7
1 2 3 5 6  7
1 2 3 5 6  7
1 2 3 5 6  7
1 2 3 5 6  7
1 2 3 5 6  7
1 2 3 5 6  7
1 2 3 5 6  7
1 2 3 5 6 7
1 2 3 5 6  7
1 2 3 5 6  7
1 2 3 5 6  7
1 2 3 5 6  7
1 2 3 S 6  7
1 2 3 5 6  7
1 2 3 5 6  7
APPENDIX I
Q U ES T IO N N A IR E  U S E D  IN S E C O N D  R O U N D  O F  DATA C O L LEC TIO N
IN SC A LE D EV ELO PM EN T
3 0 3
Please describe any (if any) and all images, such as pictures, sounds, tastes, 
smells, scen es, e tc ..., that cam e to your mind whUe you were viewing the 
advertisement. Comment on the quality of that imagery. Be as specific as 
possible. There are no right or wrong responses, so  anything you write is of 
interest to the researcher.
3 0 5
T he follow ing Item s c o n ce rn  a n y  Im agery  yo u  m ay  have experienced w hile view ing th e  ad . R espond  to  th e se  
h em s by  circling th e  n u m b er th a t  b e s t  re p re se n ts  h o w  strong ly  you ag ree  o r d isag ree  w ith  th e  s ta te m e n t. All o f 
Me Roms concern w hst wax going through your hood whBm viewing the md.
Exam ple: "T he Im agery  w h ic h  o ccu rred  w a s  pale ."
If you  fo rm ed  im ages from  th e  ad , b u t th e y  w e re n 't  very  d e a r  in your m ind, you  w ould  circle 7  (strongly  agree). If 
th in g s  w ere  very  d e a r  a n d  lifelike, you  w ould  circle 1 (S trongly  d isagree). C ird e  o n e  o f  th e  re s p o n se s  In be tw een  
1 and  7  if you  ag ree  o r  d isag ree , b u t n o t very  strongly .
/ /  //l I ,
1 . T he im agery  w h ich  o ccu rred  w a s  c lea r. 2 3 5 6  7
2 .  M y im agery  w a s  v e ry  d is tin c t. 2 3 5 6  7
3 . 1 fan tasized  a b o u t th e  p ro d u c t in th e  ad . 2 3 5 6  7
4 .  T he im agery  w hich  o ccu rred  w a s  detailed . 2 3 5 6  7
S. T he  im agery  1 ex p erien ced  w a s  crisp . 2 3 5 6  7
6 . 1 fo rm ed  v e ry  specific  Im agery . 2 3 5 6  7
7 . T he  im agery  w h ich  o ccu rred  w a s  w eak . 2 3 5 6  7
8 . 1 w ould  describe  th e  im agery  
1 experienced  a s  h a 2 y. 2 3 5 6  7
9 .  1 im agined w h a t it w ou ld  b e  like to  
u se  th e  p ro d u c t ad v e rtise d . 2 3 5 6  7
10 . N othing cam e to  m y  m ind . 2 3 5 6  7
1 1 . 1  experienced  very  defin ite  im agery . 2 3 5 6  7
1 2 . M y im agery  w a s  explicit. 2 3 5 6  7
1 3 . T he im agery  w hich  o ccu rred  w a s  fuzzy. 2 3 5 6  7
1 4 . 1 rem em bered  th in g s  from  m y 
life th a t  re la ted  to  th e  ad . 2 3 5 6  7
1 5 . T he  im agery  w hich  o ccu rred  w a s  vague . 2 3 5 6  7
1 6 . 1 really onfy ex perienced  o n e  im age. 2 3 5 6  7
1 7 . T he im agery  w h ich  o ccu rred  w a s  vivid. 2 3 5 6  7
1 8 . J u s t  o n e  sc e n e  cam e  to  m y  m ind. 2 3 5 6  7
1 9 . 1 im agined o th e r peop le  using  th e  p ro d u c t. 2 3 5 6  7
2 0 .  T he im agery  w hich  o ccu rred  w a s  sh a rp . 2 3 6 6  7
3 0 6
/ / /  L /  // // / V
2 1 . 1 im agined a  n u m b er o f th in s* . 1 2 3 4 e 6 7
2 2 . I Im agined th e  fee l o f th e  p roduc t. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2 3 . T he im agery  w h ich  o ccu rred  w a s  w ell-defined. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2 4 . T hings w e re  b lurry In m y  m ind. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2 5 . M any im ages c a m e  to  m y  m ind. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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The aim  of this exercise is to  dot ermine th e  style o r m anner you use  when carrying out different mental tasks. Your 
responses to  the  statem ents sh o d d  reflect the m anner in which you typicaHy engage In each  of the tasks mentioned. There 
are no right o r wrong answ ers, w e  only a sk  that you provide honest and  accurate answ ers. Please respond to  each 
statem ent by circling one  of th e  five possible responses.
Example: *1 seldom  read books.* If this w as your typical behavior, even though you m igh^read one book a  year, you 
would circle 5  (Strongly Agree).
1. I snjoy work tha t requires th e  use  of words.
2 . I like to  picture future events o r  situations In my mind.
3 . I can  never seem  to  find th e  right word when I need  ft.
4. I do  a  lot of reading.
5. There are  som e special tim es In my life that I like to  relive 
b y  mentally -picturing* fust how  everything looked.
(L I think I often use  w ords In the wrong way.
7. Before I perform an  activity, I often d o se  
m y eyes and  picture doing ft.
6. I snjoy learning new  words.
6. I think of writing a s  one  of my hobbles.
10. W hen listening to  som eone describing their experiences,
I try to  mentally picture w hat w as happening.
11. W hen I think of som eone I know, I often -picture* 
in m y mind what they look like.
1 2 .1 find It helps to  think In term s of mental 
pictures w hen doing m any things.
1 3 .1 often think of synonym s for words.
14. W hen I have forgotten som ething I frequently try to  form 
a mental -picture' to  rem em ber ft.
1 5 .1 have difficulty using new  words.
1 6 .1 enjoy using mental pictures to  help m e solve problem s.
1 7 .1 prefer activities that do n 't require a  kx of reading.
1 8 .1 spend very little tim e attempting to  Increase m y vocabulary.
1 8 .1 seldom  picture p as t events In m y mind.
























































In thJ* exercise, consider the numbered stimulus (sword or a picture). Place an TC* In the apace closer to the anchor (a 
word or a picture) more strongly essodeteri w#h that stimulus.
(1) WORK




_  —  : : : :  COINS
(3) HOME (B)






SHIP__ £ ( 1 0 ) 4 ^ ^TRAIN _
You are: _____  Male  Fem ale
You are: _____ Right-handed  Lett-handed
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